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1.1. Introduction  
The advances in biomedicine sparked a renewed interest in rights. The contemporary 
development of practices of law-making illustrates that in an era where new biomedical 
practices and technologies cause much fear and anxiety, it is through the appeal to rights that 
citizens seek to shield themselves against potentially dangerous new technologies. For 
example, the UNESCO set of declarations on genetics, bioethics and human rights, namely, 
the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), the International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003), and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights (2005), as well as the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) 
suggest that human rights often act as criteria for developing law regulating new technologies 
and setting standards for the type of new technologies that should be practiced.  
However, the appeal to and use of rights as benchmarks for the development of new 
biomedical practices and technologies is not unproblematic. Rights critique has been a topic 
of proliferous legal research since the emergence of legal realism in the beginning of the XX 
century. Critical legal scholars brought to light such previously unnoticed and unexplored 
characteristics of rights as indeterminacy, instability and the ability to conceal and mask 
rather than reveal and transform political inequality and injustice (Kennedy 1997; Tushnet 
1983). Duncan Kennedy, one of the founders of the critical legal studies (hereafter CLS) 
movement, famously declared that he lost faith in rights (Kennedy 1997). Despite that, over 
time, it has nevertheless been recognized that ‘there is something too valuable in the 
aspiration of rights … to abandon the rhetoric of rights’ in order to achieve some important 
social transformations (Minow 1990, 307; see also Williams 1991) and the critique of rights 
has softened, the critical approach to rights has surely undermined an overly optimistic faith 
in rights and demonstrated the need for a more complex analysis of rights discourse.  
Several consequences emerge if we take a critical perspective upon rights when they 
are used as regulatory benchmarks for regulating new technologies. First, the appeal to rights 
may contain a hidden agenda different from the one that those who appeal to the relevant 
rights claim they have. For example, as Jackson (2008) illustrated, in countries’ 
technoscientific controversies, pro-life movements often appeal to the need to protect 
women’s health, wishing to shore up an old paternalism and protect unborn life, and therefore 
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resisting the development of new practices such as egg donation and stem cell research, 
instead of genuinely caring about women’s health. Therefore, taking a critical stance is 
important to make sure that the use of rights discourse is geared exactly towards those social 
and moral ends that the relevant society or international community wishes to achieve through 
biomedical and biotechnological innovations and not to mask some political or moral stances 
by referring to a ‘neutral’ rights discourse.  
The second reason why the appeal to rights is not unproblematic relates to the 
transformation of rights themselves. Specifically, as the meaning of ‘human’ in human rights 
can no longer be taken for granted because new biomedical and genetic technologies provide 
much opportunity for intervening into and transforming what we used to regard as ‘human 
nature’, it is no longer clear who exactly the holder of (human) rights is. In science and 
technology studies (hereafter STS), the possibilities and consequences of reprogramming 
‘human nature’ do not raise eyebrows, since scholars have long accepted that what we treat as 
natural or cultural is a product of social processes and not an intrinsic quality of the world 
(Latour 1993). Yet, the appeal to ‘human nature’ often figures in political controversies where 
the notion of ‘human’ is treated as a constant and the only process that warrants concern is the 
unsettling of entitlements of ‘human nature’ by technoscience. The critical approach to rights, 
coupled with the insights from STS, can help expose how the assumingly stable nature and 
rights, that are needed to protect it, are mobilized, which (political, religious, or economic) 
ends those who mobilize them seek to achieve, and whether these are the values that the 
relevant society wishes to ensure.  
Finally, the third reason is that rights might actually act, not as a protection against 
new technologies with dangerous or unknown implications, but as incentives promoting and 
further expanding their use. For example, with respect to human embryo stem cell research 
(hESC), Rubin (2008, 22) argued that despite that many countries such as Germany opposed 
it as violating human dignity, what she called ‘therapeutic promise’, or the medical and health 
benefits of hESC, in fact ‘prevailed in ethical discourses within different national contexts as 
a strong and universally applicable moral coin’ and paved the way for a more liberal use of 
human embryos in biomedical practices. Similarly, in the so-called ‘bioethical triangle’ 
(Brownsword 2008), human rights are an empowering ethical perspective, favoring the 
development of new biomedical practices. Therefore, the use of rights as benchmarks for the 
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regulation of new biomedical technologies may act not as a normative value enabling a more 
reflexive discussion of the use of new biomedical technologies, but only favouring their broad 
use.    
These are only some of many reasons why the appeal to rights may raise problems. 
Yet they suffice to show that — in light of their social importance, with rights being the core 
element of countries’ constitutional orders and with the role that they are consequently called 
on to play in the development of new biomedical practices in modern democratic societies — 
an in-depth exploration is warranted of how rights are used in social controversies around new 
technologies. The main objective of this work is to explore how rights figure in social 
controversies around new technologies as well as to highlight the possible advantages, 
problems and difficulties that the use of them may involve.  
Although others have also explored this problematic, the present work differs from 
existing research in two ways. First, whereas previous research discussed the interplay 
between human rights and new developments in biomedicine from either an EU regulatory 
perspective (Flear 2008, 2015; Flear and Vakulenko 2010) or a medical, and therefore private 
law, perspective (Jackson 2008), this work seeks to enlarge our understanding of how 
constitutional rights interact with biomedicine. Second, it explores rights from a critical angle 
using three overlapping disciplinary perspectives, namely, CLS, STS, and the Foucauldian 
theorization on biopolitics, law and the state. Hence, this work will engage and further 
develop the concept of bioconstitutionalism. This concept was proposed by several scholars in 
science and technology studies, all affiliated with the J. F. Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard University, at a panel discussion at the 2010 annual meeting of the Society for Social 
Studies of Science in Tokyo and was further developed in a book (Jasanoff 2011b). 
Bioconstitutionalism emerged as a concept to provide a nuanced and comprehensive 
theoretical framework for exploring how new technologies affect the relationships between 
states and their citizens, institutionalized in constitutional rights. Bioconstitutionalism, as 
developed by these scholars, builds on ideas from STS, the Foucauldian critique of state and 
power, and CLS, which are applied to analyze the influence of new biomedical practices and 
technologies on the construction of legal personhood, subjectivity, constitutional rights, 
citizenship, and the problems of legitimacy and accountability. This thesis builds upon the 
concept of bioconstitutionalism, but applies it to the exploration of problems related to the use 
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of rights as benchmarks for the development of new biomedical technologies and practices. 
Furthermore, as bioconstitutionalism is a new and underdeveloped concept, this work will 
further develop the concept to provide a better understanding of how rights interact with new 
developments in biomedical science and technology. 
The exploration of the role of rights for the regulation of biomedical sciences and 
technologies can hardly be performed in the abstract. Therefore, much of bioconstitutional 
investigation and other research exploring the interplay between new science and technology 
and society has looked into concrete cases and controversies (Nelkin 1984; Jasanoff 1995; 
Martin and Richards 1996; Jasanoff 2011b). Controversies, their emergence, development and 
closure, represent a useful site for analysis, because they show how the intertwining of 
technoscience, laws, politics, rights and values emerges and is forged, by means of which 
elements and along which pathways. As Jasanoff argued, social controversies [work] as 
‘laboratories’ for studying how science and technology work in society (Jasanoff 2012, 439). 
They provide answers to questions not only ‘who wins and who loses in particular struggles 
over representation, but who benefits, to what ends, by what means, and at how great a cost’ 
(Jasanoff 2012, 439).  
This work will be mainly based on the exploration of the debate around the 
technology known as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in Italy. PGD is usually sought 
to detect for genetic abnormalities in the embryo before implantation in order to start 
pregnancy with an already healthy embryo. In Italy, the acceptability of PGD was a vexed 
issue. Together with other reproductive technologies, it had been freely practiced up till 2004 
when the Italian Parliament passed a law on medically assisted reproduction (Law 40/2004) 
and prohibited many reproductive technologies, including PGD. All this was considered 
necessary to protect the rights of human embryos created through IVF, which were granted 
legal personhood and turned into ‘citizen subjects’ by Law 40/2004 (Metzler 2007, 2011). 
However, the adoption of the Law was followed by a massive litigation campaign initiated by 
Italian citizens who had predispositions to various genetic diseases and supported by patient 
and scientific associations. As a result, in a series of decisions, the Italian Constitutional Court 
repealed the most contested provisions of the Law that prohibited PGD as they violated the 
right to health of Italian citizens. Thus, unlike other European countries, which, despite being 
engaged in hot debates on the ethics of PGD, nevertheless managed to draft regulations 
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governing its application (Mulkay 1997; Bleiklie, Hoggin and Rothmayr 2004; Metzler 2017), 
the acceptability of PGD in Italy for more than 30 years has been, and still remains to some 
extent, an unresolved issue, not covered by country-wide legislative provisions.  
Importantly, and this is the main reason why I chose to discuss rights-biomedicine 
interaction using the Italian debate around PGD as a case study, rights have been the central 
element of the entire controversy, not only by sparking it (PGD was prohibited by Law 
40/2004 to ensure the protection of the rights of embryos) but also by closing it (the right to 
health of the woman was recognized by the Constitutional Court as the reason why PGD 
should be allowed). The fact that rights both caused and closed the controversy, whose scope 
and intensity sets Italy apart from its European neighbors, already points to a potential 
difficulty of using rights as benchmarks for regulating new technologies in that such 
benchmarks can point to different (or even opposite) approaches to how new biomedical 
technologies should be governed.  
The second reason relates to the fact that the debate on and the enactment of embryos’ 
rights and of the respective prohibition of PGD capture the second of those ‘new’ issues 
mentioned above that new biomedical technologies raise for rights, that is, how assumingly 
stable and clearly defined human nature, grounding legal rights, is mobilized by powerful 
political actors to achieve certain objectives. Specifically, in Italy the emergence of a new 
technoscientific object/subject – an embryo outside its mother’s body – both urged the Italian 
Parliament to grant legal personhood to IVF embryos whose ‘human nature’ and natural 
rights made them akin to born persons and therefore entitled them to the same degree of 
respect and protection, and turned the rights (of embryos) into benchmarks according to 
which the acceptability of PGD and other assisted reproductive technologies (hereafter ART) 
must be evaluated. However, this position was mostly put forward and promoted by the 
Catholic Church with the help of political parties using Catholic moral imperatives to promote 
their own agenda. As the controversy evolved, it turned out that it was far from clear which 
exact aspects of this ‘human nature’ made humans humans and which exact rights this human 
nature implied or engendered. 
The third reason relates to the period spanning from the mid-1980s to 2004 when the 
regulation of IVF and PGD was practically non-existent in Italy. This period of an almost 
unrestricted freedom reminds one of the type of freedom discussed by sociologists of 
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medicine (Rose 2006) as one of the ways in which modern politics is performed, that is, not 
through the ‘state’, but through non-state institutions such as medicine and the governance of 
individuals through their subjectivation. The existence of this freedom, followed by an almost 
total prohibition of new ART by Law 40/2004, and its partial dismantling by the 
Constitutional Court makes it worthwhile to explore the different ways in which rights are 
implicated in the governance as well as the problems related to their central stage in 
governance. Hence, taking into account the different roles that rights had played in the Italian 
controversy, as well as different ways in which they had been used, appealed to, shaped, and 
implemented, I seek to explore the problematic of using rights in social controversies around 
new technologies.  
1.2. Research questions  
This thesis asks the following two main questions.  
1. How have rights been used (identified, created, transformed, balanced, etc.) in the debate 
around PGD in Italy and how has this process been connected with the regulation of PGD? 
The use of the ‘how’ question in this work means that it will attempt to examine both the 
process of intertwining of rights and PGD (‘how’ as a trajectory and methods) and the result 
of the process (‘how’ as a form that this intertwining ultimately took). For example, I will 
address such questions as: What were the reasons (political, moral, historical) why Parliament 
granted rights to IVF embryos and through which rhetorical mechanisms did it do so? How 
was human dignity and the natural (human) rights mobilized by those seeking to attribute 
legal personhood and legal rights to the embryo?  
2. To what extent can rights ensure a ‘right’ regulation of new technologies? The tinge of 
normativity in the second question means that this work is an exercise in contextual self-
reflexivity. Rather than giving a definite answer in the abstract whether rights are a ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ tool for shaping new biomedical technologies such as PGD, it more seeks to elucidate 
possible advantages, problems and difficulties of using rights in regulating new biomedical 
technologies in their particular context. Hence, I will address such questions as: What can the 
fact that rights were the reason why the controversy was not only sparked but also eventually 
closed tell us about the role of rights for biotechnological regulation? What do the litigation 
and the appeal to rights in technoscientific controversies such as the controversy over PGD in 
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Italy tell us about the allegedly apolitical nature of rights? Which problems can the use of 
rights in technoscientific controversies create, in light of the value systems prevailing in a 
certain society? Which other possible and (perhaps unexpected) roles does the use of rights in 
technoscientific controversies play? 
1.3. Theory  
In the introduction to the edited volume on bioconstitutionalism, Jasanoff describes the 
rationale of developing the idiom of bioconstitutionalism and the theoretical framework 
bioconstitutionalism builds upon. She observes that the effects of the biotechnological 
revolution, which had started with the discovery of DNA, on law were so profound that they 
‘should be seen as constitutional or, more precisely, bio-constitutional in their consequences’ 
(Jasanoff 2011a, 3). And further,  
[r]evolutions in our understanding of what life is burrow so deep into the foundations of 
our social and political structures that they necessitate, in effect, a rethinking of law at a 
constitutional level (Jasanoff 2011a, 3). 
However, according to Jasanoff, constitutional lawyers have been slow in addressing these 
changes (for example, see Goldberg 1994). In particular, she points to the reluctance of 
constitutional lawyers to grapple with new entities such as genes, embryos, human embryonic 
stem cells, or hybrids/chimeras. In addition, in those accounts in which constitutional lawyers 
do address this problem, they do so from a technology-deterministic perspective known as 
‘law lag’, and which in other accounts has been defined as a problem of ‘regulatory 
connection’ or the ‘problem of the new’ (Brownsword 2008). According to this approach, 
new science and technologies ‘race ahead’ of society and constantly create new challenges 
that society, including morality and law, seem always to need to catch up with.  
With respect to constitutional rights, the interaction between rights and biomedicine 
has been approached from what Jasanoff calls the ‘classical’ constitutional thought 
perspective. The latter operates with an essentialist understanding of rights, treating them as 
stable constitutional guarantees with well-defined meanings and definitions that should be 
protected and reasserted against erosion and violation. As a result, constitutional theorizing 
has used the vocabulary of ‘impact’ and dedicated efforts only to exploring how rights and 
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other constitutional guarantees must be protected against threats posed by biomedical 
advances. For example, the concept of geneticization has gotten traction (Nelkin and Lindee 
1995). Similarly, those wishing to protect human dignity have been particularly vociferous, 
claiming that the very human dignity of people is under threat (Kass 2002). Hence, by using 
the vocabulary of impact, this research overlooked important aspects of rights-biomedicine 
interaction, including the transformation of rights themselves, the multiplicity of sites where 
rights emerge and are being forged, hidden ideological and political interests that ground 
assumingly neutral judicial constitutional decisions, as well as the problematic nature of rights 
themselves unmasked by CLS.  
The main aim of using and developing the idiom of bioconstitutionalism is to confront 
the misconceptions about the modes of interaction between science and constitutional law. To 
address this point, Jasanoff stressed the importance of the following moves. The first concerns 
the change of the currently prevailing view on what constitution and constitutional rights are. 
Jasanoff observed that it is important to abandon the ‘classical’ view of constitutional rights 
as products made by judges as it fails to account how individuals themselves work out their 
biopolitical relations with the state in other sites. To do so, she suggested to expand the notion 
of bioconstitutionalism. Specifically, Jasanoff proposed to explore ‘constitution’ ‘with a small 
c’ that would encompass ‘the full range of sites and processes in which individuals work out 
their biopolitical relationships with the institutions that regulate them’ (Jasanoff 2011a, 10). 
Regarding rights, this broad definition would include ‘quasi-constitutional rights that no court 
has declared nor legislature decreed, but that are created (or constrained) through everyday 
practice and thought in technologically advanced societies’ because a ‘right in practice 
emerges not only at the moment when a court declares it, but also when people (and 
institutions) assume that they or others own the right and can assert it through their actions’ 
(Jasanoff 2011a, 15). This broad understanding of the constitution taps into recent discussions 
in postnational, societal and democratic constitutional theory, which have also dealt with 
radical reconceptualization of constitutionalism (Teubner 2004). In addition, it also resonates 
with performative forms of citizenship (Isin and Nielsen 2008) and rights claiming (Zivi 
2012) that do not necessarily have courts and litigation as the sites and means of ensuring 
rights. 
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Second, it is important to overcome the prevailing view on how constitutional rights 
work and how they interact with science and technology. To do this, she stressed that it is 
important to abandon the deterministic view of science in its relationship with law, including 
constitutional law and constitutional rights. Instead, she argues, it is important to take into 
account how the two traditionally separated worlds of the normative and the epistemic ‘have 
supported each other for centuries in patterns of mutual construction, stabilization, and 
reinforcement’. In this way, her claim resonates with the well-known concept used in STS – 
the  co-production of social and technoscientific orders – of which she is one of the main 
authors (Jasanoff 2004a; Latour 1993). Furthermore, she stressed the importance of adopting 
a critical perspective upon rights in order to debunk ‘the neutrality and validity of the 
“baselines” against which we consider constitutional questions’ (Jasanoff 2011a, 12) such as 
the neutrality of private-public distinction.  
Finally, Jasanoff and others emphasized that the insights of Foucault, and his concepts 
of biopower and biopolitics, are needed to better understand how life itself had become the 
object of different ways and modes of political governance. The latter include not only those 
performed by the state through commanding the death of citizens, but also those through 
subjugating their bodies and controlling populations (Sunder Rajan 2011, 193-194, Jasanoff 
2011a, 6).  
The subsequent sections of this Chapter are concerned with situating 
bioconstitutionalism in this broad theoretical domain, in order to highlight how it can inform 
our thinking about the interplay between constitutional rights and new biomedical sciences 
and technologies. In Section 1.3.1, I will attend to the concept of biopower, biopolitics and 
biological citizenship. In Section 1.3.2, I will explore the critical approach to rights, including 
the approach of Foucault and CLS. In Section 1.3.3, I will describe the idiom of co-
production. In Section 1.3.4, I will describe the insights from technology regulation studies. 
Finally, I will also highlight some current inconsistencies and gaps in the theorization of 
bioconstitutionalism, both of which this thesis will seek to correct.  
1.3.1 Biopower, biological citizenship and bioconstitutionalism: the Foucauldian approach  
Bioconstitutionalism is informed by the Foucauldian notion of biopower, which underlies 
how in late modernity, power is focused on regulating and enhancing life itself (Sunder Rajan 
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2011, 193-194, Jasanoff 2011a, 6). In what follows, I will describe the idioms of biopower 
and biopolitics and will critically address the ways in which bioconstitutionalism draws on 
and seeks to further develop these concepts.  
Biopower and biopolitics  
Foucault made his perhaps most famous distinction, namely, between the ‘juridical mode’ of 
power and what he termed ‘biopower’ (Foucault 1990) in his book Will to knowledge, in 
chapter V entitled ‘Right of Death and Power over Life’. According to Foucault, the juridical 
mode of power could be characterized as the power of the sovereign to seize ‘things, time, 
bodies, ultimately the life of subjects’ (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 195). In contrast, since the 
seventeenth century, this ‘deduction’, or the deprivation of things, time, body and life, was to 
be integrated into and subordinated to a new form of power. This power, which he called 
biopower, acted ‘to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under 
it’ (Foucault 1980, 136). 
Foucault proposed a by now rather familiar diagram of biopower. In this diagram, one 
focus is the anatomo-politics of the human body or the disciplinary power. It is performed 
over an individual body through disciplinary techniques in such institutions as schools, 
prisons, army and hospitals, both to increase the economic productivity of the human body 
and ‘[weaken] its forces to assure political subjection’ (Lemke 2011a, 36), turning individuals 
into ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault 1977, 1990). The second form of biopower, the biopolitics of 
population, emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century and focused ‘on the species 
body, the body imbued with the mechanisms of life: birth, morbidity, mortality, longevity’ 
(Rabinow and Rose 2006). Similar to anatomo-politics, Foucauldian analysis of biopolitics 
also focused on disciplinary techniques and therefore was reduced to body politics. The two 
poles can be interconnected into what Foucault calls ‘apparatuses’ (dispositifs). One of them 
is sexuality: on the one hand, it is located on the microlevel of the body and, on the other 
hand, on the macrolevel of a population (Foucault 1980). 
Governmentality  
Foucault would later come back to discussing biopolitics in his lectures at the Collège de 
France. Before proceeding to exploring biopolitics, Foucault first dedicates his lectures to 
government, governmentality and to liberalism as one of the modes or ‘families’ of 
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governmentalities (Miller and Rose 2008). It must be stated at the outset that Foucauldian 
thinking on governmentality and government is fragmented and at many points contradictory 
and incoherent therefore does not constitute a well elaborated theory. However, for the 
purpose of this work several elements of his explorations on governmentality must be pointed 
out and fleshed out. 
First, the idea of developing the concept of governmentality is to explore ‘how the 
modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other's 
emergence in the long-term processes of co-evolution of modern statehood and modern 
subjectivity’ (Lemke 2007, 44). Foucault thus explores different ‘arts of government’. 
However, unlike the politicized meaning of the word used today, Foucault understands 
government as conduct, or better ‘conduct of conduct’, performed in different, and not 
necessarily political, settings, such as home, school, administration, as well as self-conduct. 
Government thus ranges from ‘governing others’ to ‘governing self’. In the center of 
government Foucault places not the omnipotent and homogenous state, but the process of 
government. Political power is thus exercised through a number of institutions and practices, 
including both formal bureaucratic bodies and a number of non-governmental institutions, 
practices, knowledges, techniques, expertise, and rationalities, which he calls 
governmentality. The more societies aspire towards liberalism, hence limiting the scope of the 
state in governing life of citizens, the more the importance of these non-state institutions 
grow, as they claim their legitimacy exactly by existing beyond the state. They influence the 
behavior of individuals, but not through the rule and command, but through subjectification 
and the use of ‘the technologies of the self’ and ‘technologies of the social’.  
For example, this understanding of the mutual constitution of the state and 
subjectivities was employed by scholars to differently conceptualize and describe the societal 
transformations taking place in the twentieth century. One of them is the shift from the 
Keynesian welfare state toward ‘free market’ policies and the rise of neo-liberal political 
projects in Western democracies. Looking at these developments through the governmentality 
lens, scholars concluded that these political changes should be seen not as a retreat of the state 
but the favoring of other forms of government, such as self-government by responsible, 
prudent and entrepreneurial individuals, as well as ‘privatized risk-management, 
empowerment techniques, and the play of market forces and entrepreneurial models in a 
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variety of social domains’ (Lemke 2012, 84; Miller and Rose 2008). In other words, in order 
to advance the governmentalization of the state, liberalism produces, or subjecfies, individuals 
with particular identities that would enable them to be directed and governed, namely, as 
individuals having the ability to exercise freedom along some structured pathways. Thus, 
freedom is a precondition for government. However, this freedom is not absolute but is, using 
Rose’s apt expression, ‘regulated autonomy’. Governmentality also produces ‘free’ subjects 
via rights and I will come back to this question in Section 1.3.2. 
Second, liberalism represents one of the ‘families’ of governmentality. In other words, 
liberalism is not an economic theory or a political ideology but as a specific art of governing 
which involves two types of legitimation and limitation of political power. The first type 
includes those instruments that are ‘external and excessive in relation to government’ 
(Foucault 2008, 9). By these instruments, Foucault primarily meant the concepts of ‘original 
or natural rights’ and ‘social contract’. As Foucault (2008, 39) stated, ‘this approach consists 
in starting from the rights of man in order to arrive at the limitation of governmentality by 
way of the constitution of the sovereign’. In other words, according to this approach, 
individuals resign some of their natural rights and submit to the authority of the sovereign, in 
exchange for obliging the latter to protect the remaining essential natural rights against other 
people or the state itself. This way of limiting state power was implemented by the French 
revolutionaries and found its most explicit theoretical elaboration in the idea of the ‘social 
contract’ of Rousseau.  
The second type of limitation derives from governmental practice itself and from the 
‘de facto limits that can be set to this governmentality’ (Foucault 2008, 40). This is where 
Foucault starts to develop his view on a new rationality of government that differs from 
previous historical rationalities of government such as state reason (raison d’état): the idea of 
a nature of society that constitutes the basis and the internal limits of governmental practice. 
Nature here is not a carryover of tradition and therefore differs from ‘natural rights’ acting as 
an external limit to government. Instead, it represents a form of self-regulation of a society 
that the government should respect if it does not want to act ‘clumsily’. The main intellectual 
element used to know society’s nature is political economy. As Foucault (2008, 15) states, 
political economy 
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considers [governmental practices] in terms of their effects rather than their origins, not 
by asking, for example, what authorizes a sovereign to raise taxes, but by asking, quite 
simply: What will happen if, at a given moment, we raise a tax on a particular category of 
persons or a particular category of goods? 
Because the limits to political power are set from within by nature, the ‘coordinates of 
governmental action are no longer legitimacy or illegitimacy but success or failure; rejection 
focuses not on the abuse or arrogance of power but rather on ignorance concerning its use’ 
(Lemke 2011a, 46). Therefore, in order to learn whether the government is acting properly, ‘it 
is necessary to investigate the “natural order of things” that defines both the foundations and 
the limits of governmental action’ (Lemke 2011a, 46). According to Foucault, this second 
conception of legitimation and limitation of power has been dominant, although the first one 
has not entirely disappeared 
Third, government is usually a consequence of an emerged problem. As Miller and 
Rose (2008, 14) put it, ‘if the conduct of individuals or collectivities appeared to require 
conducting, this was because something in it appeared problematic to someone’. Importantly, 
problem is not treated as given but emerges as a result of different tactics of problematization. 
Therefore, in conducting analysis from the perspective of governmentality, one first should 
start with a question of how the rendering of things became problematic and therefore should 
focus on the process of problematization and the respective search for solutions to the 
problem. With respect to biopolitics, it means that different corporeal existence such as bodily 
experiences and biological characteristics (e.g. sexuality or madness) are not treated as given 
that should be uncovered by ‘objective’ scientific knowledge and corrected by medicine. 
Instead, they should be treated as outcomes of problematization. As Lemke put it, it explores 
how ‘certain objects of knowledge and corporeal experiences become a moral, political, or 
legal problem’ (Lemke 2011a, 178).  
Biopolitics and governmentality  
In his lectures at the Collège to France, Foucault never comes back to biopolitics again and 
never explicitly developed the connection between biopolitics and governmentality due to his 
death. However, according to Lemke, the two should be discussed together because for 
Foucault biopolitics was ‘an art of government’. Here, one should recall the previous 
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conceptualization of biopolitics as merely performed through disciplinary power. In other 
words, he first treated biopolitics as including only ‘technologies of the body’ and therefore 
biopolitics was a kind of ‘body politics’, performed on the zoē, the bodies, of individuals 
(Agamben 1998). However, in his lectures at the Collège do France, Foucault corrects his 
conclusions in the earlier studies where he explores subjectivity as the construction of ‘docile 
bodies’ as he focused only on the processes of discipline. With the notion of government, he 
thus explores the connection between the technologies of the domination and technologies of 
the self.  
I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western civilization, 
he has to take into account not only techniques of domination but also techniques of 
the self. Let’s say: he has to take into account the interaction between those two types 
of techniques – techniques of domination and techniques of the self. He has to take into 
account the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one 
another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And 
conversely, he has to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are 
integrated into structures of coercion and domination. The contact point, where the 
individuals are driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we 
can call, I think government. Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word, 
governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is 
always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts with 
complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and 
processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself” (Foucault 
1993, 203-4). 
The account for the ‘technologies of the self’ as a technology of power allows to apply 
biopolitics to the investigation of biopolitical processes in liberal democracies. Thus, Foucault 
asks: ‘How can the phenomena of “population,” with its specific effects and problems, be 
taken into account in a system concerned about respect for legal subjects and individual free 
enterprise?’ (Foucault 2008, 317). Or, in other words, ‘how are free subjects— subjects of law 
— governed when they are simultaneously understood as living beings?’ (Lemke 2011a, 
175). Consequently, viewing biopolitics as an art of government gives important advantages 
for it allows to account, not only of how the biological existence of people zoē, but also their 
moral and political existence bios are implicated in contemporary biopolitics. It thus allows to 
 28 
connect, not only two poles of power (individuals and population), but also two dimensions of 
human existence, that is, zoē and bios.  
Hence, biopolitics includes three elements which together participate in biopolitical 
governance (Lemke 2011a, 2011b; Rabinow and Rose 2006). The first element is truth 
discourses and experts authorized to speak truth. These truth discourses include systematic 
knowledge about life and living beings and are required to ‘provide cognitive and normative 
maps that open up biopolitical spaces and define both subjects and objects of intervention’ 
(Lemke 2011a, 119). The second element is power strategies, including ‘strategies for 
intervention upon collective existence in the name of life and health’ (Rabinow and Rose 
2006, 197) and strategies of power that ‘mobilize knowledge of life and how processes of 
power generate and disseminate forms of knowledge’ (2011a, 119). The first type of 
strategies also encompasses the strategies of subjectification. They include both bodily 
disciplining and regulation of the population and the self-constitution of individuals as 
individual and collective subjects. Subjectification in this second sense is performed with the 
help of ‘technologies of the social’, through which individuals identify themselves as part of a 
society, and ‘technologies of the self’, through which individuals shape a particular attitude 
towards their bodies, their health, and their conduct. The third element is the types of 
identities that subjectification produces. They include, for example, new biosocial 
communities such as patient groups (Rabinow 1996) and the new type of identity termed 
‘somatic individuality’ (Rose 2006).  
Biological citizenship and ‘biopolitics from below’ 
Due to recent developments in biomedical and genetic sciences, biopolitics is undergoing 
transformations. Rabinow (1992) proposed the concept of ‘biosociality’ as an extension of 
Foucauldian biopolitics. By biosociality Rabinow means ‘a new type of autoproduction’ in 
which ‘nature will be modeled on culture understood as practice’ (Rabinow 1992, 241). 
Rabinow suggests that due to growing knowledge about genetic diseases and genetic 
predispositions to diseases, new individual and collective identities emerge. People start 
describing themselves and others using biological and genetic terminology. He further goes 
on to suggest that technical innovations also create new forms of socialization and identity 
politics. Thus, citizens are not passive recipients of bioscientific information and medical care 
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but build communities such as self-help groups and patient associations through which they 
seek to understand themselves and their disease. 
Besides leading to new forms of individual and collective identity, the growth and 
diffusion of biomedicine and genetics also lead to new forms of political activism and the 
demand of recognizing one’s ‘vital rights’ related to one’s genetic abnormalities. Heath, 
Rapp, and Taussig (2004) proposed the concept of ‘genetic citizenship’, and Rose and Novas 
(2004) introduced the term ‘biological citizenship’, which is similar but wider than genetic 
citizenship. Political activism which ‘biological’ or ‘genetic citizens’ would exhibit thus 
represents a ‘biopolitics from below’.  
To understand the role that citizenship plays in biological citizenship, Rose (2006) 
argues that one must break away from the political-philosophical considerations of citizenship 
and instead locate the different forms of contemporary citizenship within the political history 
of their ‘citizenship projects’, that is, the ways in which authorities thought about and acted 
upon certain groups of people as citizens. According to Rose, biological citizenship refers to 
‘all those citizenship projects that have linked their conceptions of citizens to beliefs about the 
biological existence of human beings, as individuals, as families and lineages, as 
communities, as population and races, and as a species’ (Rose 2006, 132). Rose and Novas 
use the expression of ‘making up’ citizens, that is, constituting citizens with particular 
subjectivities, identities and self-understanding by authorities. In this way, they align the 
concept of citizenship with those theories of citizenship that treat citizenship not only as a 
formal connection between citizens and the state but as a lived experience of self-
identification and participation, hence the term ‘performative citizenship’ (Butler 2011; Isin 
and Nielsen 2008).  
Importantly, building upon the Foucauldian view of dispersed form that power 
assumes, in their conceptualization of biological citizenship Rose treats authorities not as the 
formal state apparatus but different experts. Doctors have been ‘central to the development of 
the arts of government; not only the arts of governing others, but also the arts of governing 
oneself’ (Rose 2006, 26). In recent years, these experts proliferated and include various 
‘counselors’ – genetic, reproductive, family planning councilors – as well as nutritionists, 
fitness experts, physiotherapists as well as others ‘pastors of the soma’ under the sway of 
which individuals construct their subjectivities. The expansion of expertise is one of the key 
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elements of contemporary liberal governance of individuals, which is exercised ‘at a distance’ 
(Rose 1993), that is, not directly through a formal state apparatus but indirectly through 
expertise and knowledge. Therefore, Rose states that biological citizenship is primarily a 
‘regime of the self’ when ‘individuals shape their relations with themselves in terms of a 
knowledge of their somatic individuality’ (Rose 2006, 134). Biological citizenship also has a 
collectivizing dimension, of which ‘biosociality’ is the most obvious example. Activism, 
which may involve the state and political authorities, which Rose calls ‘rights biocitizenship’ 
and which will be the topic of Chapter 5 of this work, is part of this second collectivizing 
form of citizenship (Rose 2006, 134). Yet it is important to remember that authorities involve 
also ‘experts’ and that therefore the shaping of biological citizens’ identities, rights, duties 
and responsibilities may and does also take place in more mundane places such as fertility 
clinics.  
The extension of sites where people exercise their entitlements makes an important 
contribution to the work on rights, as it helps illustrate how rights practice also figures 
‘beyond the state’ (Petersen 2013, 268). The need to pay attention to such unconventional 
sites to see how technologies are being accommodated has been the call of scholars (Murphy 
2009a, 2009b). According to Murphy (2009a, 2009b), ethnographic exploration of these sites 
and practices taking place there can disprove the claim of legal scholars that new technologies 
create only threats for rights. Indeed, in their often quoted study regarding PGD Franklin and 
Roberts (2006, 14) argued that  
Contrary to the image of genetic medicine ‘racing ahead’ of society, or impacting upon 
it like some wayward meteor, the description here reveals an intensely social activity 
that is very much in our midst. Many of the choices and challenges described in this 
book may be ‘new’ scientifically or medically, but the relationships involved — within 
families, between individuals and the medical profession, or between scientists and 
governmental regulatory authorities — are well established, and in some cases very 
old. 
These practices, I argue, also constitute an important site of biological citizenship in the 
Italian case and the ‘vital rights’ that citizens will acquire in it will become the basis of those 
legal rights that will be litigated in courtrooms (Chapter 5).  
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Despite the enormous value of this reconceptualization of biopolitics, it has several 
shortcomings. First, according to Lemke (2011b), it does not pay attention to the different 
ways in which biopolitics from below is integrated into politics or biopolitics from above. For 
example, Heinemann and Lemke (2014) showed how the state has not entirely disappeared 
from the arena and biological citizenship is affected by the biopolitical imperatives of the 
state. Second, Sunder Rajan (2011) argued about the importance of paying attention to the 
context in which these processes take place and looking at other sites beyond ‘advanced 
liberal democracies’. Third, it pays little attention to how exactly these ‘vital rights’, their 
claiming and satisfaction, are implicated in the process of government by producing a subject 
with a particular identity. I will come back to this particular issue in Section 1.3.2.  
Bioconstitutionalism, biological citizenship and biopolitics/biopower 
As I stated earlier, bioconstitutionalism draws on the ideas of biopower and biopolitics and is 
interested in exploring how life becomes the object of governance in a constitutional order. 
For example, Sunder Rajan points to the importance of ‘biopower and biopolitics in helping 
us conceptualize the ways in which life became a particular subject of political understanding 
in modernity’ (Sunder Rajan 2011, 194). In addition, the authors of bioconstitutionalism also 
draw on the idea of ‘biological citizenship’ to emphasize ‘the self-molding and creative self-
reinvention that occur in response to new biomedical knowledge, even when the subjects of 
this knowledge are disciplined, exploited, or suffering in various ways’ (Sunder Rajan 2011, 
195), and thus to ‘celebrate the opening up of agency from below’ (Jasanoff 2011a, 6). 
However, and this is where bioconstitutionalism remains underdefined, the authors do 
not clearly define where biopolitics ends and where bioconstitutionalism begins. One 
potential difference between the two is the role of law. For example, Jasanoff defines 
bioconstitutionalism as ‘fundamental understandings about the state’s responsibility for life 
that are articulated and enacted through law and policy’ (Jasanoff 2011b, 67), hence 
emphasizing the importance of law in articulating bioconstitutional rules. A similar 
interpretation is given by Winickoff (2015, 16) according to whom bioconstitutionalism is 
‘the especially deep entanglements of biology, constitutional law and the rights-bearing 
subject’. However, as I mentioned earlier, Jasanoff (2011a) also emphasized the importance 
of expanding the text of the constitution and to explore ‘not only as these are formally 
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construed by courts, but also as they are tacitly understood and worked out by scientists, 
lawyers, and policymakers, articulated in research practices; hardened into material 
technologies, or built into professional discourses’ (Jasanoff 2011, 16). Similarly, as 
bioconstitutionalism also involves other sites where rights are forged and exercised and thus 
includes biological citizenship, bioconstitutionalism is broader than citizenship defined in 
legal terms. This broad definition of the constitution blurs the boundaries between strictly 
speaking law and non-law and draws bioconstitutionalism closer to biopolitics/biopower, as 
the latter also employs the ‘legal complex’, as well as to its reconceptualization expressed in 
‘biological citizenship’. 
I suggest that bioconstitutionalism should be treated as one of the elements of 
biopolitics seen as a liberal way of governing (Lemke 2011a, 2011b). It belongs to its second 
element, namely, power strategies, and as such is a technology of power (Lemke 2011a, 
2011b; Rabinow and Rose 2006, 197). More specifically, it can be defined as a strategy of 
intervention upon biological existence of citizens, articulated in the form of claiming, 
attributing, implementing, or exercising constitutional rights. Bioconstitutionalism as a 
‘strategy of intervention’ should thus include, for example, vital rights, which are part of 
biological citizenship as ‘biopolitics for below’ (e.g. when citizens exercise their rights 
through using a particular biomedical technology or contest the exercise of political power 
through litigation, Chapter 5) and positive rights that the government grants ‘from above’ 
(e.g. when a parliament accords rights to new entities such as IVF embryos and implements 
restrictive regulations to protect such rights, Chapter 4, or when the judiciary recognizes the 
rights claimed by citizens during litigation, Chapter 5). This definition of rights (including the 
right to health and right to life) brings them into the domain of politics and therefore means 
that the definition of rights, of their ontological premises, subjects, objects and other ‘building 
blocks of rights’ (Jasanoff 2011a) are negotiable, changeable and subject to the influence of 
the local political and cultural factors. By exploring the social controversy around PGD in 
Italy, the rationalities used, the knowledges appealed to, the powers involved, and the 
outcomes achieved, it will become possible to understand the role that the appeal to 
constitutional rights plays in controversies around new biomedical technologies and practices. 
I will come back to examining and refining bioconstitutionalism in the Conclusion where I 
will discuss how this work will benefit from treating rights as technologies of power over life. 
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The importance of acknowledging that bioconstitutionalism is a particular form of 
making biological life an object of political concern is not sufficient for exploring how 
exactly rights participate in social controversies around new biomedical technologies and 
practices. It is important to explore the specificity of rights themselves as a legal and political 
artifacts. In what follows, I will describe the Foucauldian approach to law and rights and will 
show how it was taken up by other scholars. I will also illustrate the CLS approach to rights.  
1.3.2. Law and rights: a critical approach  
Foucauldian approach to law and rights 
As Foucault himself said little concerning law, different interpretations of the Foucauldian 
view on law co-exist. The first main interpretation was given by Hunt and Wickham (1994). 
According to them, law in the Foucauldian view is an instrument associated with pre-modern 
monarchical sovereignty and therefore is defined in terms of commands, prohibitions and 
punishments. Foucault thus views law differently from the accounts of other scholars who 
both pluralize law and argue about the blurring of boundaries between law and regulatory 
forms of control (Hunt and Wickham 1994). In addition, in interpreting Foucault’s position, 
Hunt and Wickham (1994) argued that Foucault attributes to law a subordinate role that 
supports another, more powerful form of power – disciplinary power.  
I do not mean to say that law fades into the background or that institutions of justice 
tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and the 
judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses 
(medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory 
(Foucault 1978, 144). 
The second main interpretation is given by Ewald (1990) and Rose and Valverde (1998). 
According to them, Foucault interprets law both as an instrument of the sovereign and as an 
instrument of the ‘legal complex’, thereby decentering law and rejecting its unity. Law thus 
represents an ‘assemblage of legal practices, legal institutions, statutes, legal codes, 
authorities, texts, norms and forms of judgment’ (Rose and Valverde 1998, 542). According 
to Rose and Valverde (1998, 542), Foucault saw this legal complex as being ‘pervaded by 
forms of knowledge and expertise that were non-legal’ or, in other words, as being 
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increasingly governmentalized. This legal complex operates not through juridical power but 
through norms. As a result, disciplinary and governmental power ‘colonize’ law, which as a 
result tends to reproduce and legitimize the former. For example, in his lectures at the Collège 
de France, he was exploring the connection between specific modes and forms of truth 
speaking, or what he called ‘regimes of veridiction’ and modes and forms of governance, or 
‘regimes of jurisdiction’. For Foucault, this connection is fundamental: the history of truth is 
coupled with the history of law (Foucault 2008, 35). He says: ‘When penal practice replaced 
the question: “What have you done?” with the question: “Who are you?” you see the 
jurisdictional function of the penal system being transformed, or doubled, or possibly 
undermined, by the question of veridiction’ (Foucault 2008, 34-35). Here we see a parallel 
with the idea that Rule of Technology might undermine and displace the Rule of Law 
(Brownsword 2008). However, in the case of governmentality, law is not displaced by 
technical reason but rather legitimates it, and the technical reason starts acting under the 
auspices of law. 
Similarly to law, rights have an ambiguous position in the Foucauldian philosophy. 
On the one hand, rights were largely disregarded by Foucault because he did not treat them as 
shields able to protect individuals against the exercise of power. Because Foucault saw power 
as being exercised, not only though the formal state apparatus, but through other non-state 
practices, knowledges and techniques of governmentality, claiming the protection of rights 
from the state would only reify the effects of governmental power acting through law. 
Similarly, speaking about identity and identity-based rights (such as for gay people, women, 
disabled people, etc.), he warned against the dangers of the regulatory powers of identity and 
of identity-based rights as they further translate into life the effects of disciplinary power 
(Foucault 1980). Therefore, if we come back to the view of Foucault about the first type of 
limitation of political power in liberalism, that is, natural rights, even if such rights are 
implemented in law and do perform the function of the limitation of political power, in 
practice their liberating potential is undermined because through rights other forms of power 
such as disciplinary power of governmentality take shape.  
The convergence of human rights with governmentality was also explored by scholars 
(Brown 1995, 2000; Guilhot 2008; Odysseos 2010; Sokhi-Bulley 2011a, 2011b). For 
example, Odysseos (2010, 748) argued that human rights produce a subjectivity homo 
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juridicus which ‘is a subject amenable to self-government and, as such, acts as a partner, 
indeed a predicate, to neoliberal governmentality’. In this way, she criticizes Foucault for 
giving only marginal attention to human rights by showing how the latter even further enables 
neoliberal governmentality. Similarly, Wendy Brown concludes that rights do not simply act 
as instruments that the right claimant freely uses to achieve their own objectives. In 
discussing identity-based rights, Brown observes that ‘the more highly specified rights are as 
rights for women, the more likely they are to build that fence insofar as they are more likely 
to encode a definition of women premised upon our subordination in the transhistorical 
discourse of liberal jurisprudence’ (Brown 2000, 232). Hence, on the one hand, she builds on 
the Foucauldian critique of rights but, on the other, corrects it by saying that rights do not 
simply converge with disciplinary power but are ‘from the beginning a potentially 
disciplinary practice’ (Brown 1995, 99).  
This research provides a valuable and missing contribution to the exploration of 
biological citizenship and the solidification of ‘vital rights’ by showing how the use of legal 
rights, via claiming, granting and implementing, is involved and further translates into life 
governmentality by creating a ‘legal subject’ endowed with legal freedom and capacity to act. 
However, as I will show in this work, rights can nevertheless work as a limit to 
governmentality. For example, when the Italian Parliament, pushed by the Catholic Church, 
enacted the rights of embryos, it acted exactly in order to withstand the governmental power 
of biomedicine. Although this act of Parliament can be criticized for other reasons, it 
nevertheless demonstrates the possibility of resisting the governmental power through the 
appeal to natural rights and human dignity.  
On the other hand, Foucault personally participated in many political demonstrations. 
Telling is his participation against the war in Vietnam and the letter he wrote calling on the 
governments to protect rights. According to Lemke (2001) and Biebricher (2012), such 
actions of Foucault did not mean that he recognized the liberal view on rights as shields. 
Instead, he used them politically to gain freedom through practice. As Lemke (2011, 3) put it, 
‘freedom does not take shape in institutional arrangements or legal texts. Rather, freedom is a 
practice, and the only way to preserve it is to claim it’. As Foucault himself stated: ‘the 
freedom of men is never assured by the laws and the institutions that are intended to guarantee 
them (...). “[F]reedom” is what must be exercised’ (Foucault 1980).  
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Critical approaches to rights 
Critical socio-legal studies have been important in contributing to the discussion of legal 
rights and their ability to ensure states’ recognition and satisfaction of their citizens’ demands. 
Some scholars developed an extensive critique of rights, emphasizing such characteristics of 
rights as abstractness, indeterminacy, and individualism, foreclosing real social and legal 
progress (Tushnet 1983; Rosenberg 1991; Scheingold 2004). The ‘crits’ argued that the 
appeal to rights in judicial and political settings does not only fail to empower the weakest 
and the disempowered members of society but in fact reinforces and deepens existing 
relations of power and dominance. Assumingly positive rights such as the right to privacy of 
freedom of contract, so the crits argued, do not liberate but, in contrast, subordinate weak 
members of society and subject them to the power of the strong (MacKinnon 1987). 
Furthermore, the appeal to rights fails to bring to tangible legal and social changes because 
the judiciary is bound by the constraints of their legal culture (Rosenberg 1991). Specifically, 
legal precedents, grounding the very ‘continuity scripts of the law’ (Rosenberg 1991, 11), 
limit the judiciary’s discretion and their power, for example, to declare new rights or extend 
old rights to new situations.  
Probably the most famous ‘loss of faith’ in rights was expressed by Duncan Kennedy 
(2002). He argued that he lost his faith in rights because rights turned out to be just like any 
other type of rhetorical or policy arguments and therefore were not ‘trumps’ in the Dworkian 
(1977) sense. Even if they are used as ‘trumps’, rights have the ability to produce counter-
claims and therefore the need to balance them will again reduce the dispute to some political 
or subjective arguments, as there is no objective criterion through which this balancing can be 
performed. As Kennedy observed, once ‘the case requires a balancing of conflicting rights 
claims, it is implausible that it is the rights themselves, rather than the “subjective” or 
“political” commitments of the judges, that are deciding the outcome’ (2002, 198).  
The criticism of the use of rights was also the subject of much feminist critique 
(Petchesky 1987, 1995; MacKinnon 1987, 1991; Smart 2002; Brown 1995, 2000). For 
example, feminist legal scholars criticised rights based on their ability to produce counter-
claims The abortion case has been used as one of the most illustrative examples. For example, 
Carol Smart (2002), following Kingdom, argued that winning rights could not lead to 
women’s emancipation because of the tendency of rights claims to produce counter-claims 
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related to other rights, such as men’s rights, fetal rights and children’s rights. According to 
Smart, these counter-rights could be, and are being, used to restrict women’s access to 
abortion and constitute a disguised support for patriarchy. Therefore, for Smart, the use of 
rights by women is, in fact, counterproductive because instead of liberating women they 
simply reinforce and reproduce patriarchy. 
Other scholars, being aware of the critical approaches to rights, nevertheless rejected 
the complete discarding of rights and emphasized the role of rights in bringing about positive 
social and legal changes and impoving legal and social position of disempowered social 
groups (Dworkin 1997; Minow 1990; Williams 1991; Cornell 1991). They generally 
subscribe to the idea of classical political philosophy, similarly grounding much of the 
contemporary human rights philosophy, that individuals possess some inalienable and 
universal rights based on the simple fact of being human. Rights thus represent a claim for 
having a space where individuals can exercise their interest and capability ‘to will, to act, to 
choose’ (Langlois 2010, 254). They sustained that a necessary element of a just political order 
is a work of  translating of these natural and inalienable rights, already enacted in the 
countries’ constitutions, into positive law, for example, through judicial decisions and 
legislation.  
In order to bring such positive changes into law though rights, many feminists and 
critical race theorists engaged in the project of reconstructing rights. For example, critical race 
theorists emphasized the importance of using rights strategically to achieve political changes. 
What does it mean to use rights strategically? To begin with, it is to ‘rhetorically invoke the 
“trump” aspect of rights discourse-capturing a sort of historical residue of rhetorical meaning’ 
(Roithmayr 2000, 1127), without necessarily subscribing to the Dworkian idea that rights are 
indeed trumps. Further, according to Williams (1991), communities may use rights as tactical 
means to achieve material gains. Framing their demands through a language that the majority 
still adheres to could improve their material position.  
Other feminist scholars, for example, sought to tackle the individualism that 
characterizes the traditional – liberal – conception of rights. They suggested that rights should 
be reconsidered and seen not as shields protecting the individual space against intrusion but, 
in contrast, as relations. For example, Nedelsky (2011) proposed to regard rights as tools that 
structure relationships among people in such a way that they foster certain values. Thus, she 
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puts in the centre of her reconstructed definition of rights values and relationships that 
promote those values. Further, Herring (2013) suggested that rights could be seen as an 
instrument protecting relational values such as care and responsibility. While rights can and, 
for the most part, do protect individual values and interests, according to Herring, they can 
promote relational values and interests as well. However, despite these attempts to 
reconceptualize rights, the conceptualization of rights as instruments clearing a space for 
individuals ‘to will, to act, to choose’ (Langlois 2010, 254) remains the prevailing one.  
Bioconstitutionalism and rights 
One of the main omissions of current research on bioconstitutionalism, is that its authors do 
not engage sufficiently with critical legal scholarship, feminist studies and other studies that 
have explored rights from a critical perspective. In particular, none of the authors engaged in 
the project of bioconstitutionalism explore rights-biomedicine interaction from the critical 
perspective on rights. However, such work can significantly benefit the theorization of 
bioconstitutionalism by showing the political and ideological underpinnings of how rights are 
claimed and defended in technoscientific controversies. This issue will be the topic of Chapter 
5 of this thesis.  
1.3.3. Co-production of law and technology 
Bioconstitutionalism as developed by Jasanoff and others (2011b) builds on the idea of the 
co-production of social and technoscientific orders (Jasanoff 2004a). The underlying meaning 
of the idiom of co-production is that science and technology, on the one hand, and society, 
including law, on the other, do not develop independently but, in contrast, mutually produce 
and reinforce each other. As Jasanoff observed, ‘knowledge and its material embodiments are 
at once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; society cannot 
function without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without appropriate social 
supports’ (Jasanoff 2004, 3b).  
Regarding law, the idea of co-production, unlike deterministic thinking, implies that 
while law might indeed be in need of being fine-tuned to grapple with new questions, law is 
nevertheless ‘already present as a conceptual and cultural resource, governing responsible 
human behavior and conditioning the terms in which people imagine the normative 
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organization of their worlds’ (Jasanoff 2011). For example, scholars developing the idea of 
co-production build on the works of Shapin and Shaffer (1995) or Ezrahi (1990). According 
to them, the ideas of what democracy is have been intertwined with the conception of ‘good 
science’. Both authors illustrate how the understanding of ‘good science’ and the 
understanding of democracy went hand in hand. With respect to rights, this position means 
the need to abandon deterministic thinking regarding rights. As stated above, it is important to 
see rights not as mere passive guarantees that should be protected against erosion but as 
flexible social and legal instruments. 
The idea of co-production has affinity with two philosophies. First, it traces back to 
Latour and to his view of the world as being essentially ‘hybrid’ rather than composed of 
clearly separated or separable pure elements of nature and culture (Latour 1993). However, 
Jasanoff observes that while co-production builds on this perspective, it overcomes Latour’s 
overemphasis on material products and also takes into account the many ethical norms, 
political interests and legal commitments that participate in the mutual stabilization process of 
technoscientific and social worlds (Jasanoff 2004). However, she criticized this approach as 
not paying enough attention to agency and moral commitments. Therefore, with the idea of 
co-production, Jasanoff is more interested in exploring the role of law and its normative 
power. In this sense, co-production draws closer to the late Foucauldian thinking on 
governmentality in which he asserts his argument about the mutual constitution of the regime 
of jurisdiction and the regime of veridiction and explores the possibility for and the conditions 
of freedom. 
Boundaries  
An important implication of the mutual construction of science and society is the 
acknowledgment that the existence and drawing of boundaries – between human and 
inhuman, nature and culture – is a social and therefore contingent process and not an 
automatic application of their pre-given definitions (Latour 1993). Boundaries are needed 
because they help maintain social order, and the separation of objects and practices of 
external reality from their opposites help maintain or at least create the illusion of this order’s 
presence. In reality, however, all these categories are essentially ‘hybrid’ and mixed up 
(Latour 1993). The recognition that boundary drawing is an essentially social process allows 
 40 
us to look differently at the taken-for-granted boundary between science as a self-contained 
and bounded body of objective knowledge about the world, on the one hand, and society, 
including law, as a domain of values, economic interests and political rationales, on the other. 
Unsurprisingly, researchers working both in public policy and academia have acknowledged 
that this boundary is a myth. They merely differ in views whether it has always been a myth 
that has recently taken on a new form (Shapin and Shaffer 1985; Jasanoff 2004a) or whether it 
is a particular characteristic of the latest trends in scientific development due to its rising 
complexity, uncertainty and risk (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). In any case, all agree that 
things are mixed up.  
The recognition that boundary drawing is an essentially social process has given 
ground to much work exploring how exactly this boundary work is performed. A number of 
concepts emerged, such as ‘boundary-work’ (Gieryn 1983, 1999; Wainwright and others 
2006), ‘boundary organization’ (Guston 1990), and ‘boundary objects’ (Star and Griesemer 
1989). In addition, their methodological potential in uncovering the intricacies of the 
science/politics demarcation has led to the expansion of issues studied through the lens of 
boundary work. For example, the concept entered into the methodological toolkit of scholars 
interested in the production of scientific knowledge for policy purposes called ‘regulatory 
science’ and the role of non-scientists, including policy-makers, in drawing the dividing line 
between science and policy (Bijker et al. 2009; Jasanoff 1990; Wynne 2002; Guston 1999). 
Bioconstitutionalism and co-production  
Bioconstitutionalism builds on the idea of co-production of social and technoscientific orders. 
For example, it dedicates a lot of attention to the problem of boundaries. Thus, one of the 
interests of bioconstitutionalism is how countries deal with ‘boundary-crossing’ objects 
created by science and technology, such as entities produced via somatic cell nuclear transfer, 
human-animal chimeras or IVF embryos, are classified by state regulatory agencies, as a form 
of top-down bioconstitutionalism. For example, it is relevant to analyze whether regulatory 
agencies will place these new techno-scientific objects in the domain of constitutional law, 
where they will be regulated as members of the relevant political community, or in the domain 
of science, where the language of risk will reign (Metzler 2011). These boundary-crossing 
entities are in themselves hybrid, produced via technological means and owing to human 
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ingenuity. Yet, for the purpose of regulation, regulators seek to fix their identity in order to 
know what to do with them. Consistent with the main idea within STS of co-production, 
bioconstitutionalists attempt to show how this classification of objects into ‘objects’ or 
‘subjects’ follows countries’ important constitutional traditions. This work will also engage 
with the idea of boundaries. In Chapter 4, it will illustrate the importance of rights for such 
fundamental boundaries as those drawn around medical professions and knowledge.  
1.3.4. Technology regulation and future-proofing of rights 
The conclusion that rights should not be regarded as mere passive guarantees in need of 
protection is reminiscent of much European scholarship in human rights law and technology 
regulation (Brownsword 2008, Murphy 2009, Hildebrandt 2008, Yeung and Dixon-Woods 
2010, Flear and Vakulenko 2010, Flear 2015), which the authors of bioconstitutionalism 
almost entirely neglect. Furthermore, scholars in technology regulation, and this is where they 
add to the further elaboration of the idea of bioconstitutionalism, explore not only how rights 
change due to biomedical advances, but they are also interested in how rights could and 
should be recast in order to withstand challenges posed by biomedicine. For example, much 
concern in this literature has been expressed with respect to the risk that the Rule of 
Technology might displace the Rule of Law and become new ways of governing 
(Brownsword 2008). This ‘revolutionary sting’ is reminiscent of the Foucauldian studies on 
governmentality, which point to a similar relationship between new technologies and the Rule 
of Law. Both scenarios underline the potential for human rights to become merely one of 
several ‘technologies of hubris’ (Jasanoff 2004; Flear and Vakulenko 2010), an empty shell 
that is designed to quiet public dissent. 
Authors in technology regulation also explore how rights are being challenged by 
other normative discourses such as dignitarianism and utilitarianism, making part of the so-
called ‘bioethical triangle’ (Brownsword 2009). According to Brownsword, human rights 
represent a point of departure in the emerging international regulatory framework on new 
technologies that has been pioneered by UNESCO, but they do not stand alone. They are 
instead one part of an ethical plurality, or ‘bioethical triangle’, sharing the regulatory terrain 
with both a dignitarian ethic and a utilitarian one. Moreover, although the dignitarian ethic 
and the human rights one share a commitment to human dignity, they differ radically as to 
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what is needed in order to protect and promote this commitment. In the rights ethic, dignity is 
linked to autonomy and empowerment whereas, for the ‘dignitarian alliance’ (Brownsword 
2009), dignity is invoked as the reason why we must say ‘no’, ‘no more’, or ‘enough’ to 
particular technologies (Murphy 2009). This difference of opinion on human dignity, and 
more generally the existence of three different ethical frameworks, will not be always 
problematic; sometimes utilitarians, dignitarians and rights advocates will be in agreement. 
But it does suggest that a regulatory framework might be less viable over the longer term and 
because also challenges the idea of human rights as law’s main ‘hope technology’ (Murphy 
2009). 
1.4. Method  
1.4.1. Discourse analysis  
The main method used in this thesis is discourse analysis. It applies the idea of performing 
two-level analysis of discourse elaborated by Hajer (1995). This approach enables the 
researcher to approach the analysis of abstract political processes through the analysis of 
concrete political events, individual strategic actions and speech acts. Following Foucault 
(1980) and Hajer (1995), I understand language not only as a means of communication, but 
also as a practice that shapes reality. For example, calling an embryonic entity ‘a human 
person’ does not mean a neutral description of objective reality, but effects a construction of 
reality according to the normative stance of the speaker.  
Following Hajer (1995), I pay attention to individual actors and therefore perform 
discursive analysis on the level of interpersonal communication. Specifically, I explore two 
elements. First are subject-positions. Subject-positions differ both from Foucauldian 
‘subjectivity’ and conventional psychological ‘roles’. Subject-positioning represents ‘an 
integral part of the processes by which people construct accounts of themselves in interaction 
with others ... as people actively take up positions within different, and sometimes competing, 
discourses’ (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 110). It sees people as ‘active, selecting and 
adapting thoughts, mutating and creating them, in the continued struggle for argumentative 
victory against rival thinkers’ (quoted in Hajer 1995, 54). As a result, they seek ‘not only to 
make others see the problems according to their views but also seek to position other actors in 
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a specific way’ (Hajer 1995, 53). This view of a subject as ‘decentered’ allows us to 
understand logics of the argumentation of a specific actor that may at first glance seem 
unintelligible, but also to illuminate how a subject through argumentation can sustain or 
transform discourses. For example, politicians appealing to strong normative principles can be 
accused by their opponents of religious ‘fundamentalism’ and unwillingness to accept and 
account for the multiplicity of different opinions on the issue. Therefore, these politicians may 
appeal not to religious truth as a justification for their position but to science. However, the 
‘discursive affinity’ of their argument with religious teaching nevertheless leads their 
opponents to position them as religious dogmatists and discard their arguments as illiberal.  
Second, I analyze how the production, reproduction, transformation and change of 
discourses happen through concrete utterances—something that Foucauldian analysis has 
largely neglected. ‘The fact that there are similarities between statements (i.e. historical 
continuity) is to be explained by memory or historical references that people draw upon in a 
new speech situation.’ And, further ‘the rules and conventions that constitute the social order 
have to be constantly reproduced and reconfirmed in actual speech situations, whether in 
documents or debates’ (Hajer 1995, 55). Here metaphors can be very important: as illustrated 
in the following Chapters, ‘Procreative Far West’, ‘the embryo is one of us’, ‘a son at any 
cost’ have been metaphorical ‘anchors’ that sustained and steered the controversy over PGD 
in Italy.  
This reproduction of a discourse often leads to ‘blackboxing’: the process through 
which things start appearing ‘natural’ and fixed (Latour 1987). Blackboxed things or practices 
are usually taken for granted and are not challenged, reconsidered or changed. Opposition to 
blackboxed things or practices is either not possible or hampered. Questioning routinized 
practices that are taken for granted is difficult, because opponents can easily undermine the 
viability and credibility of alternative modes of thinking by referring to historical memory and 
traditions – ‘we have always done it that way’. For example, state prohibition of clinical 
practices such as PGD that were wide-spread in Italy can lead to the objection that, since 
these practices are so wide-spread, both nationally and internationally, they are widely 
supported by the public and do not contradict public morals. However, the dependence of 
discursive change on the degree of its routinization and ‘blackboxing’ remains salient and 
cannot claim absolute predictive power. For example, an opposing party can always interpret 
 44 
routinized practices differently, by saying that they developed exactly because there had been 
no state intervention in their regulation and that the fact they are so wide-spread is the main 
reason for needing to outlaw them. Indeed, this challenge to blackboxed clinical use of 
embryos in Italy was successful and resulted in the prohibition of any sort of embryo 
manipulation in 2004. Therefore, the analysis of concrete statements uttered in public but also 
expressed through written documents, be they laws, law drafts, proposals or government 
opinions, is important to understand how and why particular ideas, understandings or values 
reproduce, transform or change. 
1.4.2. Primary and secondary sources of analysis 
The primary sources of analysis in this work are bills, parliamentary debates and court 
proceedings. I have extracted the texts of all bills submitted to the Italian Parliament (71 bills 
in total) and the minutes of the parliamentary debates in the period from 1984 till 2004, from 
the website of the Italian Senate, www.senato.it. Despite the voluminous data, I have 
performed traditional text analysis of the minutes of parliamentary debates using manual 
analysis and close reading of the texts, both to trace (potential) gradual changes in 
argumentative techniques and the meanings invested by speakers in their speech acts. I have 
also extracted court rulings (20 rulings in total) from the websites www.altalex.it and 
www.cortecostituzionale.it. Similarly to the legislative debates, I have applied manual, close-
reading text analysis of the court rulings.  
To help understand the primary sources and place them in the broader social context in 
which the relevant debates took place, I have furthermore analyzed the secondary Italian 
literature, which has widely discussed the pre-Law and post-Law debates.  
1.5. Contribution 
The main contribution of this thesis consists in providing much-needed exploration of the role 
of rights for the regulation of biomedical practices and technologies from the critical and not 
strictly legal perspectives of CLS, STS and Foucauldian philosophy. The importance of 
researching the role of rights for biomedical regulation from such perspectives has been 
already much emphasized by lawyers interested in investigating this topic (Murphy 2002). 
For example, Murphy and Ó Cuinn (2013) proposed to use ‘STS as a human rights method’ to 
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read and interpret courts’ jurisprudence, its effects and consequences. According to Murphy 
and Ó Cuinn (2013, 289), STS ‘seems a great deal more engaged and engaging, and a great 
deal more reflexive, than their international human rights law counterpart’ in the analysis of 
people’s dealings with new technologies. Thus, they praised the work on ‘biological 
citizenship’ (Rose 2006) as well as stressed the importance of ethnographic research (Franklin 
and Roberts 2006) to provide an alternative understanding of how individuals deal with new 
biomedical practices to the one accepted in mainstream legal thinking. Such an understanding, 
according to them, would help to dispel the fears prevailing in legal scholarship about 
‘science racing ahead’ and jeopardizing some important legal guarantees.  
The work on bioconstitutionalism has been an important step towards such alternative 
explorations. Indeed, Murphy and Ó Cuinn (2013) also mention it as a valuable contribution 
to more nuanced research on rights-biomedicine interaction. However, as I stated above, the 
idiom of bioconstitutionalism remains underexplored in several ways. First, it is not entirely 
clear how bioconstitutionalism relates to biopolitics/biopower/biological citizenship. Second, 
authors do not engage with CLS to explore the ideological underpinnings of rights discourse. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, they are more interested in exploring the patterns along 
which bioconstitutional transformations evolve and are less interested in pinpointing the 
problems of using rights as benchmarks for biomedical regulation. Therefore, further work is 
much needed to take on and further explore bioconstitutionalist approaches to the analysis of 
rights.  
This thesis attempts to address these gaps. First, it elaborates the definition of 
bioconstitutionalism, suggesting that it could be defined a strategy of intervention upon the 
biological existence of citizens, articulated in the form of claiming, attributing, implementing, 
or exercising constitutional rights. This clarification does not only make bioconstitutionalism 
more analytically tractable, but also adds to the theorization on biopolitics by illustrating that 
the rights and sovereign power have not waned in modernity but are ‘alive and well’ (Smith 
2000, 285). Second, it engages with CLS (Chapter 5) and explores the advantages and 
shortcomings of using rights litigation as an instrument that ‘biological citizens’ can use to 
withstand biopolitics from above. Third, in the Conclusion (Chapter 7), this thesis explores 
the pitfalls and the positive aspects of using rights for the regulation of biomedical 
technologies. Fourth, it adds to the research on the regulation of biomedicine through rights 
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by expanding the notion of constitutionalism and exploring the different sites in which rights 
can originate and citizenship can be practiced. 
The Italian controversy around PGD serves as a productive methodological site for 
exploring this problematic. Although all chapters of this work relate to Italy (with the 
exception of Chapter 6, which is a comparative chapter), they all discuss the problematic of 
rights from different, partly overlapping, perspectives and engage with different concepts 
(boundary-work, natural rights, governmentality, biological citizenship, rights vs. counter-
rights). This combination of perspectives on the same case allows a deep and nuanced 
analysis of the controversy and the role of rights in it and prevents a flattened and simplified 
account of the debate (which in my view characterizes the work of many scholars writing 
about the debate, such as Patrick Hanafin). In order to overcome the limitations of a one-
country case study method and to illustrate the importance of context for bioconstitutional 
transformations, Chapter 6 provides a comparison of how ART and human embryo stem cell 
(hESC) research have been approached by regulators in Italy and Germany.  
1.6. Chapters outline  
This work consists of four academic articles that have been submitted (Chapter 3) or accepted 
for publication (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). After explaining related theories and methodologies in 
the present chapter, this work first provides a brief overview of the events surrounding PGD 
in Italy in Chapter 2, which can serve as a point of reference for the reader to keep an 
overview of the different debates and events. The following three Chapters explore the three 
crucial instances in which rights have been involved and debated in the Italian controversy on 
PGD: the debate on and enactment of restrictive provisions of Law 40/2004 to protect the 
rights of IVF embryos (Chapter 3); the debate around the provision that allowed the 
implantation of the maximum of three embryos, both in Parliament and courts (Chapter 4), 
and the litigation campaign of Italian citizens (Chapter 5). These three elements of the 
controversy are covered in the Chapters in largely chronological order. Therefore, each 
Chapter allows to not only get a deeper understanding of how rights figured in the 
controversy, but also tells a story about a specific stage of the controversy and, taken together, 
they reconstruct the history of the debate on PGD. Finally, Chapter 6 compares the regulation 
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of IVF, PGD and hESC in Germany and in Italy. In Chapter 7, I draw conclusions from the 
analysis in all these Chapters.  
More specifically, Chapter 3 explores how a rationality of government – natural rights 
as an external legitimation of political power – was employed to classify IVF embryos either 
as entities having a mere biological existence as zoē, or as human persons, capable of moral 
and political existence, as bios. I show how through the appeal to natural rights of embryos, 
the latter were granted legal subjectivity and rights, and how the implementation of the 
restrictive regulation of ART to ensure the ‘making live and letting die’ (Foucault 1980, 70) 
of these new Italian citizens was performed. In this way, I contend that natural rights have not 
been displaced by other rationalities for the exercise of political power such as nature as an 
internal self-limitation of power. This conclusion may fit with the acknowledgment of other 
scholars that the argument in favor of protecting human nature or human dignity, broadly 
termed ‘dignitarianism’, has increased because of fears that the new biomedical technologies 
may erode the fundamental basis of humans – human dignity (Brownsword, 2008). Finally, I 
argue that the three elements of biopolitics suggested by Lemke – knowledge, power and 
subjectification – also help structure the exercise of biopolitics in cases where natural rights 
act as external limits to government, but they take a different shape if biopolitics is exercised 
according to this modality than they often do in biopolitics as described so far in most 
literature. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the debate around the provisions of Law 40/2004 that prescribed 
a uniform method of performing IVF in Italian fertility clinics. Specifically, the Law obliged 
the treating practitioner to fertilize no more than three oocytes during one IVF cycle and to 
transfer all the embryos created into the patient’s uterus simultaneously. By setting this ‘three 
embryo standard as the constitutive element of IVF, the pro-life members of the Italian 
Parliament sought to prevent the creation of surplus embryos and their cryopreservation, and 
thereby to ensure the rights of IVF embryos. Drawing on the concept of boundary-work 
(Gieryn 1983, 1995), I explore how the Italian Parliament justified the expansion of the 
jurisdictional powers of the State into a domain traditionally occupied by the medical 
profession, namely, the prescription of treatment methods, and how the Italian Constitutional 
Court established and motivated the constitutional illegitimacy of the Parliament’s actions. I 
argue that the demarcation of the jurisdictional domains of the medical profession and the 
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Italian State depended upon how the latter tipped the balance between the conflicting rights of 
IVF embryos and the rights of adult Italian citizens, and the procedures of embryo surplus 
production and cryopreservation acted as a terrain where both the State and the medical 
profession came to defend their interests. As such, the demarcation of the jurisdictional and 
occupational boundaries of the medical profession and the State, and the definition of 
constitutional rights, formed two sides of the same bioconstitutionalist governing project.  
Chapter 5 explores the Italian litigation for access to PGD as an example of biological 
citizenship. It pays particular attention to how exactly the interests of citizens have been 
recognized through rights litigation and therefore engages with the critical approach to rights. 
It illustrates that the recognition of citizens’ interests in the Italian litigation process was 
partial, because the Constitutional Court accepted only the protection of mothers’ health as a 
justification for having access to PGD. Instead, relational values and interests of biological 
citizens such as responsibility and care for the health of their future children, the core element 
of biological citizens’ identity, that the plaintiffs displayed during litigation, were not 
recognized by the Italian Constitutional Court. It links this partiality to the prevailing 
(bio)ethical construction of the embryo as a person whose rights the State was obliged to 
protect, which was consolidated in the Italian legal doctrine. It argue that what was at stake in 
the Italian litigation for PGD was a dispute which right – a more individualistic right (to 
health) or right that encompassed also relational values (the right to reproductive self-
determination) – should legitimize the access to PGD. The former, however, prevailed over 
the latter due to the high value attributed to unborn life in the Italian constitutional order, 
urging the Constitutional Court to recognize that right that would better promote this value. 
Hence, the recognition of biological citizens’ ‘vital rights’ claimed vis-à-vis the state through 
litigation in Italy was partial; however, this was so not because the existing relations of power 
affected how individualistic rights would be balanced, but because certain important societal 
values, consolidated in the constitutional jurisprudence of Italy, prevented the participants of 
the debate from reconceptualizing the right to PGD from an individualistic into a more 
relational one. 
Chapter 6 puts the Italian controversy on PGD in a comparative perspective and 
compares the ways in which Germany and Italy, countries with comparably strong bioethical 
reservations against new biomedical technologies, debated and enacted regulations on IVF, 
 49 
hESC and PGD. It is directed towards analyzing human dignity because exactly the protection 
of human dignity, conceptualized as sanctity of life in Italy, was the main purpose for 
adopting the restrictive Law 40/2004. It explores the debate on these technologies in Italy and 
Germany from a comparative perspective to shed light on when and under which 
circumstances the appeal to human dignity in public debates around new technological and 
scientific practices becomes problematic. The main argument of this Chapter is that in both 
countries, ‘human dignity as constraint’ played a key role in the political debate around the 
new ART and hESC research, mainly because these were framed as a potential assault on 
human dignity. Yet, the two countries differed in terms of their success to build their policies 
regarding ART and hESC research upon the principle of human dignity. Two factors were 
responsible for this difference. The first factor was whether dignitarianism is the dominant 
bioethical perspective in the relevant country. The second factor was the degree to which the 
regulators were willing to strike compromises with their opponents if dignitarianism was not 
the dominant bioethical perspective or was competing with other bioethical perspectives for 
regulatory relevance.  
Finally, in Chapter 7, I draw conclusions from previous Chapters to answer the main 
research questions. I first conclude how rights figured in the debate on PGD and then discuss 
the advantages, problems and difficulties of using rights for regulating new biomedical 
technologies such as PGD.  
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CHAPTER 2 
  
The debate on preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
in Italy 
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2.1. Parliamentary debate1 
2.1.1. IX Legislature (1983-1987) 
Santosuosso Commission 
First attempts to regulate the application of reproductive technologies in Italy date back to 
mid-1980s. In 1984 the then Minister of Health Costante Degan set up a special 
interdisciplinary commission to inquire into technical, scientific, ethical, social and legal 
issues raised by homologous insemination and to produce a text that could subsequently serve 
as the basis for a law. The Commission included doctors, biologists, philosophers, lawyers 
and public officials and was presided by the then judge Fernando Santosusso. The debates of 
the Commission lasted one year and resulted in the presentation of two bills preceded by 
explanatory reports. They prohibited heterologous insemination, gamete donation, the access 
to reproductive technologies to single women and homosexual couples, but allowed the 
production of surplus embryos and their following cryopreservation if that was necessary to 
protect woman’s health.  
Degan Circular 
The Government did not implement the proposals of the Santosuosso Commission. Instead, 
two months prior their publishing, he issued a ministerial circular entitled “Limits and 
conditions of legitimacy of services for artificial insemination in the domain of SSN”. The 
Circular prohibited the creation, freezing and preservation of embryos for research and 
industrial purposes, as well as for deferred implantation. It was more restrictive than the 
proposals of the Santosuosso Commission which allowed embryo cryopreservation. An 
important feature of the Circular consisted in that it applied to public IVF clinics only, that is, 
to those that belonged to the National Health Service ("Servizio Sanitario Nazionale", SSN). 
                                                
1 Since the following Chapters only discuss parts of the Italian PGD debate that are 
relevant for the purpose of the Chapter at issue, this Chapter offers a more comprehensive, 
descriptive overview of the Italian PGD debate, which the reader can use for reference 
purposes. This Chapter thus integrates various descriptive parts that feature in the following 
Chapters.  
 53 
The provision of IVF services by private clinics therefore remained beyond the regulatory 
scope of the Circular.  
First bills 
Alongside governmental attempts to bring ART under state control, the intention to initiate 
parliamentary discussion of the future law also came from the Italian Parliament. Several 
parliamentarians engaged in the drafting of a number of bills which expressed alternative 
visions of how reproductive technologies ought to be regulated. In total 9 bills were submitted 
to both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The main purpose of the majority of the 
presented bills was to avoid abuses which the unregulated sector of assisted reproduction 
could give rise to. These abuses boiled down to the commercialization of reproductive 
technologies, ‘exploitation’ of patients, infliction of harm on women and newborns and a 
number of controversial practices as eugenics and surrogacy. Unlike the Santosuosso reports, 
the need to outlaw these detrimental practices was framed without any explicit reference to 
establishing certain normativities.  
Donum Vitae 
In 1987, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the highest-ranking department of the 
administrative apparatus of the Roman Catholic Church, published the Instruction for Human 
Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation Donum Vitae. The Instruction contained 
the official position of the Roman Catholic Church on the issues of human assisted 
reproduction. The only reproductive technology that the Instruction approved was 
homologous insemination. IVF was condemned, together with other technologies 
(heterologous insemination, surrogacy) because they violated firm principles of Catholic 
teaching: ‘the life of the human being called into existence and the special nature of the 
transmission of human life in marriage’. A notable feature of the Instruction was that it 
included the requirements with regard to assisted reproduction addressed both to those who 
used them (patients, clinicians, scientists) and to regulators. Furthermore, it created an explicit 
link between moral values and positive law.  
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2.1.2. X Legislature (1987-1992) 
Petition ‘For life and dignity of the man’ 
In September 1987, a petition ‘For life and dignity of the man’ signed by 2.5 millions of 
Italian citizens was presented to the Italian Parliament. The Parliament was asked to extend 
legal protection to the embryo from the moment of conception that could guarantee “respect 
for life being born and dying” (‘la vita nascente e morente’). The draft of the petition's text 
and the collection of signatures have been organized by the Movement for life and personally 
by its president Carlo Casini.  
Bills and the parliamentary motion 
Later, the text of the popular petition became the basis of two important legal documents 
which set the stage for further deliberation of reproductive technologies. In July 1988, a 
number of parliamentarians presented a parliamentary motion which appealed to the Italian 
government and called it ‘to promote a moratorium on all types of research and 
experimentation related to the manipulation of embryos’. Later, in December of the same 
year, 23 parliamentarians, including Carlo Casini and the president of the Christian 
Democracy Mino Martinazzoli drafted and presented to the Parliament a bill also building 
upon the text of the petition. The main purpose of the Martinazzoli bill was to ‘extend the 
protection of the right to health and to physical integrity onto the initial phase of human 
existence’ and thereby to recognize human embryo as a subject of rights, particularly of the 
right to life. Besides Martinazzoli bill, another seven bills, both of liberal and more restrictive 
disposition, were submitted to Parliament.  
Establishment of the National Committee on Bioethics 
Another way of establishing state control over the development and use of reproductive 
technologies consisted in setting up an institution that would discuss and pronounce decisions 
on ambiguous issues raised by new scientific and technological developments, including 
reproductive technologies. A number of parliamentarians suggested to establish a Committee 
(or Commission) charged with a task of considering ‘bioethical’ topics. According to them, 
this institution should be composed of members with high scientific record and act 
independently from the Parliament but be accountable to the Presidency of the Council. Other 
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groups of parliamentarians stressed that a body with similar competences should be instituted 
but it should be accountable to the Parliament. A third motion was made to institute a 
Commission within the Ministry of Health. The latter has been immediately discarded as 
similar and ‘unsuccessful’ attempts have been already made through the institution of the 
Santosuosso Commission. The motions were consolidated into a parliamentary resolution that 
paved the way for the institution of a national Italian bioethics committee - the National 
Committee on Bioethics instituted in 1990. 
2.1.3. XI (1992-1994) and XII (1994-1996) Legislatures  
Busnelli Commission 
In XII The Ministry of Grace and Justice established another inquiry commission presided by 
Francesco Busnelli in the XII Legislature. The Commission issued a report which had a rather 
liberal frame: it recognized the right to access heterologous and post-mortem insemination, 
gamete donation and did not forbid embryo cryopreservation. However, the report of the 
Busnelli Commission was met with an arduous opposition from the Vatican. According to 
Busnelli himself, this was the reason why the project was not passed to the parliament: “the 
work had been done, but the results have been put on the shelf”.  
Bills 
Beside the work of the Busnelli Commission, the Parliament received a number of bills from 
various parliamentarians. Thus, in XI Legislature in total five bills were submitted and sixteen 
bills during XII Legislature. However, all of them had the same destiny: with the fall of 
parliamentary coalitions, their discussion had not even started.  
2.1.4. XIII Legislature (1996-2001) 
‘Progetto Bolognesi’ 
The task of elaborating a bill was assigned to the Commission on Social Affairs of the 
Chamber of Deputies presided by Marida Bolognesi, a member of the ‘Democrats of the Left’ 
(‘Democratici di Sinistra - L’Ulivo’). The Commission received in total seventeen different 
proposals elaborated by individual parliamentarians and parliamentary groups. To make the 
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process of deliberation more efficient and smooth, Bolognesi set up a special Restrictive 
Committee. After several months of intensive deliberation, the Restrictive committee came up 
with a bill. The Bill represented a clear attempt to find a compromise between opposing views 
on the right way of regulating ART. Among its most significant provisions were the 
prohibition of the access to IVF to singles and to homosexual couples and the restriction of 
the number of embryos to be produced to four in order to avoid the problem of surplus 
embryos. At the same time the Bill allowed heterologous insemination and embryo 
cryopreservation. In addition, it did not oblige the doctor to implant all the embryos 
simultaneously, which meant the possibility to select embryos without general and 
chromosomal abnormalities in the case PGD was sought. During the discussion of the Bill in 
the Commission of Social Affairs, it was amended. In particular, the provision that restricted 
the number of produced embryos was modified: the embryos had to be implanted 
simultaneously. However, the overall spirit of the law remained the same.  
Several parliamentarians, including the most active opponent to this bill, a member of 
the ultra-right conservative party North League Alessandro Cè published a Report of the 
minority group. Cè became the main and most active opponent to Bolognesi when the bill 
was passed to the Chamber of Deputies for further deliberation. Cè promoted the granting of 
legal personhood to the human embryo. Almost immediately after the bill was passed to the 
Chamber of Deputies, art. 1 of the bill was amended to include the embryo in the list of 
subjects whose rights the future law had to protect. Marida Bolognesi refused to support the 
bill and her position as a Reporter for the majority group was substituted by Cè. The Chamber 
of Deputies voted for the amended bill in its restrictive formulation.  
When the bill was passed to the Senate for deliberation, some of its provisions that 
had been amended by the Chamber of Deputies, were amended again. One of them was the 
provision that granted rights to the embryo. However, the approved bill was abandoned 
because of the fall of the coalition government.  
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2.1.5. XIV (2001-2006) Legislature 
Law 40/2004 
Similarly to the XIII Legislature, in the XIV Legislature, the work on a bill on ART was 
delegated to the Commission on Social Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies. The Commission 
received in total sixteen bills from different parliamentarians and parliamentarian groups. 
Again, similarly to the previous Legislature, the Commission established a Restrictive 
Committee to examine them and to elaborate a unified bill. The Committee held a number of 
informal meetings with two experts in biomedicine, doctors Carlo Flamigni and Bruno Dalla 
Piccola, who provided the Committee with technical details about the use of reproductive 
technologies. As a result of the internal meetings of the Committee and taking into account 
the opinions of medical experts, the Commission elaborated a unified bill. Its spirit and text 
were very similar to those of the bill voted for by the Chamber of Deputies in the XIII 
Legislature. It prohibited heterologous insemination, embryo cryopreservation, PGD, the 
access to IVF to single women and homosexual couples and laid down the obligation to 
produce no more than three embryos and to implant them simultaneously. The Chamber of 
Deputies adopted the Bill without introducing any amendments. After the Senate introduced 
slight changes regarding the rights of embryos, it was passed for approval to the Chamber of 
Deputies. On 10 February 2004 the Chamber of Deputies approved the bill, which became 
Law 40/2004.  
In art. 1, the Law recognized the human embryo as a right-holder. It allowed the 
access to ART only to infertile couples if other methods of treating infertility resulted 
unsuccessful.2 Further, in art. 13, the Law forbade embryo experimentation,3 prescribed that 
                                                
2 Law 40/2004, art. 4 para. 1. ‘Il ricorso alle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente 
assistita è consentito solo quando sia accertata l'impossibilità di rimuovere altrimenti le cause 
impeditive della procreazione ed è comunque circoscritto ai casi di sterilità o di infertilità 
inspiegate documentate da atto medico nonché ai casi di sterilità o di infertilità da causa 
accertata e certificata da atto medico’. 
3  ibid, art. 13, para. 1. ‘È vietata qualsiasi sperimentazione su ciascun embrione 
umano’. 
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clinical and experimental research must be performed only for the sake of the embryo itself,4 
and forbade the creation of embryos for scientific and experimental research and eugenic 
embryo selection.5 Finally, in art. 14 it prohibited the discarding and cryopreservation of 
embryos,6 and further prescribed that the doctors must not ‘create embryos in a number higher 
than the one strictly necessary for a single and simultaneous transfer, and in any case not 
more than three’.7 The only exception to the general rule of the prohibition of embryo 
cryoconservation were serious health issues of the female patient, ‘unforeseen at the moment 
of fertilization’, which allowed doctors to freeze embryos, but after addressing these health 
issues, the doctor was obliged to proceed with embryo implantation.8 Thus, whereas the Law 
                                                
4 ibid, art. 13, para. 2. ‘La ricerca clinica e sperimentale su ciascun embrione umano è 
consentita a condizione che si perseguano finalità esclusivamente terapeutiche e diagnostiche 
ad essa collegate volte alla tutela della salute e allo sviluppo dell'embrione stesso, e qualora 
non siano disponibili metodologie alternative’. 
5 ibid, art. 13, para. 3. ‘Sono, comunque, vietati: a) la produzione di embrioni umani a 
fini di ricerca o di sperimentazione o comunque a fini diversi da quello previsto dalla presente 
legge; b) ogni forma di selezione a scopo eugenetico degli embrioni e dei gameti ovvero 
interventi che, attraverso tecniche di selezione, di manipolazione o comunque tramite 
procedimenti artificiali, siano diretti ad alterare il patrimonio genetico dell'embrione o del 
gamete ovvero a predeterminarne caratteristiche genetiche, ad eccezione degli interventi 
aventi finalità diagnostiche e terapeutiche, di cui al comma 2 del presente articolo’.   
6 ibid, art. 14 para. 1. ‘È vietata la crioconservazione e la soppressione di embrioni, 
fermo restando quanto previsto dalla legge 22 maggio 1978, n. 194’.  
7  ibid, art. 14 para. 2. ‘Le tecniche di produzione degli embrioni, tenuto conto 
dell'evoluzione tecnico- scientifica e di quanto previsto dall'articolo 7, comma 3, non devono 
creare un numero di embrioni superiore a quello strettamente necessario ad un unico e 
contemporaneo impianto, comunque non superiore a tre’. 
8 ibid, art. 14 para. 3. ‘Qualora il trasferimento nell'utero degli embrioni non risulti 
possibile per grave e documentata causa di forza maggiore relativa allo stato di salute della 
donna non prevedibile al momento della fecondazione è consentita la crioconservazione degli 
embrioni stessi fino alla data del trasferimento, da realizzare non appena possibile’. 
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did not specifically outlaw PGD, these provisions made it impossible in practice. In the same 
year, these provisions of the Law were implemented into the guidelines of the Ministry of 
Health introducing a new medical protocol of performing IVF both for public and private 
Italian clinics. 
2.2. Abrogative referenda (2005) 
Immediately after the Italian Parliament approved the Law on MAP, several political parties 
led by the Radical Party initiated a campaign for calling an abrogative referendum to repeal 
the Law. The referendum committee collected the required number of signatures (500,000) 
for a total of five referendum proposals. The first proposal called for entirely repealing the 
Law. The other four proposals concerned the repeal of various of the Law’s provisions and 
were drafted in case the Court would not endorse the first proposal. They concerned the repeal 
of the most controversial provisions: the provision outlawing embryo cryopreservation and 
experimentation (first proposal), the duty of transferring the produced embryos 
simultaneously and the prohibition to access reproductive technologies by fertile couples 
(second proposal), the provision granting legal personhood to the embryo (third proposal) and 
the prohibition of donor insemination (fourth proposal). The Constitutional Court endorsed 
the last four proposals and rejected the proposal calling for repealing the entire Law. 
In 2005 the Italian Bishops’ Conference installed a special committee called ‘Science 
and Life Committee’ (Comitato Scienza & Vita). The main objective of the Committee was to 
act as the Church’s official spokesperson on the issues put to vote at the referenda, to 
coordinate Catholic associations and movements and influence Catholic Italians’ positions 
though instructing them how to vote. The main political tactic employed by the Church was to 
call for abstentionism. ‘Sulla vita non si vota’ (‘Life cannot be put to vote’) was the main 
slogan used by the Church to stress that crucial social and ethical values are simply not those 
that can be discussed via such mundane political means as popular referenda. The campaign 
of the Church proved successful. The voters’ turnout was twenty-five percent, while the 
Italian Constitution stipulates a threshold of fifty percent as the condition for validity of a 
referendum. The provisions of the Law remained in force.  
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2.3. Litigation  
Catania case 3 May 2004  
The plaintiffs (husband and wife) were healthy carriers of beta thalassemia and were infertile. 
They sought PGD to screen out affected embryos and start pregnancy with healthy embryos. 
They started proceedings against the fertility center, claiming the violation of the wife’s rights 
under art. 2 (the guarantee of inviolable human rights) and art. 32 (the right to health and the 
right not to be forced to submit to unwanted medical treatment) were violated. The court held 
that the plaintiffs claimed not the right to health but the ‘right to a healthy child’, which the 
Italian constitution does not guarantee, and dismissed the case.  
Cagliari case 16 July 2005 
Similarly to the Cagliari case, in the present case the husband and wife were carriers of beta 
thalassemia and were infertile. The first IVF cycle at the fertility center was performed 
without PGD. When after prenatal testing the couple learned the fetus was affected with beta 
thalassemia, the woman performed abortion. Due to abortion, the wife developed an ‘anxiety 
depressive disorder’ and wished to perform IVF and PGD to prevent any further negative 
impacts on her mental state. However, the fertility clinic refused to perform PGD. In courts 
proceedings, the couple claimed that the prohibition of PGD created harm to her mental 
health and therefore infringed upon her constitutional right to health (art. 32). The court 
questioned the constitutionality of the PGD prohibition. According to the court, PGD should 
be allowed if and only if the health of the woman was at stake. The court submitted the case 
to the Constitutional Court for adjudicating art. 1. para 1. of Law 40/2004 upon its 
constitutionality.  
Constitutional Court case 24 October 2006 
This case was a follow-up to the Cagliari case. The Constitutional Court found the request of 
the Cagliari judge inadmissible on procedural grounds. It held the Cagliari court had not 
correctly formulated the appeal. 
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Florence cases 17 December 2007, 23 August 2008, 11-12 July 2008 and Tribunale 
Amministrativo Regionale of Lazio case 31 October 2007 
All the couples involved were carriers of genetically mutated genes. In these instances, other 
aspects of the constitutionality of Law 40/2004 were raised. In the cases decided by the 
Florence court, other adverse health effects the Law entailed were emphasized, such as 
ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, ovarian cancer, or multiple pregnancy. The TAR Lazio 
court also concluded that Law 40/2004 in fact provided limited rather than absolute embryo 
protection. It stated that the ‘three embryo’ rule meant that the protection of embryos was not 
absolute, because by allowing to implant three embryos and not one, the Law acknowledged 
the need to reduce embryo protection to ensure better prospects of a pregnancy. Therefore, it 
concluded that, because Parliament implicitly considered embryo protection not to be an 
absolute value, it was unreasonable to limit the number of embryos to three and to prohibit the 
cryopreservation of embryos. Furthermore, these restrictions created health risks to the female 
patient and therefore might violate art. 32 of the Constitution. The Florence court and TAR 
Lazio asked the Constitutional Court if art. 14 paras. 1, 3 and 4 were unconstitutional.   
Constitutional Court case 1 April 2009 
As a follow-up to the Florence and Lazio cases, the Constitutional Court decided that art. 14 
(paras. 2 and 3) were unconstitutional as they violated the right to health of the woman. 
However, the Court did not find unconstitutional art. 14 para. 1 of the Law, which prohibited 
embryo cryopreservation as a general rule.  
Cagliari case 9 November 2012 
This court case also concerned the access to PGD. The court decided PGD was only allowed 
if the health of the woman would otherwise be at risk, declining to grant access to PGD as a 
right to a healthy child. 
Salerno case 13 January 2010 and Rome cases 15 January 2014 and 28 February 2014  
These cases concerned the right to access ART and PGD by fertile couples. The courts 
acknowledged both the right to health (art. 32) and the right to a healthy child, part of the 
right of self-determination, (open-ended art. 2 of the Italian Constitution) as justifying access 
to PGD. They submitted art. 4 para 1. (allowing access to ART only to infertile couples) to 
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the Constitutional Court to decide on its constitutionality with respect to art. 2 (as including 
the right to self-determination and right to a healthy child), art. 3 (right to equality) and art. 32 
(right to health) of the Italian Constitution.  
Constitutional Court case 14 May 2015 
The Constitutional Court found that art. 4 para. 1 violated only two articles of the 
Constitution, namely, art. 3 and art. 32. It concluded that it was unreasonable to prohibit 
access to ART and PGD to fertile couples while at the same time allowing access to prenatal 
testing and abortion. This unreasonable prohibition violated art. 3 of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, since abortion was much more traumatic than PGD, the prohibition of access to 
ART and PGD also violated art. 32 on the right to health. As a result, the Court concluded 
that women should be allowed to access ART and PGD on the same grounds as they are 
allowed to perform abortion, that is, when the health condition of the embryo or pregnancy 
creates ‘grave risks’ to mothers’ health, as stipulated by art. 6 para. 1b of Law 194/1978.  
Naples case 3 April 2014 
The Naples court was asked to decide a case in which the doctors of a fertility center in 
Naples were accused of committing a crime that consisted in embryo destruction. 
Specifically, doctors performed PGD, requested by a number of Italian couples, and following 
the results of PGD and IVF discarded embryos with detected pathologies instead of freezing 
them. The defenders of the doctors asked the Naples court whether the provisions of Law 
40/2004 prohibiting embryo selection (art. 13 para. 3) and embryo destruction (art. 14 para. 1) 
violated, respectively, art. 32 (right to health) and art. 2 (right to self-determination) of the 
Constitution. The defenders also asked the Court to submit the case to the Constitutional 
Court for adjudication on the matter of its constitutionality. The Court agreed with the 
defenders and submitted the case to the Constitutional Court.  
Constitutional Court case 21 October 2015 
The Constitutional Court declared the provision forbidding the selection of embryos (art. 13 
para. 3) unconstitutional, because the prohibition to select and implant only healthy embryos 
would cause harm to women’s health and therefore would violate art. 32 of the Constitution. 
However, it did not find that the prohibition of destroying embryos (art. 14 para. 1) was 
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unconstitutional and violated the right to self-determination. Specifically, it concluded that 
‘the embryo, in fact, irrespective of the amount of subjectivity that is attributed to the genesis 
of life, is definitely not a mere biological material’. Its protection could be limited only if 
necessary to protect a value of greater legal and moral weight, such as women’s health. Since 
Law 40/2004 no longer obliged the doctor to transfer an embryo with a genetic disease into 
the patient’s uterus, it did not create risks to her health and therefore was not in violation of 
the Constitution.  
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3.1. Introduction1  
The success of in vitro fertilization (IVF) techniques in late 1970s prompted many countries 
in Western Europe to regulate IVF and IVF-based assisted reproduction technologies (ART) 
and bring them under state control. Belatedly, Italy became the last country to introduce a law 
(Law 40/2004) regulating the provision of ART services in Italian fertility clinics. Before that, 
the legislative vacuum had de facto rendered all ART techniques lawful. That vacuum was 
then filled by a controversial and restrictive Law 40/2004. The Law allowed access to ART to 
stable heterosexual couples of a fertile age, who could use only their own gametes to initiate 
pregnancy. The Law also prescribed that, irrespective of their morphological and genetic 
characteristics, all embryos produced during one IVF cycle (which should not exceed three) 
must be implanted into the woman’s uterus. Together with the prohibition of embryo 
cryopreservation, the Law sought to prevent the creation of surplus embryos, that is, embryos 
which would not eventually be implanted into their genetic mother.  
The enactment of these restrictive norms was meant to make clinical practices 
involving the use of human embryos consistent with the principle first introduced in art. 1 of 
the Law. This article recognized the human embryo as a right-holder and prescribed that the 
techniques of ART should henceforth be performed ‘under the conditions and according to 
the modalities foreseen in the present law which ensures the rights of all the involved 
subjects, including the conceptus’. Embryos thus were included in the scope of ‘citizen 
subjects’ (Metzler 2011) and became full-fledged Italian citizens whose rights to life and 
health the State had to guarantee, in particular, by restricting the scope of ART that could be 
practiced on Italian territory. 
In this article, I explore the debate on, and enactment of, the restrictive provisions of 
Law 40/2004 through the conceptual lens of biopolitics (Foucault 1980, 2007, 2008; Lemke 
2011a, 2011b). In his lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault observed that ‘the general 
framework of biopolitics’ is liberalism (2008, 22). For Foucault, liberalism is not as an 
economic theory or a political ideology but as a specific art of governing which involves two 
types of legitimation and limitation of political power. The first type includes those 
instruments that are ‘external and excessive in relation to government’ (Foucault 2008, 9). By 
                                                
1 Article submitted to the journal Biosocieties. 
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these instruments, Foucault primarily meant the concepts of ‘original or natural rights’ and 
‘social contract’. As Foucault (2008, 39) stated, ‘this approach consists in starting from the 
rights of man in order to arrive at the limitation of governmentality by way of the constitution 
of the sovereign’. In other words, according to this approach, individuals resign some of their 
natural rights and submit to the authority of the sovereign, in exchange for obliging the latter 
to protect the remaining essential natural rights against other people or the state itself. This 
way of limiting state power was implemented by the French revolutionaries and found its 
most explicit theoretical elaboration in the idea of the ‘social contract’ of Rousseau.  
The second type of limitation derives from governmental practice itself and from the 
‘de facto limits that can be set to this governmentality’ (Foucault 2008, 40). This is where 
Foucault starts to develop his view on a new rationality of government that differs from 
previous historical rationalities of government such as state reason (raison d’état): the idea of 
a nature of society that constitutes the basis and the internal limits of governmental practice. 
Nature here is not a carryover of tradition and therefore differs from ‘natural rights’ used as 
an external limit to government. Instead, it represents a form of self-regulation of a society 
that the government should respect if it does not want to act ‘clumsily’. The main intellectual 
element used to know society’s nature is political economy. As Foucault (2008, 15) states, 
political economy 
considers them [governmental practices] in terms of their effects rather than their origins, 
not by asking, for example, what authorizes a sovereign to raise taxes, but by asking, 
quite simply: What will happen if, at a given moment, we raise a tax on a particular 
category of persons or a particular category of goods? 
Because the limits to political power are set from within by nature, the ‘coordinates of 
governmental action are no longer legitimacy or illegitimacy but success or failure; rejection 
focuses not on the abuse or arrogance of power but rather on ignorance concerning its use’ 
(Lemke 2011a, 46). Therefore, in order to learn whether the government is acting properly, ‘it 
is necessary to investigate the “natural order of things” that defines both the foundations and 
the limits of governmental action’ (Lemke 2011a, 46). According to Foucault, this second 
conception of legitimation and limitation of power has been dominant, although the first one 
has not entirely disappeared.  
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In his lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault started to discuss biopolitics as an art 
of government that employed this second type of rationality – nature as a de facto limitation 
of political power. According to Foucault, biopolitics emerged in the eighteenth century and 
largely superseded the previous and pre-modern – the ‘juridico-discursive’ – mode of power. 
This latter consisted in the power of the sovereign to seize ‘things, time, bodies, ultimately the 
life of subjects’ and operated according to a rather simple binary code of the sovereign’s right 
over the life and death of its subjects (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 195; Lemke 2011). Instead, 
biopolitics takes places on the threshold of modernity and signals the passage to liberalism 
and therefore operates according to a different – liberal – mechanism. First, ‘life and its 
mechanisms’ moved into the realm of politics. As Foucault (1980, 142) observes, ‘for the first 
time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence’. This meant 
that the zoē, the biological life of men, became the concern of political life: ‘Western man was 
gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world (Foucault 1980, 142). 
The concern for the biological life of men prompted the state to ensure the ‘fostering’ or 
‘investing (of) life through and through’ with a purpose of ‘normalizing’ the population and 
its health. Second, liberalism means the use of particular instruments of government which 
was dictated by the ‘naturalness of the human species’ (Foucault 2008), that is, by the fact 
that life of the population – birth, death, diseases, etc. – evolves according to some natural 
laws. Biopolitics thus includes such regulatory mechanisms as forecasting, statistics, 
measuring mortality and birth rates, the use of human sciences such as biology with a main 
aim to ‘prescribe norms, adjust anomalies to an equilibrium and maintain an average among 
the “general population”’ (Klein 2010, 402). Foucault stresses that ‘nature’ of the population 
does not represent an entirely autonomous reality that governmental action should respect. In 
contrast, it is a particular focus for governmental intervention. However, as it develops 
according to its own logic, the government should ‘know’ it in order to be able to influence it.  
Although Foucault connected biopolitics with liberalism, he did not explore this 
connection any further. However, according to Lemke (2011a, 2011b), these few explorations 
represent an important step in how Foucault regarded biopolitics. His first writings on 
biopolitics, for example, in Discipline and Punish, first treated biopolitics as including only 
disciplinary power; therefore, biopolitics was a kind of ‘body politics’, performed on the zoē, 
the bodies, of individuals (Agamben 1998). Viewing biopolitics as an art of government 
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instead gives important advantages for it allows one to connect two dimensions of human 
existence – biological existence (zoē) and moral and political existence (bios) – and to explore 
how they are intertwined. The importance of connecting these two dimensions is important 
because liberalism gives rise to a particular question: ‘how are free subjects — subjects of law 
— governed when they are simultaneously understood as living beings?’ (Lemke 2011b, 
175). Hence, biopolitics includes three elements which together participate in biopolitical 
governance (Lemke 2011a, 2011b; Rabinow and Rose 2006). The first element is knowledge 
and experts authorized to speak truth. Systematic knowledge about life and living beings is 
required to ‘provide cognitive and normative maps that open up biopolitical spaces and define 
both subjects and objects of intervention’ (Lemke 2011a, 119). The second element is power 
strategies, including ‘strategies for intervention upon collective existence in the name of life 
and health’ (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 197) and strategies of power that ‘mobilize knowledge 
of life and how processes of power generate and disseminate forms of knowledge’ (2011a, 
119). The first type of strategies also encompasses the strategies of subjectification. They 
include both bodily disciplining and regulation of the population and the self-constitution of 
individuals as individual and collective subjects. Subjectification in this second sense is 
performed with the help of ‘technologies of the social’, through which individuals identify 
themselves as part of a society, and ‘technologies of the self’, through which individuals 
shape a particular attitude towards their bodies, their health, and their conduct. The third 
element is the types of identities that subjectification produces. They include, for example, 
new biosocial communities such as patient groups (Rabinow 1996) and the new type of 
identity termed ‘somatic individuality’ (Rose 2006).  
The Foucauldian concept of biopolitics, understood as the type of biopolitics whose 
shape and form of exercise are determined by the ‘natural’ basis of the population, has been 
particularly interesting for scholars exploring the social implications of the transformation of 
‘life itself’ by new biotechnological practices (Franklin 2000; Rose 2006). One of the main 
conclusions deriving from this type of research is that biopolitical strategies are now 
‘democratized’, and political goals for ensuring health protection of the population 
intertwined with the personal individuals’ aspirations for good health. For example, Rose 
suggested that biopolitics should be now regarded as ‘ethopolitics’. Ethopolitics is  
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the ways in which the ethos of human existence—the sentiments, moral nature or guiding 
beliefs of persons, groups, or institutions—have come to provide the “medium” within 
which the self-government of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the 
imperatives of good government… If discipline individualizes and normalizes, and 
biopower collectivizes and socializes, ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-techniques 
by which human beings should judge themselves and act upon themselves to make 
themselves better than they are. (Rose 2001, 18) 
The emphasis on individuals as agents of biopolitics is in line with Foucauldian theorizations 
on liberalism and represents a logical solution to the question: ‘how are free subjects — 
subjects of law — governed when they are simultaneously understood as living beings?’.  
In this article, using the Italian debate around Law 40/2004, I explore an alternative 
way in which the physical being of zoē became intertwined with the moral and political 
existence of bios. Specifically, I illustrate how another rationality of government – natural 
rights as an external legitimation of political power – was employed to classify IVF embryos 
either as entities having a mere biological existence as zoē, or as human persons, thus capable 
of moral and political existence as bios. I show how through the appeal to natural rights of 
embryos, the latter were granted legal subjectivity and rights, and how the implementation of 
the restrictive regulation of ART to ensure the ‘making live and letting die’ of these new 
Italian citizens was performed (Foucault 1980, 70). In this way, I contend that natural rights 
have not been displaced by other rationalities for the exercise of political power such as 
nature as an internal self-limitation of power. This conclusion may fit with the 
acknowledgment of other scholars that the argument in favor of protecting human dignity, 
broadly termed ‘dignitarianism’, has increased because of fears that the new biomedical 
technologies may erode the fundamental basis of humans – human dignity (Brownsword 
2008). Finally, I argue that the three elements of biopolitics suggested by Lemke – 
knowledge, power and subjectification – also help structure the exercise of biopolitics in cases 
where natural rights act as external limits to government, but they take a different shape if 
biopolitics is exercised according to this modality.  
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3.2. Italian politics, Catholic bioethics and embryo as a human person 
The public debate on the law on ART in Italy has been significantly influenced by 
Catholicism. One of the main ways in which Catholicism affected the debate on ART in Italy 
was its influence on how ART were problematized (Fischer 2000). Specifically, and unlike in 
many other European countries (Parfenchyk and Flos 2017; Hermann 2009; Mulkay 1997), 
the dominant problematization of ART was its potential assault on human life and dignity in 
which the ‘human’ largely meant one concrete entity – the human embryo.  
The reasons why the problematic that ART raise was reduced to the ‘embryo question’ 
were related to the two guises that the Catholic Church had taken in Italy, namely, its acting 
both as a morality-setting institution and a political actor. Although there has been a break 
between how the Vatican affected politics before the 1990s and after, the Vatican was acting 
as an important and powerful political actor and thereby was setting its ethical norms on an 
institutional level, supporting this by implementing positive laws. In this way, a particular – 
Catholic – bioethical perspective also became a dominant biopolitical strategy of governing 
the Italian population, including IVF embryos.  
Thus, in the period between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of 
the 1990s, the Vatican had been supporting the main Italian Catholic political party Christian 
Democracy (Democrazia Christiana, DC) and therewith had had a political ally in its 
campaign to defend core Catholic ideals. One of the most substantial impacts that the Vatican 
had had on the activities of the DC was its support of a network of Catholic organizations 
associated with the DC (these have been called ‘collateral’ because of their tight connection 
with the party (Galli 1978; Giorgi 2013)). These associations had supported the DC through 
political activism and mobilization of Catholics in the social and political life of Italy (Giorgi 
2013). The Catholic presence therefore has been strongly institutionalized, which affected 
both the forms of involvement of the Italian citizenry in social and political life of the country 
and their political convictions. 
In 1994, following corruption scandals and the ‘Mani pulite’ (‘Clean hands’) 
campaign, the DC disintegrated. This changed the relationship between the Church and Italian 
politics. On the one hand, the corruption scandals and failure to remain the central political 
force led the Vatican to abandon its direct support of political parties. In 1995 the Italian 
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Bishops Conference at its meeting in Palermo declared the impartiality of the Church and its 
political non-alignment. This impartiality, however, did not mean neutrality. One of the 
results of the Palermo meeting was the establishment of the Cultural Project, which had as its 
goal the ‘re-Christianization of Italy’ based on firm Catholic principles (Italian Episcopal 
Conference 1997). The Church, therefore, did not abandon its aim to spread Catholic values, 
it merely changed its methods. Instead of acting through the DC, it increased its public 
presence without political mediation through a single party and continued its activism in 
protecting core Catholic values.  
On the other hand, the Church’s moral judgement and vocal appeal to implement it 
through secular laws found a responsive audience among Italian politicians. Unlike the DC, 
its main successor the Italian Popular Party failed to become the center of the Italian political 
Catholic world or gather it around itself. A number of smaller parties with a Catholic 
orientation mushroomed (the United Christian Democrats, the Christian Democratic Center 
and so on), forming multiple coalitions among each other or with nationalist right parties such 
as the North League for the Independence of Padania (Lega Nord per l'Indipendenza della 
Padania). In their search for political identity and a means to gain public support, the 
reference to the moral teaching of the Church became a useful instrument to achieve these 
ends. As a result, right-wing parties, such as Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the ultra-right Lega 
Nord, turned for support to the Vatican, both to ‘acquire a political identity and to share the 
cultural legitimacy of Catholicism among the population’ (Beltrame 2016, 7). 
In these political perturbations, a key goal for both the Church and Catholic politicians 
was to ensure that new scientific and technological developments did not harm the life or 
health of embryos. In 1987, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued an 
instruction on biomedical issues, called the Instruction for Human Life in Its Origin and on 
the Dignity of Procreation Donum vitae (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987). 
Later, in 2008, an Instruction on certain bioethical questions Dignitas Personae was issued to 
complement the teaching of the Church on new biomedical technologies that emerged after 
Donum vitae had been issued (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2008). Both assert 
that an embryo should be treated as a human person from fertilization onwards. According to 
Dignitas Personae, this ethical principle is part of the existing natural moral law and 
‘presupposes a truth of an ontological character, as Donum vitae demonstrated from solid 
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scientific evidence, regarding the continuity in development of a human being’ (Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987). By ‘solid scientific evidence’, the Instruction meant 
genetic science and the possession by the embryo of a unique and unchangeable genetic code, 
from the moment of fertilization till death. Therefore, because embryos should be treated as 
persons, their lives from the moment of fertilization were inviolable and could not be 
compromised, relativized, or overridden by other interests.  
A notable feature of both Instructions was that they included requirements with regard 
to ART addressed both to those who used them (patients, clinicians, scientists) and to 
regulators. It is part of the duty of the public authorities to ensure that the civil law is 
regulated according to the fundamental norms of moral law in matters concerning human 
rights, human life and the institution of the family. Furthermore, they created an explicit link 
between moral values and positive law. According to Donum vitae ‘human rights depend 
neither on single individuals nor on parents; nor do they represent a concession made by 
society and the State: they pertain to human nature’ (Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith 1987). These moral teachings of the Vatican and prescriptions to implement natural law 
into positive law will be taken up by Italian politicians in their struggle to implement Law 
40/2004.   
This introduction gives a preliminary illustration of the constellation of powers in Italy 
when ART entered into Italian laboratories. The important role of the Church that it 
traditionally played in Italy, both in politics and social life, and that was reinforced by the 
political processes of that time, would be the main factor determining why the Catholic 
bioethical perspective on ART and embryo protection would also dominate on the political 
level. Yet, while the Catholic Church actively participates in Italian public life and Italian 
politicians attempt to exploit Catholicism for their political objectives, Catholicism as a 
dominant cultural framework of Italy cannot be taken for granted. As Garelli (2010) observed, 
Italy is characterized, first, by a deep secular-Catholic cleavage that runs through politics and 
society alike. In addition, there is division not only between secular and Catholic sections of 
Italian society, but also within its Catholic section. This latter includes a Catholic majority 
that accept the generic definition of Catholic but do not practice Catholicism, and a Catholic 
minority that is intensely religious and practices it. Within this last group, only one-tenth 
actively participates in various Catholic movements or associations. This division was one of 
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the reasons why Italian politics were unable to produce a law regulating ART for twenty 
years. The absolutist position of the Church regarding embryos and their protection precluded 
the possibility of a consensus in a society where Catholicism no longer enjoyed a monopoly 
on ethical issues.   
Another factor was related to the legislative decision-making process of the Italian 
Parliament known as ‘perfect bicameralism’. According to this process, both parliamentary 
chambers – the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate – have identical rights in designing and 
passing laws. The consequence of this rule is that, before a law can be passed, both chambers 
must approve the law in its identical form. If one of the two chambers changes a bill 
previously approved by the other, the changed provisions must once more be debated and 
approved by that chamber. This legislative process, known as navette, continues until a 
compromise is reached and passed by both chambers. The absolutist stance of Catholic 
politicians regarding embryo protection and their reluctance to forge consensus prevented 
such a compromise being reached. As a result, for many years the Italian Parliament was 
unable to produce any law regulating ART in Italy.  
3.3. Human dignity, natural rights and the beginning of life  
As stated above, according to the official position of the Catholic Church, IVF embryos are 
regarded as full-fledged persons from conception. The Church asserts that this view is part of 
natural moral law, confirmed by the latest discoveries of genetic science. Embryos are thus 
‘objectively’ full-fledged persons, simply because they are human. Similarly, embryos have 
human dignity and natural (human) rights, with the main right being the right to life. The key 
biopolitical goal of the Church was to translate these natural rights into positive rights and to 
forbid all those ART that might infringe on these natural rights through restrictive legal 
provisions.  
Obviously, the Catholic Church has not always had this stance (Pasnau 2002; 
Hastings, Mason, Pyper and Lawrie 2000). In the Middle Ages, and long before the discovery 
of genetic code, the theory of ensoulment elaborated by Thomas Aquinas dominated. 
According to this theory, before the ensoulment, which happened at the fortieth day of 
pregnancy and was usually associated with quickening, abortion was considered a sin and a 
crime against marriage. In contrast, after ensoulment, which meant that the embryo already 
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had an intellective soul, abortion considered a homicide. After the discovery of human 
gametes and the process of fertilization, and later of the genetic code, the Church’s position 
was to take into account the scientific discovery. However, according to Cooper (2009, 147), 
its position was not ‘discredited’ but ‘destabilized’ and was thought to be simply reconsidered 
to account for the facts provided by genetic science. The Catholic Church adopted fertilization 
as the moment when a human person comes into existence, hence abortion was to be 
considered homicide if performed after fertilization.  
The Catholic position towards embryos and their rights infiltrated into politics via 
different means. First, it was affecting politicians directly when they were debating ART. In 
1985, the then Minister of Health Costante Degan set up an expert commission entrusted with 
a task to elaborate the draft of a bill on ART. Degan was a member of DC and an active 
participant of Azione Cattolica, the main Catholic lay association in Italy. Following his 
Catholic commitments and the intention to protect embryos’ life through law, he included 
mostly Catholic members into the commission. Its president, judge Fernando Santosuosso 
(hence the name – Santosuosso Commission), was also a Catholic, author of a number of 
books on Catholic faith. The composition of the Commission was immediately criticised for 
being too one-sided, which led Degan to modify it and include some non-Catholic members. 
Yet, the reports produced by the Commission reflected the Catholic spirit of the majority of 
the Commission’s members, in particular through their attitude towards the embryo 
(Santosuosso Commission 1985). The reports suggested that embryos must be protected 
through law as they were ‘subjects’ and by no means ‘objects’ (Santosuosso Commission 
1985, 6). Building on this view on embryos, the Reports suggested that a restrictive regulation 
should be adopted to ensure embryo protection, such as a prohibition to create surplus 
embryos, and cryopreservation should be allowed only if it was needed for force majeure 
reasons related to women’s health.   
The Reports were not taken into account by Parliament and no law was produced. 
Instead, Degan issued a ministerial circular to regulate the provision of ART practices in the 
Italian public ART sector. The Circular was more restrictive than the Reports as they entirely 
prohibited cryopreservation. However, because the Circular applied only to public fertility 
clinics, private clinics remained beyond its regulatory reach. Therefore, there was a clear need 
for a law that would regulate the provision of ART on the entire Italian territory.  
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The debate on a law proceeded with tens of bills being presented to Parliament by 
various politicians and parliamentary groups. One of these bills that was representative of 
many other bills presented by Catholic politicians was the bill drafted by 23 parliamentarians, 
including Carlo Casini, president of the Italian pro-life association Movement for Life and 
member of the DC, and DC president Mino Martinazzoli (CDD 1988). This bill built on the 
petition ‘For life and dignity of man’ signed by 2.5 millions of Italian citizens and presented 
to Parliament in September 1987, which asked to extend legal protection to the embryo from 
the moment of fertilization. Similar to the petition, the main purpose of the bill was to ‘extend 
the protection of the right to health and to physical integrity onto the initial phase of human 
existence, within the scope of the protection of inviolable human rights ensured by art. 2 of 
the Constitution’ (CDD 1988, 1) and thereby to recognize human embryos as legal subjects 
endowed with rights, particularly of the right to life and health.  
The Martinazzoli bill stated that the IVF embryo must be given the status of a legal 
subject from fertilization because fertilization marks the coming into being of a new human 
person. According to the bill, the fact that exactly through fertilization a new person comes 
into existence is a proven scientific fact. During fertilization, the ‘unique genetically 
unrepeatable information’ (CDD 1988, 3), that is, the genetic code, is established. This 
genetic code will both allow the embryo to autonomously and continuously develop without 
external stimuli and will determine all its individual characteristics (CDD 1988, 3). They also 
rejected the possibility of connecting the moment when a new person comes into existence 
with other biological episodes. By these episodes, the authors meant such biological criteria 
as the appearance of the primitive streak on the fourteenth day of embryonic development 
or the moment of the so-called nidation when the embryo attaches itself to the uterine 
wall. For the authors, connecting the moment when a new person comes into being with 
these events would be arbitrary and completely disregard the existing scientific evidence.  
This discursive analysis of the Martinazzoli bill illustrates well the argumentative 
strategies the authors used to argue that human embryos were in fact full-fledged human 
persons and therefore should be accorded rights and legal personhood from fertilization. First, 
they referred to an essentialist conception of human nature, the possession of unique and 
unchangeable human genetic code that embryos acquire during fertilization. Neither embryo 
viability, nor other biological criteria, nor embryo dependence upon the mother to be born 
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could be used to decide from which moment their life becomes politically qualified and hence 
becomes of concern for the state.  
Second, the drafters did not refer to religion as a source of their normative position, 
but to science. Tellingly, the drafters of the bill did not explain why human embryos should 
necessarily be seen as full-fledged human persons. There is a big difference between 
classifying unborn life as ‘human life’, on the one hand, and ‘human person’, on the other. 
Indeed, many jurisdictions as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights illustrate that unborn life is generally recognized as ‘human life’ worthy of protection 
and respect (Evans v UK. 2006. 43 EHRR 21). Yet, doing so does not mean putting embryos 
on the same level as born individuals and including them into the moral community of people 
endowed with a possibility of political existence, or bios. Similarly, the presence of the 
genetic code in the embryo was not an undisputed evidence that embryos are persons. Later, 
when the adoption of Law 40/2004 would be underway, a number of other scientists, 
including Nobel Laureate Rita Levi-Montalcini, famous oncologist Umberto Veronesi and 
doctor Carlo Flamigni published a petition expressing an entirely different position. In the 
petition, they stated: ‘we humbly say that we don’t know when human person comes into 
being but we are sure that this does not happen during fertilization’ (Manifesto ‘Embrioni e 
ricerca’, 2002). However, there is a noticeable affinity between the argumentative strategy 
used by Catholic parliamentarians and by Catholic teaching, although the authors used the 
most secular and therefore credible type of evidence – science – to justify their position.  
Third, they framed the obligation to attribute legal personhood and rights to the 
embryo not as a moral duty but as recognition through law of what has been already 
discovered and defined through science. The appeal to science and not to morality made this 
extension appear ‘natural’ and ethically neutral: it was nothing more than a simple act of 
‘juridical recognition’ of a scientifically proven fact and not a normative definition (CDD 
1988, 4). This understanding of law as ‘institutional clothing’ (Pottage and Mundy 2004) of a 
naturally existing ontological architecture of the world entitled policy-makers to grant legal 
subjectivity to the embryo. 
Importantly, according to the Martinazzoli bill, these natural rights were already 
implemented in the Italian Constitution. Specifically, art. 2 that the Bill referred to states: 
‘The Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights of the person, both as an 
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individual and in the social groups where human personality is expressed. The Republic 
expects that the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled’. 
According to the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court on abortion, the fetus is a holder 
of a constitutional entitlement for state protection and enjoys rights according to art. 2. In this 
sense, the Martinazzoli bill was just a further enactment of natural rights, already recognized 
by the Constitution, in Italian positive law. Yet, there was one important difference. In the 
same judgment, the Court stated that ‘there is no equivalence between the right to life and 
health of the person and life of the one who is yet to become a person’. Put differently, the 
Court recognized that the fetus was not a person and therefore its entitlements underweighted 
the entitlements of those who were already persons such as the right to health of the pregnant 
woman. In this sense, on the one hand, the position of Catholic politicians in the debate on 
IVF assumingly built on the Italian constitutional law but, on the other hand, by claiming that 
IVF embryos were persons and therefore should be attributed legal personality, they 
introduced important changes into the regulation of artificial reproduction compared to how 
natural reproduction was approached by the Constitutional Court.  
The analysis of this bill illustrates how science was used by Catholic politicians, 
similarly to the Church, in arguing why embryos have to be recognized as legal subjects from 
conception. In political debates, genetics became an important ‘truth discourse’ (Lemke 
2011a, 2011b), which Italian politicians would heavily rely on to ‘prove’ that an embryo was 
a person. The reference to expertise and not to the divine decree is indicative of the 
importance that modern liberal democracies attach to science in governing populations and its 
role in biopolitics. However, the use of genetic science in this case significantly differs from 
its use as discussed by Foucault and the role it is generally assigned in current biopolitical 
regimes. As I stated above, the role of science in the Foucauldian account of biopolitics was 
to know the nature and use the knowledge to optimize and improve the health of 
populations—in other words, to make it manageable and transformable. As Rabinow stated 
with regard to the human genome, ‘the object to be known—the human genome—will be 
known in such a way that it can be changed’ (Rabinow 1996, 92). Instead, the use of genetics 
in the Italian debate on IVF embryos was used to ‘discover’ the essence of things, to identify 
their inherent value and foreclose the possibility of undermining it in order to allow the 
potential of an embryo, which is already present in the embryo, to develop. In this sense, the 
 79 
appeal to genetics was nothing more than an appeal to a natural moral law couched in genetic 
terms through which Italian Catholic politicians wished to set limits to the evolving 
biomedical practices.  
In addition, Catholic teaching itself was soon to become a form of expertise, when it 
started influencing the nature of an emerging discipline, now famously known as bioethics, in 
Italy. Unlike secular bioethics, Catholic bioethics has been flourishing in Italy over the past 
30 years (Mori 2004). One of the issues that has received much scholarly exploration by 
Catholic bioethicists was the ‘moral and legal status of the embryo’. In Italian bioethics, the 
so so-called ‘ontologically grounded personalism’ (Sgreccia 1988, 1991) dominated. 
According to it, the embryo was ‘a person with potential’ and not ‘a potential person’, a 
position advocated by ‘functionalism personalism’ (Ford 1988, 1991). The theory of 
‘functionalist personalism’, prevailing, specifically, in Britain, assumed that the possession of 
certain characteristics and traits was necessary to attribute a moral status of personhood to an 
entity (Ford 1988; Warnock 1984). In contrast, the theory of ontologically grounded 
personalism builds ‘on the objective value of the dignity of every human person’ (Sgreccia 
1988, 1991), with no distinction whatsoever, but for the only reason of being human and 
having human dignity. 
Similar to Catholic Church, an important aspect of ‘ontologically grounded 
personalism’ is that it builds on science – genetics – to prove that embryos are persons. 
Specifically, it proposes a triangular method analysis, which includes scientific data 
collection, constituting the cognitive level, ethical analysis, representing the justifying level, 
and ethical evaluation and deliberation, representing the deliberative level. Hence, this 
position heavily relies on science, namely, genetics. This made many Italian bioethicists 
engage with scientific debates to prove that the embryo was a person. According to Mori, this 
is an important and distinctive characteristic of Italian bioethics (Mori 2005). For example, 
Donum vitae itself did not refer to science as a source of justification but, instead, to an act of 
God such as the infusion of the soul into an embryo or a fetus. In addition, it stated that the 
question of whether the human embryo was a person or not was not a scientific question but a 
philosophical one. Genetic science was an important yet not necessary factor to prove that 
embryos are persons. In contrast, authors like Sgreccia and many other Italian Catholic 
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bioethics scholars dedicated a lot of attention exactly to scientific analysis to come to 
normative conclusions.  
Hence, similarly to genetics, bioethics as a form of expertise became an important 
device to legitimize the position of those who sought to defend the protection of life from its 
beginning. In this way it became another – indirect – instrument affecting Italian political 
decision-making on ART. This was so when bioethics became an official bioethics. In 1990, 
the National Committee on Bioethics (Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica, CNB) was set up. 
Initially, its purpose was to create an institution, composed of people of a high scientific 
record, that could be entrusted with the task of discussing and pronouncing expert decisions 
on ambiguous issues raised by new scientific and technological developments. However, from 
the very beginning of its institution and functioning, the CNB was mostly Catholic. Due to the 
political processes of that time and to the willingness to forge alliances with the Church and 
get its political support, the government designated mostly Catholic bioethicists to the CNB. 
As a result, during many years, members of the CNB were Catholics suggesting the spirit of 
reports the CNB would issue. Some of the CNB members, such as Elio Sgreccia, were also 
Vatican officials, pointing to an even tighter interpenetration of the Church with politics. 
Further, in December 1994, Silvio Berlusconi, who ruled a center-right coalition, nominated a 
majority of Catholic members in the CNB, which incited civil society to dub CNB the 
‘Bishops’ committee’ because of its overwhelming majority of Catholics. 
The view that embryos are human persons was adopted by the CNB in its report 
Identity and status of the human embryo issued in 1996 (CNB 1996). As stated before, at that 
time CNB was composed of mostly Catholic members assigned by Berlusconi. It was this 
composition that affected the nature of the report. The Commission unanimously concluded 
that the embryo had to be treated like ‘one of us’, that is, as a human person. According to the 
report, ‘a simple possession of human nature implies for every individual the fact of being a 
human person’ and ‘the human nature of the embryo, the progressive and continuous 
character of embryonic development are the elements that entitle us to attribute the 
“ontological” concept of person to the embryo’ (CNB 1996). 
This report played an important role in political debates. For example, in 1998 the bill 
was adopted by the Commission on Social Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies that would 
pave the way for the further decision-making on ART, dubbed the Bolognesi project. The bill 
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was sent to the Commission on Constitutional Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies for 
assessing its text on the matter of its consistency with the Italian Constitution. Rosa Iervolino 
Russo, president of the Commission and a former DC member, concluded that it was 
constitutional because it provided enough protection to IVF embryos. Mainly relying on the 
purported science-based argumentation in the CNB report to legitimize her position, she 
argued that she ‘thought, naturally, about the laic ethics that makes reference to the same 
human nature and to human rights because only to them the legislator can appeal, whereas 
every choice related to faith remains a personal issue of individuals’ (CDD 1998).  
Thus, one of the main effects of Catholic teaching and Catholic bioethics on politics 
was the imposition of its essentialist view on embryos as human persons. Their natural right 
to life, similarly to that of born individuals, was to be transposed into positive law and 
therefore become the positive right to life and serve as an external limitation to the 
development of biomedical practices and technologies. The use of expertise was connected 
with the appeal to natural rights as external limitation. First, unlike the traditionally discussed 
view of genetics that it is or can be used to transform the genome, the use of genetic science 
in Italy was used to ‘prove’ that an embryo was a person having human dignity and to 
foreclose the development of biomedical practices that would harm it. Second, bioethics was 
also used to restrict the use of genetic and biomedical sciences, in contrast to other countries 
where it has been geared towards encouraging self-transformation such as through improving 
one’s health and managing one’s genetic predispositions. As I will illustrate in the following 
section, similarly to genetics, the approach of Italian political actors to the biomedical 
technologies of ART would eventually result in a political regime rather distinct from the one 
adopted in what is now usually called ‘advanced liberal democracies’ (Miller and Rose 2008).  
3.4. IVF as a ‘public space’, the adoption of Law 40/2004 and biopolitics through natural 
rights 
The appeal to natural rights of embryos, and the respective implication that they were persons 
and legal subjects, became the main argument why restrictive regulation of ART had to be 
adopted. As stated above, in 1998, the Commission on Social Affairs of the Chamber of 
Deputies was assigned the task to produce a bill on ART. Marida Bolognesi, president of the 
Commission, created a Restrictive Committee that had to draft a unified bill on ART based on 
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21 bills submitted by parliamentarians. The unified bill resulting from the Bolognesi project 
stipulated that a doctor was allowed to create a maximum of four embryos in one IVF cycle, 
transfer as many embryos as deemed appropriate in a concrete case to initiate pregnancy, and 
cryopreserve the remainder (CDD 1997a). Four was chosen as a maximum number of 
embryos to tackle the problem of surplus embryo production. 
However, when the Bolognesi project reached the floor of the Chamber of Deputies, 
criticism was voiced that because an embryo was a human person, a more restrictive 
regulation of ART was needed to protect embryos against technological manipulation. The 
main and most active supporter of maximum embryo protection was Alessandro Cè, a 
member of the Lega Nord. Cè introduced an amendment into the bill that extended legal 
personhood to the embryo. However, through a technical maneuver undertaken by President 
of the Chamber of Deputies Luciano Violante, this amendment was not put to the vote. In 
particular, Violante found the amendment of Cè to the Bolognesi project inadmissible because 
he believed that the question of embryos’ legal personhood and ART had to be discussed 
separately, for they concerned different, albeit overlapping, topics. Cè disagreed. According 
to Cè and his supporters, the question of embryos’ legal personhood could and should be 
discussed precisely during the debates around the law on ART. According to him, it was 
exactly the right place to do so: an embryo created in vitro was different from a child created 
naturally. As he claimed,  
procreation in this new version would lose its connotation of naturalness in which the 
responsibility for the life of the embryos is assumed by parents, as it is stated in Law 
1942. In fact, it will fall, at least partially, upon the state, indirectly involved via 
administrative disciplines and sanitary authorizations, in the implementation of 
procedures necessary to allow the procreation’ (Cè, Seduta 395, 20.07.1998).  
Thus, according to Cè, owing to the involvement of third parties, ART were an ‘empirically’ 
or ‘de facto’ public sphere. The State, therefore, had to assume a greater role in protecting 
embryos, particularly through granting rights to them. A similar position was voiced by many 
other parliamentarians as well as the main pro-life association of Italy, Movement for Life.  
                                                
2 The law on abortion passed in 1978 (Law 194/1978).  
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The second reason why natural reproduction was considered different from artificial 
and which required a more stringent regulation of ART than natural reproduction was 
related to an apparent lack of interests that conflict with embryos’ interests in the case of 
ART. The possible risks to mothers’ health were represented as non-existent. According to 
Cè, because in the case of ART ‘there are no interests conflicting with mothers', it is 
necessary to introduce absolute protection of the embryo’ (Cè, Seduta 395, 20.07.1998). In 
addition, stressing the absence of such competing interests was important in order to 
counter the arguments that, if adopted in this restrictive form, the law on ART would be 
inconsistent with the Law 194/1978. The latter allowed the termination of pregnancy if it 
was needed to prevent negative impacts of pregnancy on women’s health. However, an 
assumed difference between IVF embryos from fetuses conceived naturally meant that the 
law on ART did not have to be consistent with abortion, as these were completely different 
cases. Thus, according to Cè, ‘without necessarily revising at the same time the law 194, it 
is necessary to provide a better protection to the embryo produced in vitro, that is, to the 
one outside the body of the woman’ (Cè, Seduta 395, 20.07.1998). 
According to Cè and his supporters, the implementation of two legal changes was 
necessary to ensure the protection of life and health of embryos. The first one was granting 
legal personality and rights, including the right to life and to health, to IVF embryos. 
Similar to the authors of the Martinazzoli bill, Cè and others represented legal rights as 
positive law equivalents of naturally existing entitlements, namely, human rights, which all 
human persons, including embryos, had for the mere reason of being human. Instead, adult 
citizens had only duties with respect to embryos. The desire to have a child was not a ‘right 
to have a child’. A right to have a child would mean reducing the embryo to a ‘res’ (thing), 
which was illegitimate because embryos were persons.  
The second way of ensuring embryo protection was the imposition of restrictive 
rules on the practice of ART. According to Cè, only one embryo must be created an 
implanted (CDD 1998). Others believed that more embryos could be created, but in the 
latter case they all had to be implanted into the woman’s uterus in order to avoid the 
creation of surplus embryos. In addition, procedures that could harm embryos such as 
cryopreservation or preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) should be forbidden. Not 
only would they harm the embryo, they would also be unnecessary due to the absence of 
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countervailing interests. Finally, the supporters of restrictive regulation of ART suggested 
that women should be prohibited from withdrawing consent after fertilization of embryos 
to ensure their subsequent implantation (CDD 1998). 
During the further debate of the bill, negative aspects of such restrictive regulations 
on mothers’ health were nevertheless voiced and emphasized. Specifically, liberal 
politicians argued that the prohibition to create more than three embryos would force the 
doctor to perform repeated ovarian stimulations of the woman, thus raising the risks of such 
health conditions as ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) and ovarian cancer (CDD 
1998; SDR 2000). Furthermore, the duty to implant all created embryos simultaneously 
would raise the risk of causing triple and therefore significantly more dangerous pregnancies 
(CDD 1998; SDR 2000). Finally, the duty to implant embryos that were non-viable, that is, 
incapable of development, as well as embryos with different genetic pathologies that could be 
screened out through PGD would force the woman to either perform abortion or to experience 
miscarriage or stillbirth. However, these risks were either disregarded by their pro-life 
opponents, or acknowledged but considered to be less important than the need to preserve the 
life of another participant of the treatment – the IVF embryo (SDR 2000). 
The further discussion of the bill would eventually allow the Catholic politicians to 
win over their liberal counterparts. During the debates Cè, together with a number of other 
conservative parliamentarians, proposed to amend art. 1 of the Bolognesi project in the 
following way: ‘The present law protects the rights of all the involved subjects, in particular 
of the conceptus’ (emphasis mine). This amendment was accepted with 223 votes in favor and 
202 votes against it. However, with the fall of the parliamentary coalition, the bill failed and 
the idea of granting rights to the embryo was not fulfilled. In 2001 Italy held elections, and 
central-right parties occupied the majority of seats in Parliament. The Commission on Social 
Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies elaborated a new bill. It significantly built on the 
Bolognesi bill, but it was amended by Cè who replaced Bolognesi as the representative for the 
parliamentary majority. The new bill received parliamentary approval of the Chamber of 
Deputies and was in limbo awaiting discussion in the Senate. Although the Government 
appeared in no hurry, according to Valentini (2004) the situation changed with the 
intervention of the Vatican, which openly urged Parliament to adopt the law in its then form. 
In December 2003, the Government obtained the Senate’s approval of the bill. However, the 
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Senate, which has traditionally been more liberal than the Chamber of Deputies, modified the 
provision of embryos’ rights. The formulation of the article voted for by the Senate was ‘the 
law ensures the rights of all the involved subjects, including the conceptus’ (emphasis mine). 
To ensure embryo protection, the bill also prohibited embryo cryopreservation, testing, 
selection, PGD, and prescribed that all created embryos, irrespective of their health status, 
must be implanted into the woman. After the second approval of the bill by the Chamber of 
Deputies, on 10 February 2004, it was passed as Law 40/2004. 
Hence, what the debate on Law 40/2004 shows is the ways in which new biomedical 
technologies may lead to very different biopolitical regimes if deployed in different political 
settings. In these different regimes, the ‘analytics of biopolitics’ (Lemke 2011a, 2011b) 
allows to trace the ways in which life becomes the object of politics, however, the constitutive 
elements were at work differently in Italy comparing to other ‘advanced liberal democracies’. 
First, as I argued above, the ‘truth discourse’ in the Italian case was also human science (i.e. 
genetics), and bioethics. Therefore, similarly to their counterparts from other countries, Italian 
politicians based their political decisions on science. Yet, regarding the ways in which 
knowledge was used, hence the second element of the ‘analytics of biopolitics’, Italy 
substantially differed from other countries. In particular, unlike other countries, in Italy the 
use of expert knowledge was used to promote an essentialist view on human life and foreclose 
the development of biomedical and genetic sciences and technologies that could jeopardize 
life and to learn from nature in order to know how to transform it. This made genetics an 
ontological, ‘conservative’ source of knowledge, in contrast to the ‘transformative’ source of 
knowledge that it played in many other countries.  
Another strategy of intervention in ‘advanced liberal democracies’ have been 
technologies of the self and technologies of the social. According to Rose, ‘the developments 
in biomedicine have become deeply intertwined with prevailing technologies of the self, and 
the contemporary biopolitics is ethopolitics’ (Rose 2001, 2). However, these technologies of 
the self or technologies of the social do not have a single calculating center, such as the state, 
where they are designed and from which they are exercised. As Rabinow and Rose (2006) 
argued regarding ART, ‘it is hard to discern some unified biopolitical strategy underlying 
these developments’. A parallel development is the contraction of the state and the spread of 
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non-state actors that Rose called ‘experts of the soma’, advising people how to live happier, 
healthier and more satisfying lives.  
Instead, due to the crucial role of Catholicism, the Catholic Church as a political actor 
and the political climate of the time, in Italy, new biomedical technologies led to the 
employment of a different strategy of intervention – a direct and unified imposition of legal 
rules by the sovereign. Starting from the implementation of embryos’ rights and ending with 
the restrictive provisions regulating ART, law with its binding force and direct state 
regulation were used to exercise biopolitics in Italy. Through law, the Italian Parliament 
implemented those rights that it considered of key importance – the rights of embryos and the 
duties of parents. As a result, it led, not to the contraction of political power, but to the 
expansion of political power, as represented by the state.  
According to the arguments of Italian politicians, the expansion of political power, in 
the form of the translation of human rights into positive law and the adoption of restrictive 
regulations of ART, was warranted due to the specificity of the site in which they existed, that 
is, the fertility clinic. The ‘public’ nature of IVF as well as the exposure of IVF embryos to 
the ‘violence’ of women, doctors and scientists that their creation in vitro enabled, justified 
the expansion of sovereign power. Clearly, one can doubt whether Italian politicians who 
stressed the difference between ART and natural reproduction indeed believed that this 
difference warranted a more stringent regulation of ART than of natural reproduction. For 
example, according to Biondi (2013), by enacting a more stringent regulation of ART than of 
natural reproduction, the Italian Parliament, urged by the Church, simply wished to use this 
inconsistency to question the constitutionality of the law on abortion and make the policy on 
abortion as restrictive as ART.  
Irrespective of what the true motives were, the Italian debate on ART is indicative of 
several facts. To begin with, with the development of new technologies, unresolved moral 
controversies such as those around the ‘moral and legal status of embryo’ might spark anew 
and provide new arguments to those who wish to ensure the protection of unborn life. Further, 
‘nature’ might be far from the only legitimation and limitation to the exercise of political 
power in liberal democracies exactly because new biomedical technologies allow, not only to 
control ‘nature’, but also to reprogram it. Hence, as Lemke put it, ‘the idea of a natural origin 
of all living beings is beginning to be replaced by the idea of an artificial plurality of living 
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beings that are more technical artifacts than natural entities’ (Lemke 2011b, 170). Due to 
these developments, there is an increasing appeal to restrict such practices as they violate 
human dignity and erode human nature, the position that received the name of ‘human dignity 
as constraint’ or ‘dignitarianism’ (Brownsword 2008). Hence, in modern liberal societies, 
there may be a reemergence of the conservative discourses of human dignity or as in the 
present case – of natural rights that build on an essentialist view on human nature as 
determined by the human genetic code. Natural rights thus may act as a shield against 
governmentality of science and medicine. Coming back to Foucault (2008, 39), these are the 
‘rights of man’ that allow ‘to arrive at the limitation of governmentality by way of the 
constitution of the sovereign’, but also, as we have seen in the Italian case, allow the 
expansion of sovereign power.  
In addition, in Italy disciplinary power was used as a strategy of intervention upon life 
and health of Italian women. In their relationships with embryos, women’s role was in fact 
reduced to a mere zoē needed to gestate embryos. Women’s bodies were needed to ‘make 
embryos live’. This approach is particularly visible in the example of the Law’s provision that 
prohibited to withdraw consent after fertilization and before embryo implantation. As Weir 
(2011, 6) observed, in such situations pregnancy becomes ‘a time for routinely conserving 
and optimizing population at and prior to birth’. 
Finally, the third element of the analytics of biopolitics is subjectification. In 
‘advanced liberal democracies’ the rhetoric of choice, autonomy and rights dominated. 
Instead, in Italy, we can observe a rather different process. During the debate, two 
‘participants’ of IVF were subjectified. The first were IVF embryos. By according legal 
personhood and rights to them, Parliament reclassified them from being a mere zoē and 
included them into the community of political subjects whose life and health the state had to 
care about. However, as an IVF embryo itself cannot act, ‘it forms the lower limit of 
subjectification, being culturally understood as capable of being acted upon but not as capable 
of managing its own conduct’ (Weir 2006, 12); their subjectification thus forced changes in 
the modes of behavior of other people towards IVF embryos. The second group were, clearly, 
women. The passage of the Law was accompanied not by the rhetoric of choice, but by the 
duty to care about life of new unborn citizens. This attempt to make adult citizens 
‘responsible’ before IVF embryos resonates with the conclusion of feminist scholars 
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according to whom women are turned into responsible citizens that should care about the 
health of their future children (Rapp 2000). Yet, in the Italian case women were called on as 
devoid of any entitlements and possessing only duties with regard to the life of embryos. 
Coupled with the disciplinary power, the restrictions of women’s freedom and their reduction 
to subjects needed to gestate embryos was necessary to ensure the protection of ‘life’ as 
embodied in new Italian citizens, regardless of whether or not they are viable or healthy. As I 
will illustrate in the following section, the debate on how death of embryos should be 
determined similarly disregarded the importance of women’s consent to carry pregnancy. 
3.5. ‘Abandoned embryos’ and the debate on the end of life  
Famously, IVF embryos are used not only for overcoming individuals’ fertility issues and 
hence for bringing new life into existence. IVF embryos are also the source of human 
embryonic stem cells (hESC) that have a great scientific and medical potential. However, the 
derivation of hESC from embryos involves their destruction. In what follows, I will explore 
an attempt of Italian politics to find a solution to this challenge. Although the solution has not 
(yet) been found and hence no legal regulation of this conflict exists so far, I suggest that the 
ways in which Italian state authorities approached the problem is indicative of the possible 
solution that might be adopted in the future.  
As mentioned above, before the adoption of Law 40/2004, the practice of IVF in 
Italian private fertility clinics was unconstrained and Italian doctors were free to create as 
many embryos as they saw fit. Therefore, after the Law was adopted, it was no longer clear 
what to do with these ‘persons-non-persons’ dwelling in fertility clinics (Burani-Procaccini, 
CDD 1998). One suggestion was to use them for hESC research (Associazione Luca Coscioni 
2005). However, Minister of Health Girolamo Sirchia rejected this possibility appealing to the 
right to life of embryos. Therefore, he issued a Circular that obliged fertility clinics to keep all 
embryos remaining from fertility treatment frozen (Ministro della Salute 2004). 
However, the Circular made an important distinction. It distinguished between 
embryos that should be implanted and those that have been ‘abandoned’ by their parents 
(stato di abbandono), that is, those embryos whose parents have rejected to implant them as 
well as those embryos for which the relevant fertility center could not contact the couple for 
minumum one year. In the summer of 2006, this latter category of embryos triggered debates 
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in the Italian Senate. The debate was provoked by an announcement that the Minister for 
University and Research Fabio Mussi made in May 2006. Mussi stated that he did not have an 
intention to strictly oppose the financing of hESC through European sources of funding, 
which has been the policy of former Italian governments. Specifically, Italy, together with 
Austria, Germany, Malta, Poland and Slovakia signed the ‘declaration of ethics’ in which 
they opposed the legitimacy of funding hESC research with European sources of funding. 
Mussi declared he could withdraw the signature of Italy from the declaration and allow the 
use of European funding to conduct research on hESC in Italy. Mussi’s announcement in 
Brussels raised controversy in Italy. After almost two months of highly emotional debates, the 
right to make a final decision on this issue was entrusted to Parliament (Gottweis, Metzler and 
Griessler 2006, 81-82). 
The discussion in Parliament revolved on whether some of these cryopreserved 
embryos might no longer be implantable and therefore used in hESC research. In other words, 
the topic of the debate was the possibility of drawing a boundary that, if crossed, would mark 
that embryos could be considered ‘dead’ (Senato della Repubblica 2006c). How and by whom 
could and should this boundary be drawn? To address this question, three resolutions were 
presented and discussed in the Senate. The first one, signed by Rocco Buttiglione and others 
(center-right alliance Casa delle Libertà), prohibited financing projects and research that 
would involve the destruction of embryos (SDR 2006a). The second one, proposed by the 
center-left parliament group Gruppo per le Autonomie, generally prohibited research 
involving the destruction of embryos but allowed only the use of frozen embryos for research 
(SDR 2006a). Finally, the third resolution, proposed by Anna Finocchiaro (center-left alliance 
l’Ulivo), in general urged the Italian government to oppose those types of research that ‘do 
not lead to the destruction of embryos’, but also urged it ‘to explore the possibility of research 
on frozen embryos that are no longer implantable’ (SDR 2006a). According to the supporters 
of the third resolution, what was needed is the establishment of a cut-off line beyond which 
embryos would be considered dead, or, in other words, criteria for the ‘death’ of embryos. On 
July 19, 2006, with 152 voices in favor and 150 voices against, the third resolution was voted 
for by the Senate (SDR 2006b).  
This resolution was an obvious compromise between the Catholic and liberal 
members. In general, it called for promoting other ways of performing research. Furthermore, 
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and importantly, it contains what Metzler has defined as an Italian solution to the problem of 
the ethics of performing research on embryos (Gottweis, Metzler and Griessler 2006). It 
suggested the possibilities of defining the threshold which, when passed, would mean that 
embryos are no longer alive and therefore might be used for research. What exactly this 
threshold meant, however, was not clear. Was it some biological conditions of the embryo? 
Or was it its abandonment by its parents?  
In 2007, the CNB approached these issues by presenting its opinion entitled Destiny of 
embryos derived from ART and that are no longer implantable (CNB 2007). Members of the 
CNB were asked to answer two questions. The first one was whether it was possible, and if 
so, under which conditions and subject to which requirements, to donate embryos that are no 
longer implantable for research. Embryos that are no longer implantable included both 
embryos with ‘grave and irreversible anomalies’ and healthy embryos, including those 
‘cryopreserved, remaining in the state of abandonment and for which the parental project is 
no longer possible’ (CNB 2007, 7). The second question was whether it was possible to 
determine the death of embryos, after which ‘dead embryos’ could be used for research.  
The members of the CNB split on both issues. Answering the first question, some 
members agreed to donate for research only embryos ‘with grave and irreversible 
pathologies’, others decided that also healthy but ‘abandoned’ embryos could be given for 
research, while yet others rejected both possibilities. According to the last group, embryos 
were persons whose life must be protected, even if their parents did not want them. The 
second question on the possibility of determining the criteria for the death of embryos 
received two different answers. The first was given by members who proposed to establish 
‘organismic death’ as a criterion of death. By ‘organismic death’, its proponents meant the 
‘loss of the capacity to develop in an integral, self-regulating way, via a progressive cell 
differentiation’ (CNB 2007, 8). The second answer was offered by members who argued that 
it would be difficult to use this criterion as it would be arbitrary and would be established in 
such a way as to make possible the use of embryos for research. Instead, more research should 
be done to ascertain with full precision the criteria that would ‘objectively’ mark the death of 
embryos.  
Interestingly, for all the CNB members the mere fact that embryos for any reason 
could not be implanted into their genetic mother and therefore did not have any prospects for 
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life, did not mean they should be regarded dead. In other words, they did not equate the 
impossibility of implanting embryos into the woman with their death. The female 
embodiment through which embryos could be born (and not be dead) was entirely absent in 
the debate. Only some internal processes of the embryo itself that could preclude it from 
further development such as ‘organismic death’ could serve as criteria of death. This 
importance of the role of women for making a decision on the death of embryos was only 
voiced in a dissenting opinion by a famous Italian feminist scholar, Gloria Zuffa, who was 
also a member of the CNB. She first agreed that non-implantable embryos could also be given 
for research. Yet, she criticized both liberal and Catholic members for the way they answered 
the second question, namely, on the definition of the criteria of death. According to her, the 
criteria for defining embryos’ death could not be determined in the same way in which the 
criteria of death of born people are determined, exactly because embryos are not born yet. 
This means a complete disregard of the role of women in their very possibility to be born and 
to be alive (CNB 2007, 14).  
At the moment, it is not clear what the Italian State will decide regarding both the 
destiny of non-implantable embryos and the definition of the criteria of embryos’ death, nor 
how hESC will be regulated in Italy. However, the discussions both in the Senate and the 
CNB suggests that the debate on the legality of hESC might shift to the debate on the 
scientific (biological or genetic) criteria of establishing embryos’ death. First, establishing 
death through reference to some biological processes would reinforce the Italian essentialist 
approach to embryos whose ‘human nature’ is the main source of their entitlements and 
would preserve and reinforce the discursive and legal construction of IVF embryos as full-
fledged human persons, as it has been institutionalized in Law 40/2004. Similarly, just as the 
beginning of life of a human person is a fact established by science, so would their death be a 
scientific fact. As a result, embryos’ right to life should not be jeopardized by new biomedical 
technologies. In contrast, the right to perform hESC only on embryos who are already ‘dead’ 
would reinforce their moral personhood and the possession of an inalienable right to life. 
What does the disappearance of women mean and how does it relate to the conclusion 
made above about the exercise of disciplinary power over them? I suggest that the disregard 
for the role of women in giving birth to embryos is a reverse side of the disciplinary power 
exercised by Law 40/2004. The disciplinary power turns individuals into ‘docile bodies’ 
 92 
(Foucault 1977, 1980) by supervising, controlling and commanding their behavior, hence 
disregarding their agency. The prohibition to withdraw consent after fertilization means 
exactly this dismissal of women’s freedom in autonomously controlling their bodies. 
Similarly, the disregard of women’s role in carrying pregnancy to term for identifying the 
moment of embryos’ death means that the availability of women’s bodies for gestating 
embryos is simply taken for granted and that their consent in having the embryos implanted is 
apparently irrelevant. Women are seen as always present if needed to give life to new Italian 
citizens.  
3.6. Conclusion  
In this article I have sought to show, using the Italian debate around Law 40/2004, how 
natural rights as the legitimation of political power have been employed to perform 
biopolitical governance in Italy, in particular by including IVF embryos into the moral and 
political community of humans. Whereas the Italian case might be a somewhat extreme 
example of how natural rights of embryos are implemented into actual policy, it can point at 
two important conclusions for our understanding of biopolitics. First, natural rights as the 
limits for new biomedical practices may experience a revival due to the fears that human 
dignity may be uprooted by new biomedical advancements. It thus confirms the conclusions 
of already existing research that points at the importance of dignitarianism as a third type of 
ethical reasoning alongside liberal human rights and utilitarian thinking (Brownsword 2008). 
Second, the elements of the ‘analytics of biopolitics’, namely, knowledge, power, and 
subjectivity, also structure and help implement biopolitical strategies in cases where natural 
rights act as a key element of governmentality rationality, but they take a different shape than 
is usually seen in other cases of biopolitics.  
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4.1. Introduction1  
As a consequence of recent advancements in biomedical sciences, many countries across the 
world have had to reconfigure their constitutional arrangements. As “life itself” (Rose 2006) 
has become the object of increasing scientific and technological examination, intervention and 
manipulation, societies’ most basic and fundamental legal settlements have had to be 
redefined in order to respond to new techno-scientific developments. Redefining 
constitutional frameworks has included the acknowledgment of new legal rights (Scott 2013), 
the extension of legal personhood to new artificially-created life forms (Metzler 2007, 2011), 
and the emergence of biological citizenship as a new “citizenship project” (Rose and Novas 
2004). In legal scholarship, these transformations have been defined by the portmanteau term 
“bioconstitutionalism” (Jasanoff 2011a), a term which underlines the increased importance of 
the “bios” in the constitutional governance of life in the modern world. 
In many countries, bioconstitutional transformations have been accompanied by 
intense public controversy. Because biomedical and biotechnological innovations such as 
cloning, xenotransplantation, or the more conventional preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD), have touched upon a number of important ethical and legal values, bioconstitutional 
deliberations have often been embroiled in persistent debates about the normative aspects of 
technoscience and how these should be translated into law (Metzler 2011; Testa 2011). In this 
article, I focus on one such controversy that has evolved around defining the place and role of 
medical expertise in state’s government programs in light of the increasing number of 
reproductive opportunities offered by the new assisted reproductive technologies (ART). I 
explore this debate under the rubric of bioconstitutionalism to illustrate how the renegotiation 
by the State of its constitutional obligations towards its citizens, provoked by ART, influences 
the redrawing of the boundary of medical expertise. I build my analysis on the Foucauldian 
concept of governmentality (Foucault 1991), as applied by Johnson (2003, 2005) to the 
analysis of professions, according to which professions and the State are not discrete and 
                                                
1 Article published as: Parfenchyk, Volha. 2016. “Redrawing the Boundary of Medical 
Expertise: Medically Assisted Reproduction and the Debate on Italian Bioconstitutionalism.” 
New Genetics and Society 35 (4).  
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independent actors, but simultaneously participate in the same governing project. Specifically, 
Johnson (2003, 2005) argued that the tensions between the State and the medical profession 
should be seen, not in terms of the autonomy/intervention dualism (Freidson 1988), but as 
techniques of governmentality. In this article, I further advance the Foucauldian approach to 
the analysis of professions and their role in the process of state formation by illustrating the 
role that legal rights play in this process.  
To do this, I examine the debate around the provisions of the Italian Law 40/2004, 
which prescribed a uniform method of performing IVF in Italian fertility clinics. Specifically, 
the Law obliged the treating practitioner to fertilize no more than three oocytes during one 
IVF cycle and to transfer all the embryos created into the patient’s uterus simultaneously 
(Repubblica Italiana 2004). By setting this “three embryo” standard, the pro-life members of 
the Italian Parliament sought to prevent the creation of surplus embryos and their 
cryopreservation, the constitutive elements of IVF (Gianaroli et al. 2000; Hillier 2013) and 
thereby to ensure the protection of a new technologically-created entity – the embryo outside 
the women’s body (Metzler 2011). Drawing on the concept of boundary-work (Gieryn 1983, 
1995), I explore how the Italian Parliament justified the expansion of the jurisdictional 
powers of the State into a domain traditionally occupied by the medical profession, namely, 
the prescription of treatment methods, and how the Italian Constitutional Court justified the 
constitutional illegitimacy of the Parliament’s actions. I argue that the demarcation of the 
jurisdictional domains of the medical profession and the Italian State depended upon how the 
latter tipped the balance between the conflicting rights of IVF embryos and the rights of adult 
Italian citizens, and the procedures of embryo surplus production and cryopreservation acted 
as a terrain where both the State and the medical profession came to defend their interests. As 
such, the demarcation of the jurisdictional and occupational boundaries of the medical 
profession and the State, and the definition of constitutional rights, formed two sides of the 
same governing project.  
This article starts by setting out the analytical framework. It identifies the 
transformation of the relationship between the State and the medical profession, which 
resulted in the latter taking over the role of medical expert, as a tactic of governmentality. The 
subsequent analysis of parliamentary debates and litigation foregrounds the role of 
constitutional rights in the redefinition of the jurisdictional and occupational terrains of the 
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medical profession and the State. More specifically, it illustrates how redrawing of the 
boundary between the domains of the medical profession and the State and re-defining the 
constitutional commitments of the Italian State towards its citizens, prompted by the 
emergence of new ART, became part of the same governing project. Further, confirming the 
conclusions drawn by other works on the transformation of the governance of biosciences and 
biomedicine (Jasanoff 2005; Salter and Jones 2007), this analysis recognizes that the appeal 
to knowledge can no longer legitimize the development of biomedical practices and that other 
ways of legitimizing them are now required.  
4.2. Bioconstitutionalism, governmentality and boundary-work 
Bioconstitutionalism, as a defining term, was introduced into academic literature to 
theoretically conceptualize the relationship between constitutional law and the new 
developments in biological sciences, medicine and technology and thus provide an 
instrumental toolkit to support a systematic theorization of their interactions (Jasanoff 2011a). 
Bioconstitutionalism builds on Jasanoff’s research on the co-production of science and social 
order (Jasanoff 2004) and is influenced by the ideas of biopower and biopolitics (Rabinow 
1992; Foucault 1998; Rose 2006) in that it acknowledges the importance of the life sciences 
in the governance of life. Yet, by engaging with such traditional constitutional law categories 
as legal rights, legal personhood, and citizenship, bioconstitutionalism attaches itself to legal 
analysis and legal theory, enriching them with philosophical reflections on the significance 
that science and technology have in regard to constitutional governance. Specifically, Jasanoff 
mentions two bioconstitutional transformations, which were prompted by new biomedical 
practices. According to the first, top-bottom perspective of bioconstitutionalism, states grant 
legal recognition to “new entities, new subjects, or new rights” (Jasanoff 2011, 289) created 
by techno-scientific advancements. The second, bottom-up bioconstitutionalism, represents 
the articulations of new right claims by individual subjects towards their governments, and 
the use of biological knowledge as a means of legitimizing them. The second type of 
bioconstitutionalism relates to what, following Petryna (2002), Novas and Rose called 
biological citizenship (Novas and Rose 2004).  
In this article, the notion of bioconstitutionalism is employed to advance the 
understanding of how changes in the constitutional commitments that state governments have 
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towards their citizens, prompted by biomedical advances, interact with the establishment of 
the jurisdictional boundaries of medical expertise. The theories emanating from the sociology 
of professions traditionally explained the relationships between professions, including the 
medical profession, and the state in terms of the autonomy/intervention dualism (Freidson 
1988). According to such conceptualizations, the main reason for granting autonomy to 
professions is the latter’s exclusive possession of objective, credible and highly complex 
expert knowledge, training and skills (Parsons 1949; Abbott 1988; Freidson 1988). The 
highly complex and “esoteric” (Freidson 1988) nature of this knowledge justified the 
exclusion of lay and untrained people because “only properly trained men can know and 
evaluate it” (Freidson 1988, 360). Conversely, in such works, the knowledge possessed by the 
professions automatically received the seal of approval by virtue of it being the product of the 
work of professional social groups.  
Johnson (2005) opposed this conception of professions and drew on the idea of 
governmentality propounded by Foucault to lay ground for his understanding of professions. 
In the lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de France (Foucault 1979), he drew on his earlier 
work about biopower and began to develop an understanding of the development of the 
modern bureaucratic state and the role that expert knowledge had in state formation. He 
suggested that, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, political power has been 
exercised through a number of institutions and practices, including both formal bureaucratic 
apparatuses and a number of non-governmental institutions, practices, knowledges, 
techniques, and rationalities. It was this ensemble of apparatus that he called governmentality 
(Foucault 1979, 20). At the center of the exercise of political power he thus located, not the 
homogenous and omnipotent State, but the process of government, exercised through multiple 
forms, techniques, and institutions, in which the State was only one agent (Miller and Rose 
2003, 77). These non-governmental practices, which could be loosely defined as expertise, 
became integrated into a state apparatus, which justified and legitimized its policies and 
political programs by relying upon the “neutral” language of expertise. Yet, the neutrality of 
expert knowledge was the product of a mutual stabilization process of the State and expertise, 
and not a characteristic of its essential and transcendental nature.  
Applying the idea of governmentality to the analysis of professions, Johnson (2005) 
argued that expertise, embroiled in the process of governance, was ultimately institutionalized 
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in the form of professions and was thus a product of government programs. Put differently, 
the institutionalization of professions and the formation of the State were the outcomes of a 
single state-expertise stabilization process. Johnson, therefore, agrees with Larson (1977) and 
Abbott (1988) that professions are not pre-constituted entities, but, in contrast, acquire their 
jurisdictional boundaries as an outcome of the struggles they undergo to expand their 
jurisdictional domains. Yet, following Foucault, Johnson challenges the role and nature of the 
expert knowledge possessed by the professions. Building his analysis on the idea of the 
mutual constitution of expertise and the State, he argues that knowledge is a product of the 
mutual participation of expertise and the State in the process of government. Therefore, the 
attribution of “correctness” to expert knowledge is also a result of government, and not an 
intrinsic quality of knowledge (Johnson 2005, 10).  
One implication of the mutual constitution of expertise and the State is that the 
government has the opportunity to transform the “arenas of professional neutrality and 
autonomy” (Johnson 2005, 10), into the political object, if such a transformation is needed to 
implement new government objectives. In this way the State is able to redraw the boundary 
between its own jurisdictional domain and the domain of expertise, and expand its jurisdiction 
over issues which had previously been within the sole purview of the profession. However, 
transformations such as this are never easy as the State can be accused of politicizing 
knowledge for its own political objectives. The State and the profession may, therefore, be 
engaged in boundary disputes over the domains that the competing parties hold important and 
where they “return to defend, assert or extend their interests” (Thomson 2013, 194). Gieryn’s 
(1983, 1995, 1999) concept of boundary-work provides a good analytical framework for 
advancing this analysis.  
Gieryn employs the term boundary-work to explore the discursive practices which 
scientists use to draw a “rhetorical boundary between science and some less authoritative, 
residual non-science” (Gieryn 1983, 783) and to initiate action to establish epistemic authority 
over the disputed domains (Gieryn 1999, 23). Boundary-work is thus a strategic activity 
which scientists perform to pursue their ideological objectives because much is at stake – 
“authority, jobs, fame, influence, nature” (Gieryn 1999, 15) – when the disputes on the locus 
of the boundary are in play. Gieryn (1995) distinguished four strategies which scientists use to 
establish their epistemic authority over a disputed domain. First, scientists may seek to expel 
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some claims to knowledge from the domain of science as “bad” science, a strategy Gieryn 
called “expulsion”. Second, scientists may seek to expand their epistemic authority to a 
domain, previously occupied by non-science, such as art, politics, or religion. The task here is 
to “distinguish science from other forms of knowledge deemed to be less reliable, less truthful 
and/or less relevant” (Petersen, Tanner and Munsie 2014, 193). Third, they may compete for a 
more truthful representation of reality, attaching authority to their scientific conceptions and 
denying it to their rivals, the boundary-work Gieryn called monopolization.  
Finally, the last type of boundary-work, which Gieryn defines as “keeping politics 
near but out” (Gieryn 1995, 435-436), refers to scientists’ efforts to protect science from the 
attempts of outside powers to control or use science for their own objectives. This type of 
boundary-work is particularly evident in the boundary disputes between scientists and 
politicians. As Gieryn details, scientists seek to draw science close to politics, particularly, 
because when a political judgment builds on science, it is “simultaneously measuring and 
reproducing the authority of science over claims about reality” (Gieryn 1995, 435) and 
thereby reinforcing science’s “epistemic authority”. But, if science is drawn too close or a 
“spillover” of politics into science occurs, it threatens the monopoly of scientists over science. 
Importantly, politicians also seek to maintain a fence between politics and science. Politicians 
draw legitimacy from science, but they can do so only if science remains “neutral” and 
“objective”, which it can only be if it remains independent and untainted by political choices. 
In recent years, the concept of boundary-work has been employed in a variety of 
fields, including biomedical sciences, medicine and healthcare. This research illustrates the 
importance of normative discourses and ethics in undertaking boundary-work. Wainwright et 
al. (2006) illustrated how scientists perform “ethical boundary-work” to legitimize stem cell 
research. Ehrich et al. (2006) explored how the staff of reproductive clinics employ the ethical 
principle of the “welfare of the child” in making decisions on whether or not to provide IVF 
and PGD treatment. Kelly (2003) demonstrated the role that bioethical deliberation has in 
public bioethics committees on deciding upon the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of embryo 
research. Research on interprofessional competition has explored different types of 
legitimation discourses, which the professions use to expand their professional authority, such 
as holism and patient-centeredness (Timmons and Tanner 2004). Little research, however, has 
been done to explore how the normative discourses are employed in the boundary-work 
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undertaken between medical professions and government bodies. Applying the concept of 
boundary-work to the case at hand, I illustrate the importance of State constitutional 
obligations towards the citizens in the boundary disputes between the medical profession and 
the State. Using this approach to explore the mutual constitution of medical expertise and the 
State (Johnson 2005), I therefore foreground the role that bioconstitutionalism plays in 
assigning the respective place to medical expertise as an instrument of government.  
4.3. Stage 1. The institution of the Santosuosso Commission, the Degan Circular and the 
“Far West procreativo”   
IVF made its debut in Italian laboratories in mid-1980s. In 1983, less than 5 years after the 
birth of Louise Brown, the first girl conceived with the help of IVF, an Italian gynecologist 
Vincenzo Abate successfully performed the first IVF in a private Italian clinic (Valentini 
2004). Immediately following Abate’s team success, other Italian university clinics repeated 
and surpassed it. In 1986 the first frozen IVF cycle was performed (La Repubblica, April 12, 
1987) and, a few years later in another clinic, a child conceived with a donated oocyte was 
born.  
The deliberation within the Italian government on how to accommodate IVF in the 
country’s healthcare arrangements immediately faced ethical and legal hurdles. The main 
reason was the use of human embryos in IVF treatment, their creation outside of the women’s 
body and the respective possibilities of manipulating them. Similarly to other countries, 
where the use of embryos in IVF brought religion back to the fore in public debate (Mulkay 
1997; Bleiklie, Goggin, and Rothmayr 2004), the traditionally strong role of Catholicism in 
Italy, with its uncompromising position with respect to human embryos, affected the first 
attempts to legislate on IVF (Flamigni and Mori 2005). This was particularly evident in 1984 
when, both as a response to the first Italian IVF and to the establishment of the Warnock 
Committee in Great Britain, the current Minister of Health, Costante Degan, set up a special 
interdisciplinary commission to inquire into issues raised by ART and to produce a text of a 
future law. The Commission included doctors, biologists, philosophers, lawyers and public 
officials and was presided over by Judge Fernando Santosuosso. As a member of the 
Christian Democrats, Degan first decided to appoint individuals to the Commission who were 
known for supporting traditional and conservative views, in particular, on matters such as 
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divorce and abortion (Flamigni and Mori 2005). Fernando Santosuosso himself was a catholic 
and author of a number of books on the catholic faith. This composition of the Santosuosso 
Commission was immediately criticized by civil society, leading Degan to modify it and 
appoint some more liberal members, including a well-known clinician and gynecologist Carlo 
Flamigni and one of the founders of IVF in Italy, Ettore Cittadini (Valentini 2004). 
Despite these attempts to “liberalize” the Commission, the conservative mood 
prevailed, leading to the adoption of a rather restrictive text of the reports. On the one hand, 
the Commission recognized the unique potential of medicine to find causes and treat human 
ailing, such as infertility, and therefore help citizens fulfil their legitimate and “worthy” desire 
of having progeny. On the other hand, if left unregulated, the new medical developments 
might lead to the “instrumentalization of human life” (Santosuosso Commission 1985, 38). 
By human life the members meant the human embryo; although they did not specify what 
exact moral status the human embryo had, they concluded that they “hoped that the legal 
status of the embryo would be defined soon” (Santosuosso Commission 1985, 47), as it was 
definitely “a subject” and by no means “an object”. The acknowledgement of both medicine’s 
promises and its growing powers to “instrumentalize” life underpinned the decision of the 
Commission on what role medicine should be allowed to play in the management of the life, 
health and reproduction of Italian citizens.   
First, the Commission found that only a limited range of procedures were legitimate, 
namely, artificial insemination and IVF using the gametes of the requesting couple. The 
existing technological limitations in inducing pregnancy with only one embryo and the threat 
to women’s health, caused by recurrent hormonal stimulations, such as ovarian hyper 
stimulation syndrome (OHSS) and ovarian cancer, justified the creation of surplus embryos 
and embryo cryopreservation. However, if the doctor did create surplus embryos, then the 
embryos which were not transferred in the first cycle, must be transferred to the same woman 
in later cycles. Second, following the opinion of the majority of the Commission’s members, 
the Commission prohibited research on surplus embryos to better understand the factors 
leading to infertility as being contradictory to the principle of human dignity. Third, it 
prescribed that IVF must only be performed by doctors holding knowledge in “gynaecology, 
physiopathology of human reproduction, seminology, with collaboration of sanitarians with 
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competences in the biology of human reproduction with experience in in vitro culturing” 
(Santosuosso Commission 1985, 59).  
The conclusion of the Santosuosso Commission serves as a good introduction to an 
analysis of how the Italian Government first attempted to define the place and role of medical 
expertise in the fulfilment of government objectives, in light of the opportunities provided by 
the new ART. On the one hand, the Commission acknowledged the unique power of the 
medical profession to secure one of these objectives, namely, health protection, because of the 
possession of expert knowledge. Therefore, it entrusted all matters, for which such knowledge 
was required, to doctors. On the other hand, the controversial aspects of IVF, and the ensuing 
risk of “harming” embryos, urged the Commission to place limits on the professional 
aspirations of doctors. The boundary-work was particularly evident in the way in which the 
Commission restricted the use of embryo surplus production and embryo cryopreservation to 
protect both the embryos’ life and women’s health, and in how, this limited the jurisdictional 
power of the medical profession. The result of this balance between the State’s obligation to 
protect embryos and the health of adult citizens was translated into assigning the respective 
place to medical expertise in the State government plans.  
The position of the majority of the Commission members on how new advancements 
in biomedicine should be used to protect the entitlements of Italian citizens caused two 
different reactions. The difference between these reactions was related to the opposing views 
on how to balance the interests of the embryo with the interests of adult citizens, the problem 
that plagued the debate on all issues related to human reproduction in Italy, particularly, on 
the regulation of abortion (Calloni 2001; Cesaritti 2011). For example, the more liberal 
members of the Commission, such as Ettore Cittadini and Carlo Flamigni, argued against the 
prohibition of embryo research as it could provide important knowledge on embryo 
development, improve the techniques of IVF and therefore better address citizens’ fertility 
issues (Santosuosso Reports 1985, 56). In this way, they performed the expansion-type of 
boundary-work described by Gieryn (1999), seeking to further expand the jurisdictional 
domain of medicine and bring embryo surplus production and cryopreservation into the focus 
of medicine, appealing to patient’s health as a legitimizing instrument.   
Another position was supported by Degan himself. Specifically, Degan took into 
account neither the view of the Commission’s liberal members, nor the Reports themselves 
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and refused to deliberate them with the Government. Instead, two months prior their 
publication, he issued a ministerial circular named “Limits and conditions of legitimacy of 
services for artificial insemination in the domain of SSN” (MDS 1985). The Circular aimed at 
regulating artificial insemination alone, but also contained a number of provisions regulating 
the procedures over embryos. Specifically, the Circular prohibited embryo cryopreservation 
entirely and only allowed the creation of embryos that were required for implantation. The 
boundary-work, performed by Degan, thus resulted in the contraction of the professional 
jurisdiction of the medical profession and was the result of the Government’s intent to ensure 
greater embryo protection.  
The subsequent institutionalization of the results of boundary-work followed an even 
more interesting trajectory, however. The Circular only applied to public fertility clinics, that 
is, to those that belonged to the National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, SSN). 
This left private clinics beyond its regulatory reach. As a result, a two-tier system of provision 
of ART developed in Italy. On the one hand, the professional freedom of doctors working in 
the public fertility centers was substantially restricted by the State. Whilst, on the other, 
doctors working in the private sector received a high degree of autonomy and were only 
limited by their deontological codes and the general rules of Italian law. Their professional 
autonomy, a product of the Degan Circular, was further reinforced by the persistent political 
debates on the legitimacy of embryo surplus production and cryopreservation. For more than 
ten years the failure to reach consensus on this issue precluded any attempt to even start the 
parliamentary deliberation on the law, despite the fact that numerous bills had been presented 
to both chambers of Parliament. The Vatican, whose position on human embryos has been 
one of the firmest among other religions, used the existing political crisis in Italy to impose its 
values on the Italian society through affecting the party politics (Hanafin 2007). In contrast, 
the political parties used the Vatican’s support to promote their political agendas. The 
regulatory limbo turned the Italian private sector of reproductive medicine into one of the 
most permissive in the world, giving Italy the nickname of “Reproductive Far West” 
(Neresini and Bimbi 2000).  
The different roles that the medical profession played in Italy was a direct outcome of 
the opposing views held by Government members on how embryos’ rights should be 
balanced with the rights of adult citizens and, therefore, which ART should be held 
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legitimate. As the research on boundary-work has shown, boundary-work does not always 
lead to stability and, unless there are factors that help to stabilize the results of boundary 
disputes, the latter may may remain fluid and volatile (Star and Griesemer 1989; Moore 1996; 
Guston 1999). The split system of the provision of ART services in Italy illustrates how the 
impossibility of reaching consensus on how the boundary-work should be ultimately 
performed and translated into the respective healthcare arrangements, created an entirely 
different outcome, namely, the simultaneous co-existence of two different models of 
state/expertise relations. As Franklin argued with respect to a similar situation in the United 
States, the lack of comprehensive legislation and the unregulated provision of ART are a 
direct outcome of government attempts to give clear answers to the abstract and complicated 
question of the “moral and legal status” of the embryo, instead of taking a “sociological” 
approach and accommodating as many views of its citizens as possible, a position adopted by 
the Warnock Committee in the UK, for example (Franklin 2010). Yet, the Italian government 
had been consistently trying to define the place of human embryos in the Italian constitutional 
order, thereby laying ground for the never-ending debates around the status of the embryo and 
leading to the institutionalization of the split system of regulation.   
4.3. Stage 2. The rise and the fall of the Bolognesi bill. Adoption of Law 40/2004 
The impulse for further governmental deliberation on the regulation of ART was caused by 
the international progress that had taken place in cell biology. The high profile case about 
cloning the first mammalian animal, Dolly the sheep, in 1997, created strong emotional 
turmoil in the Italian media who urged Parliament to set limits on runaway scientific 
developments (Neresini and Bimbi 2000). Unsurprisingly, the regulation of an almost 
unregulated sector of ART came top of the list of government priorities in the area of science 
and technology policy.  
The government assigned the task of elaborating the text of a bill to the Commission 
on Social Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies. The then parliamentary coalition was centrist-
left which suggested that a more permissive bill on ART would be adopted. Furthermore, the 
president of the Commission, Marida Bolognesi, herself a member of the Italian social-
democratic political party “Democrats of the Left” (“Democratici di Sinistra - L’Ulivo”), was 
known for her feminist and rather liberal views on matters related to ART and abortion 
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(Valentini 2004). The course of action, which Bolognesi would take in the discussion of the 
bill, was already reflected in her position on the moral status of the embryo, which she 
expressed in her opening speech. Resonating with the position adopted by Warnock, 
Bolognesi stated that, although the human embryo was “worthy of respect” in virtue of it 
being the “project of life”, people’s views on it differed and therefore a “shared social ethics” 
(“etica sociale condivisa”) should serve as the basis of any future laws on ART.  
To draft the first version of the bill, Bolognesi set up a special Restrictive Committee 
and assigned to it the representatives of a wide array of normative positions regarding ART. 
To a large extent, the debate in the Committee reflected the debate in the Santosuosso 
Commission, where individual views on the “moral and legal status” of the embryo 
underpinned the boundary-work they performed with respect to the procedures of embryo 
surplus production and cryopreservation. However, the existing situation with unused frozen 
embryos flooding Italian clinics because of the absence of any targeted regulation regarding 
their storage and disposal, exacerbated the skepticism of the pro-life politicians towards these 
procedures. Maria Burani Procaccini, for example, a member of the center-right party Forza 
Italia, argued for the prohibition of the creation of surplus embryos in order “to prevent the 
production of eighty thousand and more cryopreserved human embryos who are threatened 
because nobody knows what purpose they serve” (CDD 1996a). Thus, the pro-life 
parliamentarians claimed that the doctor must be allowed to create only that number of 
embryos that should be implanted into the woman according to the most recent clinical 
evidence, in order to avoid the creation of surplus embryos and their cryopreservation (CDD 
1996a; CDD 1999b). They pointed out that due the existing limitations in the ART techniques 
the creation and implantation of one embryo might not initiate pregnancy; doctors therefore 
should be allowed to fertilize several oocytes, subject to the simultaneous transfer of all the 
created embryos into the patient’s uterus. In contrast, the liberal politicians insisted that 
doctors should be given full liberty in terms of the creation of embryos and their preservation 
as such liberty was indispensable for the “good” discharge of their professional duties (CDD 
1996b).  
Following her commitment to “shared social ethics”, Bolognesi sought to reconcile 
the different ethical positions regarding surplus embryos and searched for a compromise 
solution. As a result, she endorsed the text of a unified bill, later dubbed the “Bolognesi 
 110 
project” (“Progetto Bolognesi”). This bill stipulated that a doctor was allowed to create a 
maximum of four embryos in one IVF cycle, transfer as many embryos as deemed appropriate 
in a concrete case to initiate pregnancy, and cryopreserve the remainder, but that these 
remaining must be transferred into the same woman in the following cycles (CDD 1997a). 
The “four embryo” standard was another result of the boundary-work, in which a different 
view on how the Italian State should protect the constitutional entitlements of its citizens 
resulted in a differently drawn boundary between the professional domain of the State and the 
medical profession.  
Yet, the “four embryo” standard represented a step forward in how the boundary-work 
was performed by the Restrictive Committee, compared to the Santosuosso Commission. The 
former not only balanced State commitments as it saw fit and translated this balance into a 
particular configuration of the medical profession and the State, but also attributed to it a form 
of clinical evidence. Four as a maximum number of embryos to create and implant was 
borrowed from the unfolding debates among clinicians about the appropriate number of 
embryos that should be implanted to increase the chances of pregnancy but which would also 
reduce the risk of multiple pregnancies to minimum (Murdoch 1998). The pro-life politicians, 
after having explored the existing international IVF practices, transposed into law the 
evidence, which, according to them, was shared by the majority of the clinicians themselves. 
However, unlike the medical profession, they employed this evidence not only to protect the 
health of the aspiring mother, but also to prevent embryo surplus production and 
cryopreservation. As a result, the “four embryo” standard was not about the implantation of 
embryos, but their creation.  
This move represents a tactic of governmentality (Johnson 2005), through which the 
Restrictive Committee redefined the jurisdictional boundaries of expertise to address the 
constitutional obligations of the Italian State. On the one hand, the locus of the boundary was 
partially predicated on the availability of knowledge concerning the appropriate number of 
embryos to implant and the professional capacity of the doctor to autonomously decide how 
many embryos should be created and implanted in each individual case to better account for 
the patient’s health condition. This illustrates how expertise was again made part of 
governance in order to respond to the constitutional obligations of the Italian State, such as its 
duty to protect the right to health (Johnson 2005). On the other hand, the involvement of 
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expertise in governance was also performed to ensure the protection of the new obligations of 
the State, namely, towards IVF embryos, which in medical practice do not enjoy the same 
status as adult patients. The result of balancing the State duties towards its citizens was 
translated into granting that jurisdictional power to the medical profession, which was 
necessary to enable the fulfilment of both State duties. However, this move of the Italian 
Parliament was not without problems.  
The first sign that the “four embryo” standard would create controversy came 
immediately after the bill was presented to the other members of the Commission on Social 
Affairs. First, the differences in normative commitments led to different understandings of 
what number it should be. Some conservative members of Parliament proposed that a limit be 
put on the maximum number of embryos that a doctor should be allowed to create, from one 
(CDD 1997b), to two (CDD 1998) or three (CDD 1998) and that these should be implanted 
simultaneously, thereby precluding any possibility of embryo manipulation and denying the 
doctors any medical discretion. The key requirement in these proposals was the prohibition of 
the creation of surplus embryos and their cryopreservation as such measures represented, 
according to the deputy Cesare Ercole, “a fundamental protection of embryo’s life” (CDD 
2002). As the debates progressed, the “three embryo” standard, together with the prohibition 
of embryo surplus production and cryopreservation, became the most frequently claimed 
requirement of the pro-life politicians.  
Second, an attack came from liberal politicians, supported by the Italian medical 
community. They performed the type of boundary-work that Gieryn called “keeping politics 
near but out” (Gieryn 1995). Specifically, the doctors and liberal politicians argued that the 
state-produced standards represented a “spillover” of politics into clinical knowledge. First, 
the pro-life politicians incorrectly interpreted the clinical evidence, because “four” should 
refer not to the number of created embryos, but to those implanted. Second, since the medical 
community does not only produce, but also applies knowledge as part of its practice, these 
standards would force the doctors to apply this “incorrect” and “one-fits-all” treatment in 
different clinical situations and inflict harm on women’s health, for example, through 
increasing the risk of developing OHSS and ovarian cancer. Tacitly many of the doctors and 
politicians recognized in these state-mandated clinical standards the embedded normative 
principles and the attempts of the pro-life politicians to protect embryos against harm which 
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was reflected in the speeches of some politicians (CDD 1999a). Yet, this time they also 
emphasized the apparent incorrectness of the state-produced clinical knowledge and thus 
added this type of boundary-work to the former “expansion” type. In the debates that 
followed, the standards, their claimed incorrectness and the resulting adverse health effects on 
female patients, would become the main leverage, used by doctors and liberal politicians, to 
oppose the attempts of the supporters of embryo protection to limit the jurisdictional domain 
of medicine.  
However, the recourse to knowledge for legitimizing the expansion of medical 
expertise on the procedures of embryo surplus production and cryopreservation would prove 
unsuccessful. In 2004, the Italian Senate voted for the restrictive draft of the law. 
Interestingly, as Valentini (2004) suggests, the intervention of the Vatican had a decisive 
impact upon the eventual form of the Law which prescribed that, irrespective of their 
morphological and genetic characteristics, all embryos produced during one IVF cycle, and 
which should not exceed three, must be implanted into the women’s uterus. The Law also 
outlawed cryopreservation and selective embryo reduction. These norms were meant to 
restrict doctors’ discretion with regard to treatment options and make the application of IVF 
consistent with the principle introduced in Article 1 of the Law. The article recognized the 
human embryo as a rights-holder and prescribed that ART should henceforth be performed 
“under conditions and according to the modalities foreseen in the present law which ensures 
the rights of all the involved subjects, including the conceived” (Metzler 2011). In the same 
year these provisions were implemented into the guidelines of the Ministry of Health 
introducing a new medical protocol for performing IVF in both public and private Italian 
clinics (Ministro della Salute 2004). 
This failure to refute the state-produced standards through recourse to knowledge fits 
squarely with the acknowledgement from scholars that biomedicine and bioscience, due to 
their ethically controversial nature, particularly related to the use of human embryos, proved 
no longer capable of maintaining public trust by referring to their scientific authority (Salter 
and Jones 2007). Both nationally and internationally, this resulted in the search for additional 
strategies of legitimizing biosciences and rendering them accountable to the public, and the 
normative language of bioethics become a key instrument in achieving this (Rose 2004; Salter 
and Jones 2007; Wilson 2011). The involvement of bioethics in assessing the legitimacy of 
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new biomedical practices represented another example of the erosion of science’s boundaries 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; Nowotny et al. 2001). In Italy, State constitutional obligations 
became a normative benchmark for assessing the legitimacy of IVF and thereby defining the 
jurisdictional domain of medical expertise.  
Yet, the tactics used by the pro-life politicians were not unproblematic, either. First, 
the intense controversy around them points at the difficulty of accepting the authority of such 
state-produced clinical standards, because they rested on knowledge produced by expertise for 
other state political projects, namely, to protect patient’s health (Foucault 1979; Johnson 
2005). Specifically, by giving a different interpretation to this knowledge and applying it to 
different state goals, namely, to protect IVF embryos, the pro-life politicians drew expert 
knowledge “too close” to politics and thereby undermined the “neutrality” of their political 
judgment (Gieryn 1995; Johnson 2005). This explains the attempts of both the medical 
community and liberal politicians to refute the “standards” as both “incorrect” and politically 
charged. Second, when knowledge is used to meet new state goals, the debate over it may 
become pervasive, because of the disagreements about what these goals exactly are and how 
they should be met, especially in such longstanding debates as those involving human 
embryos. As shown above, it was precisely the disagreement about the scope of State duties 
towards its citizens that created a two tier system of the regulation of ART and the debate 
among the members of Parliament as to how many embryos future law should allow to be 
created. Third, because this knowledge is openly non value-neutral, it can be subject to 
contradictory interpretations, for example, when the interpreting subject disagrees with the 
values, inculcated in such knowledge, or interprets them differently. As I will further 
illustrate, it was just such a different interpretation of the state-produced “three embryo” 
standard that allowed the Court to invalidate it as unconstitutional.  
4.4. Stage 3. Litigation and the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court   
Predictably, it was soon clear that Law 40/2004 was unable to promote a nation-wide 
compromise on regulating IVF. In 2005, the debate around the “three embryo” standard 
shifted to a different – judicial – setting. In the majority of cases the plaintiffs were Italian 
couples, claiming that the prohibition of embryo surplus production and cryopreservation 
violated a number of their constitutional rights, including the right to health, because the 
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restrictions led to a higher risk of OHSS and ovarian cancer. In one case (TARL 2007) the 
plaintiff was the World Association of Reproductive Medicine.  
Among the six submitted cases, only one was unconditionally satisfied in favor of the 
plaintiffs (TF 2007). The judge gave a “constitutionally oriented interpretation” of Law 
40/2004, as the plaintiffs requested, and allowed the creation of surplus embryos to protect the 
health of the pregnant woman. In the remaining cases the judges either did not sustain the 
complaint (TC 2004) or considered that, before proceeding, the Law’s constitutionality should 
be assessed by the Constitutional Court (TC 2005; TARL 2007; TF 2008a; TF 2008b).  
The plaintiffs’ main strategy rested on displaying the lack of scientific credibility 
underlying the “three embryo” standard. Fertility centers, which were formally the defendants 
in the trials, and medical experts, participating in the trials as third parties, supported the 
plaintiffs and claimed that the “three embryo” standard was not evidence-based medicine and 
contradicted international good practice guidelines. The lack of scientific credibility of the 
standard was, according to them, the main reason why its application by doctors in practice 
would cause harm to patients’ health and violate their right to health.  
The reaction of the courts was remarkably consistent. The judge of the Florence court, 
for example, agreed that the “three embryo” standard was not entirely consistent with the 
prevailing medical standards regarding infertility treatment (TF 2008b). But he added that, in 
designing the  “three embryo” standard, the Italian Parliament sought not only to build it on 
the most credible medical evidence, but also to strike a fair balance between protecting the 
rights of adult Italian citizens and those of embryos. Therefore, the “constitutionality” of the 
“three embryo” standard could not be assessed by its consistency with the international 
clinical standards only, but, instead, by how fairly it balanced different constitutional 
entitlements, in particular, the right to health of the woman and the right to life of the embryo, 
and whether the result of this balancing was in conformity with the Italian constitutional law. 
This conclusion of the court shifted the assessment of the “three embryo” standard from the 
epistemic to the normative, or better constitutional, terrain, because it required elucidating not 
only what was “correct”, but also how the Italian Parliament conceived of its constitutional 
obligations towards its citizens. In other words, he sought to clarify which bioconstitutional 
arrangements underlay the role assigned to the medical expertise by Parliament and whether 
this decision of Parliament conformed to the Italian Constitution. Because this assessment 
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could not be performed by local courts but required the intervention of the Constitutional 
Court, the Florence court passed the case to the latter.  
The Constitutional Court was presented with the conflicting evidence about the 
clinical acceptability of the “three embryo” standard. On the one hand, in a similar manner to 
the cases decided by local courts, the medical associations sought to display the causation 
between the legal restrictions on performing IVF and the infliction of harm on women’s 
health, a direct outcome of the clinical “incorrectness” of the “three embryo” standard. On the 
other hand, pro-life and catholic associations, followed by the Avvocatura dello Stato, the 
Italian state body representing the interests of the Italian government in legal proceedings, 
countered these arguments. They argued that there was no clinical evidence that the decision 
of Parliament, to limit the number of implantable embryos to three, inflicted harm on 
women’s health. Specifically, the Committee for the Protection of Women provided the 
Report of the Minister of Health about the state of the implementation of Law 40/2004. The 
Report contained statistics according to which, after the Law entered into force, a sudden 
decrease in complications from ovarian stimulations was detected. This, according to the 
Committee, proved that the “three embryo” standard could not cause more adverse effects on 
women’s health than the traditional IVF, at least as far as OHSS was concerned. Importantly, 
they stressed that the “three embryo” standard represented the position of Parliament on how 
the conflicting rights of the embryo and adult citizens should be balanced and what role 
medicine should play to ensure the protection of these rights. As Movement for Life argued 
“even the discretion of the doctor must respect the rules deriving from the requirement to 
protect international human rights” (CC 2009). 
In 2009, the Constitutional Court passed its milestone judgment repealing the ban on 
the creation of surplus embryos and their cryopreservation. The baseline of the Court’s 
judgment was the conclusion that the medical community was the only social institution that 
was cognitively and technically capable of performing infertility treatment. Implicit in the 
Court’s judgment was the privileging of the evidence provided by the plaintiffs over the 
evidence provided by the pro-life associations. And yet the Court’s judgment was not the 
result of it accepting the epistemic arguments provided by the plaintiffs. The entry point here 
is the first passage of the judgment, in which the Court directed its gaze at a possible 
contradiction between a seeming intent of Parliament to ensure maximum embryo protection 
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and the right granted to doctors to create three embryos. The Court suggested that Parliament 
granting permission to create three embryos instead of one was not intended to make triple 
pregnancies possible, but to ensure that there were better prospects of initiating a single 
healthy pregnancy. Therefore, Parliament had tacitly accepted “that some of them [embryos] 
might not initiate pregnancy” (CC 2009), which in practice implied Parliament’s consent to 
limit embryo protection to “ensure concrete expectations of pregnancy” (CC 2009). The Court 
concluded that, if Parliament limited embryo protection for particular therapeutic purposes, it 
implicitly relinquished its powers to protect IVF embryos and entrusted them to the authority 
of a different social institution: medicine. As a result, all subsequent medical prescriptions set 
down by Parliament, such as the limitation of the number of producible and transferable 
embryos and the ban on cryopreservation, constituted both a paradoxical contradiction to 
Parliament’s own intention to limit embryo protection and an intrusion into the medical 
profession. Importantly, the latter could create adverse health risks for female patients’ health. 
The expulsion of the State from medical practice and granting doctors the autonomy to treat 
was the only possible way that Italian medicine could ensure the right to health of Italian 
female patients. In short, while the “three embryo” standard was reasonable and not self-
contradictory for the individual parliamentarians, as exemplified in the opinion expressed by 
Ercole (CDD 2002), it was self-contradictory for the Court. It was precisely this apparent 
contradiction that was used by the Court to invalidate the “three embryo” standard as 
unconstitutional.  
The judgment of the Constitutional Court leads back to the opening paragraphs of this 
article and to its underlying idea about the mutual constitution of bioconstitutional 
arrangements and the state/expertise formation. The Court’s automatic deference to medicine 
after acknowledging the priority of citizens’ procreative rights over the rights of embryos 
shows how State constitutional duties and the assigning of the respective place to medical 
expertise, were co-dependent and co-constitutive (Jasanoff 2004, 2013). Just as the 
recognition of the priority of adult citizens’ rights over the rights of embryos implied a greater 
place of medical expertise in the government of citizens, the deference to medicine required 
legitimation, and the language of rights acted as just such a legitimizing technique. 
Importantly, it also shows how the appeal to knowledge was insufficient in invalidating the 
“three embryo” standard in the courtrooms too, thus confirming previous research on the 
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inability of biomedical practices to legitimize themselves through reference to scientific 
authority (Salter and Jones 2007).  
The pronouncement of the Constitutional Court was a key event in re-settling the 
arrangements between medicine, patients and the State, that had been so easily unsettled by 
the advent of the new ART. The latter problematized the relationships between the three by 
creating a new entity – an embryo outside the women’s body – and made from it one of the 
central objects of medical practice. In this way they introduced an old and contentious issue of 
the “moral and legal status” of the embryo into the debate about the governance of medicine. 
The Constitutional Court, through the move of co-production (Jasanoff 2004), simultaneously 
addressed the issue of how the rights of IVF embryos should be balanced with the rights of 
adult citizens, and decided on the role that medical expertise should play in the government of 
Italian citizens. Italian bioconstitutionalism thus framed the relationship between medicine, 
Italian citizens and the State, which, in turn, reinforced the re-settled bioconstitutional 
arrangements. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Analysis of the relationships between the medical profession and the State has traditionally 
regarded the two as discrete and independent entities, where the former struggles for 
autonomy, and the latter seeks to establish control over it. This article sought to provide an 
alternative understanding of this relationship and illustrate how medical expertise becomes 
involved in the process of government to fulfil a specific range of duties (Foucault 1979; 
Johnson 2003, 2005). Drawing on Gieryn’s (1983) concept of boundary-work and the notion 
of bioconstitutionalism (Jasanoff 2011), the analysis of the debate around embryo surplus 
production and cryopreservation in Italy showed how the role, assigned to expertise, was 
constitutive of the view on the Italian bioconstitutionalist settlements, namely, on the place in 
the Italian constitutional order of a new artificially-created entity – an embryo outside the 
women’s body – and its connection with the rights of adult citizens. It also illustrated how the 
“three embryo” standard became one of the outcomes of this debate. This analysis thus 
highlights the interplay and co-productionist (Jasanoff 2004) relations between countries’ 
bioconstitutional arrangements and the place of medical expertise therein.  
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This article draws attention to two particular aspects. First, confirming the results of 
the works on “ethical boundary-work” (Wainwright et al. 2006), it shows the importance of 
normative discourses, specifically, of the state’s constitutional obligations, in performing 
boundary-work. As illustrated in this article, constitutional rights were the key benchmarks in 
deciding on both the legitimacy of medicine’s “expansion” of its jurisdictional boundaries and 
on the need to keep the “three embryo” standard out of “good” medical practice as 
scientifically unfounded (Gieryn 1995). By exploring how boundary-work was performed by 
public authorities, including the Constitutional Court, this article also contends that the 
language of rights acted as an indispensable instrument, legitimizing the new ART, because 
the latter could not legitimize themselves through reference to their scientific authority (Salter 
and Jones 2007).  
Second, it illustrates how some techniques of government, such as the creation of the 
“three embryo” standard, which the State may use to comply with its newly assumed 
constitutional duties, may be problematic and remain highly contested. Specifically, when the 
government transforms the “arenas of decision making once considered realms of neutral, 
objective fact” (Johnson 2003, 148) into a political issue, it may be accused of the 
politicization of expertise. This points at the importance that societies attach to the drawing 
and maintaining of the discursive boundaries between the areas of knowledge and the areas of 
politics, even if in reality they are “ambiguous, multiple and overlapping” (Starr and 
Immergut 1987, 251).  
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5.1. Introduction1 
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the ideas of ‘genetic’2 and ‘biological 
citizenship’.3 The concepts were introduced into academic literature to conceptualize the type 
of relationships between authorities and citizens that build upon the recognition of citizens as 
biological creatures whose health, treatment, maintenance and improvement, is the key value. 
Although the authors use the traditional concept of citizenship, most of them stress that recent 
developments in biological and genetic sciences have led to the creation of new forms of 
political participation, civic engagement and a pluralization of political spaces in which the 
activities to improve citizens’ health take place. Thus, Rose emphasizes that biological 
citizenship in ‘advanced liberal democracies’ does not have a ‘nationalized form’ but instead 
represents a new ‘regime of the self’,4 or an outcome of the process of subjectification of 
citizens and constructing their identities. 5  Under the guidance of various ‘experts of the 
soma’,6 modern individuals increasingly tend to understand themselves as personally entitled 
to, and responsible for, enhancing and maintaining their vitality, for example, by individually 
managing their genetic risks. Importantly, if an illness has genetic roots, it becomes ‘familial, 
                                                
1 Article accepted with some major and minor changes by the European Journal of 
Legal Studies. 
2 Deborah Heath, Rayna Rapp and Karen-Sue Taussig, ‘Genetic Citizenship’ in David 
Nugent and Joan Vincent (eds), A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics (Blackwell 
Publishing 2007). 
3 Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas, ‘Biological Citizenship’ in Aihwa Ong and Stephen 
Collier (eds), Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological 
Problems (Blackwell Publishing 2004). Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens 
After Chernobyl (Princeton University Press 2002). Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: 
Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton University Press 
2006).  
4 Michel Foucault, Histoire de La Sexualité (Gallimard 1976). 
5 Thomas Lemke, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction (New York University Press 
2011); Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, ‘Biopower Today’ (2006) 1 BioSocieties 195.  
6 Rose (n 3).  
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a matter both of family histories and potential family futures’.7 Thus, possessing genetic 
information creates genetic entitlements and responsibilities, not only regarding one’s own 
health, but that of one’s family and future children too. Using Rose’s apt expression, in the 
contemporary ‘regime of the self’, health has become ‘a desire, a right and an obligation’, not 
only towards one’s health but also towards the one of one’s children.8  
Along with this ‘individualizing’ aspect of biological citizenship, there is its 
‘collectivizing’ aspect as well; this includes the formation of biosocial communities such as 
patient and self-help groups. 9  These communities make alliances with scientists to shape the 
direction of scientific research and lobby their governments to assign more funds for 
financing research on their health condition. They often choose transnational forms of 
organization and cooperation and the Internet is becoming one of the main instruments of 
sharing information and cooperating, thus overcoming the limits of the nation-state.  
Other scholars, however, emphasize that biological citizenship can, and does, have 
more traditional forms and involve the state apparatus. Specifically, biological citizens also 
actively formulate and make rights claims upon their governments in the name of their life 
and health, and ask the state to protect their ‘vital rights’, for example, by providing better 
access to biomedical benefits. Rights litigation is one of the most frequent mechanisms used 
to enable citizens to satisfy their rights claims. For example, in her research, Petryna showed 
how citizens of post-Chernobyl Ukraine demanded compensation for their damaged health.10 
Further, Biehl showed how, in Brazil, by litigating, ‘patients-citizens’ achieved ‘a 
democratization of medical sovereignty ’ enabling alternative health care practices’ to 
thrive. 11  Finally, Hanafin explored rights litigation in Italy against a restrictive law on 
medically assisted reproduction (Law 40/2004) 12  for examples of citizens trying to gain 
                                                
7 Rose (n 3) 108.  
8 Nikolas Rose, ‘Molecular Biopolitics, Somatic Ethics and the Spirit of Biocapital’ 
(2007) 5 Social Theory & Health 3, 11. 
9 Paul Rabinow, Essays on the Anthropology of Reason (Princeton University Press 
1996). 
10 Petryna (n 3). 
11 Joao Biehl, Will To Live: AIDS Therapies and the Politics of Survival (Princeton 
University Press 2007) 135. 
12 Legge 19 febbraio 2004, n.40, in G.U. 24 febbraio 2004, n.45 (Law 40/2004).  
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access to preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), an artificial reproductive technology 
(ART) performed to test for the presence of genetic abnormalities in the human embryo 
before embryo implantation in the uterus of the female patient.13 Hanafin concluded that the 
use of rights and litigation helped citizens to resist the ‘politics from above’ and have their 
interests, ignored by the ‘ideologically indifferent’ Parliament, recognized by the Italian 
judiciary.14  
Hence, for the authors, rights litigation was employed by citizens to fulfill their hopes 
and have their claims ‘in the name of their damaged biological bodies’15 satisfied, whether it 
was a claim for financial compensation, as it was in the case of Chernobyl workers, or for 
access to a forbidden technology, as it was in Italy. Indeed, as researchers argue, hope is 
another key aspect of biological citizenship. Hope grounds political activism in all its forms, 
whether this be the making of alliances with scientists to shape the direction of scientific 
research, political participation through lobbying, or the organization of public referenda.16 
Furthermore, and importantly, biological citizenship operates within what Rose called the 
‘political economy of hope’.17 The hope that patients have to find cures for their illness 
triggers the funding of research and treatment institutions and fuels the commercial 
aspirations of companies involved in procuring the relevant services and products. Thus, 
                                                
13  Usually PGD is performed to search and detect genetic mutations in genes 
responsible for either monogenic diseases (cystic fibrosis, beta thalassemia, Huntington’s 
disease) or for certain polygenic diseases (such as breast and ovarian cancer).  
14  Patrick Hanafin, ‘Rights, Bioconstitutionalism and the Politics of Reproductive 
Citizenship in Italy’ (2013) 17 Citizenship Studies 942. Patrick Hanafin, ‘The Embryonic 
Sovereign and the Biological Citizen: The Biopolitics of Reproductive Rights’ in Conor 
Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2012). 
15 Ingrid Metzler, ‘Between Church and State: Stem Cells, Embryos, and Citizens in 
Italian Politics’ in Sheila Jasanoff (ed), Reframing Rights: Bioconstitutionalism in the Genetic 
Age (MIT Press 2011). 
16 Rose (n 3).  
17 Ibid. 
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because of hope, ‘life itself is increasingly locked into an economy for the generation of 
wealth’,18 or indeed biovalue.19  
Yet, whereas hope might well drive biological citizens to look for cures for their 
illnesses, the hope that rights can be used as an instrument to attain this goal needs further 
exploration. Belief in rights as an instrument to remedy social ills has not always enjoyed 
support from lawyers and legal scholars. Starting with legal realists and following critical 
legal studies (CLS) scholars, rights became criticised as a useless and overinflated idea. For 
example, Rosenberg argued about the ‘hollow hope’ in the ability of courts to bring about 
social change through the pursuance of rights.20 Probably the most famous loss of hope, or 
rather faith, in rights was expressed by CLS scholar Duncan Kennedy.21 He argued that he 
lost his faith in rights because rights turned out to be just like any other type of rhetorical or 
policy argument and, therefore, were not ‘trumps’ in the Dworkian sense, that is, special 
claims which could override the interests of a political majority and lead to the closure of the 
debate.22 Even if they were used as ‘trumps’, rights have the ability to produce counter-
claims, and the need to balance them would, therefore, again reduce the dispute to some 
political or subjective argument, as there is no objective criterion through which the balancing 
could be performed. As Kennedy observed, this balancing renders the ‘rights argument 
indistinguishable from the open-ended policy discourse it was supposed to let us avoid’.23 
Therefore, what leads to a closure of a controversy is not the claiming of the rights as such, 
but the relationship between the rights claims, the identity of the rights claimer and their 
rhetorical mastery, the political viability of supporting arguments, and many other contingent 
local and historical circumstances. 
                                                
18 Rose and Novas (n 3) 452. 
19 Catherine Waldby, ‘Stem Cells, Tissue Cultures and the Production of Biovalue’ 
(2002) 6 Health: 305. 
20 Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope : Can Courts Bring about Social Change? 
(University of Chicago 1991). 
21 Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies’ in Wendy 
Brown and Janet Halley (eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique (Duke University Press 2002). 
22 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977). 
23 Kennedy (n 21).  
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The criticism of the use of rights based on their ability to produce counter-claims was 
also the subject of much feminist critique. The abortion case has been used as one of the most 
illustrative examples. For example, Carol Smart, following Kingdom, argued that winning 
rights could not lead to women’s emancipation because of the tendency of rights claims to 
produce counter-claims related to other rights, such as men’s rights, fetal rights and children’s 
rights.24 According to Smart, these counter-rights could be, and are being, used to restrict 
women’s access to abortion and constitute a disguised support for patriarchy. Therefore, for 
Smart, the use of rights by women is, in fact, counterproductive because instead of liberating 
women they simply reinforce and reproduce patriarchy.25 Similarly, according to Lacey,26  
rights may operate, in Dworkin's memorable phrase, as trumps: but trumps are of little 
use if there are many trumps in the pack. And this multiplicity of rights increasingly 
brings with it a reliance on a coercive framework of enforcement which, as Carol 
Smart has argued, inevitably depends on violence of legal power: rights are a creature 
of the state and hence a function of existing configurations of power. This means, it is 
argued, that they are of limited use to the politically marginalized or for the 
construction of claims oppositional to prevailing power relations. 
At a closer approximation, such criticism of rights contains two main elements. First, rights 
are criticised due to their main ontological presumptions, particularly, due to the definition of 
the right-bearing individual seen as a separate, atomistic and self-sufficient being and of rights 
as shields intended to protect this autonomous self against intrusion and harm.27 As a result, 
rights do not account for the relationality and interdependence among people and alienate 
                                                
24 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge 2002). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Nicola Lacey, 'Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women' in K. Knop, ed., 
Gender and Human Rights (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 13-56 at p. 39. 
Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge 2002). 
27 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and 
Law (Oxford University Press 2011), Karpin, Isabel. 1992. “Legislating the Female Body: 
Reproductive Technology and the Reconstructed Woman.” Columbia Journal of Gender and 
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them.28 Such criticism was particularly developed by feminist and communitarian scholars. 
Following the idea of relational autonomy, feminist scholars argued that individuals are to a 
large extent relational beings whose identity and bodies are shaped by the relationships and 
connections between them and other people. 29 Family has been used as an example of an 
entity whose members are particularly strongly bound by the relational ties such as 
responsibility, care and collective interests. Similarly, pregnancy has been discussed as an 
example par excellence of relational autonomy.30 Pregnant women’s personal boundaries are 
intertwined with the boundaries of the fetus and the latter, in turn, at least in the first stages of 
pregnancy, entirely depends upon the mother. The emphasis on relationality has been 
particularly important to undermine the viability of views on a disembodied embryo as a 
value in itself, or as a person having legal personality and rights, that should be protected 
against harm and violation.  
The second element of rights criticism is that what influences how such competing 
rights, protecting the autonomous and self-sufficient individual, will be balanced is the 
existing relations of power, the strength of the arguments used, and other contingent local, 
legal and political factors. Therefore, particularly for women, as a traditionally marginalized 
societal group, the use of rights is not helpful, as the relations of power will even further 
entrench the existing subordination of women.  
This full-blown critique of rights was later complemented by more contextual analyses 
of rights. Scholars working in the tradition of feminist and race critical studies were 
particularly involved in attempting to provide a more nuanced account of rights. According to 
Wendy Brown, 
[w]hile rights may operate as an indisputable force of emancipation at one moment in 
history – the American Civil Rights movement – or the struggle for rights by subjects 
of colonial domination such as black South Africans or Palestinians – they may 
                                                
28 Kairys, David, ed. 1998. The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique. New York: 
Basic Books. 
29 Ibid, Nedelsky (n 27), Karpin (n 27).  
30 Karpin (n 27).  
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become at another time a regulatory discourse, a means of obstructing or coopting 
more radical political demands, or simply the most hollow of empty promises.31 
Hence, according to Brown, it is not possible to say anything specific about rights apriori 
because the costs and benefits of rights are context-dependent. Nevertheless, according to 
Brown, both in practice and in legal scholarship, rights still figure as the universal language of 
emancipation and empowerment. 
Other scholars, including race and feminist scholars, also engaged into the process of 
reconstructing rights. Specifically, some authors developing the idea of relational autonomy, 
proposed the relational approach to rights. For example, according to Herring, rights could be 
seen as claims protecting not only individual but also relational values and interests.32 While 
rights are still claimed to protect individual values and interests, there is no reason why they 
cannot also be claimed with respect to ‘relational values’ and interests such as care, 
responsibility and parental duty. For example, rights such as the right to respect for private 
and family life, protected by art. 8 of the ECtHR, can act as such a right, promoting relational 
values. Further, Nedelsky proposed to regard rights as tools that structure relationships among 
people that foster and protect certain important societal values.33 Thus, she puts in the center 
of her reconstructed definition of rights values and relationships that promote those values. 
The values that are more important for the relevant society for the most part underlie the 
respective rights. This can act as a response to Herring that the reason why rights might not be 
able to promote relational values relates to the fact that those relational values do not enjoy 
support in the relevant society.  
With respect to new biomedical technologies, the critique of rights is pertinent 
because these new technologies raise many ethical and legal questions and controversies. On 
the one hand, criticism has been mounting in regard to the free use of technologies such as 
PGD or prenatal testing, as there are concerns that whether they are misused or not, they 
create threats to constitutional rights and guarantees, specifically, by creating circumstances 
that lead to discrimination against people with disabilities, to stigmatization and to increased 
                                                
31 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton 
University Press 1995) 98. 
32 Herring, Jonathan. 2013. “Forging a Relational Approach: Best Interests or Human 
Rights?” Medical Law International 13 (1).  
33 Nedelsky (n 27).  
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inequality.34 These fears are representative of a broader anxiety about geneticization, that is, 
the reduction of individuals to their genetic constitution and the tendency to treat similarities 
between, and differences among, people predominantly in genetic terms.35 In addition, since 
PGD involves the destruction of embryos, PGD might raise ethical and legal concerns in 
those countries in which unborn human life enjoys legal protection such as Italy or 
Germany.36 Therefore, the use of technologies such as PGD and prenatal testing should be 
either restricted by the State, allowing only their use for detecting serious diseases with high 
penetrance, an approach followed by the British regulator, 37  or entirely forbidden, an 
approach we can witness in Italy regarding PGD.  
Yet, on the other hand, some citizens argue that a restrictive regulation of 
technologies, enacted to safeguard certain rights in the face of new technologies, violates their 
rights, for example, their right to autonomy and self-determination. In this respect, the 
requirement to provide more liberal legal grounds for using new biomedical technologies is 
related to the evolving governmental ‘regime of the self’ which subjectifies citizens as 
responsible and prudent, with respect to their health and that of their children; the use of 
advances in biomedicine is then not only desirable but also necessary if these obligations are 
to be fulfilled. The conflict between the competing rights is reminiscent of the competition 
between the two ethics, namely, liberal human-rights based ethics and disempowering human 
dignity ethics. Both, together with a utilitarian ethic, form the three corners of a ‘bioethical 
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 134 
triangle’.38 Yet, what we witness here is also the competition between two competing rights, 
namely, the rights of individual citizens to shape their reproductive lives as they see fit, and 
the rights claimed by other people not to be stigmatized or discriminated against because of 
their disability or gender. Therefore, the emancipatory potential of legal rights might be 
undermined not only by their being overridden by a competing bioethical discourse, but also 
by their own ability to produce counter-claims. However, despite these questions and fears, 
many scholars working in the area of technology regulation still retain ‘hope’ in rights 
litigation.39 Yet, like those engaged in the critical analysis of rights, they call for a more 
nuanced thinking about the ability of rights to lead to human emancipation and 
empowerment.  
In light of the need for a more nuanced view of ‘hope in rights’, in this article, I 
explore the extent to which rights can ensure the recognition of citizens’ interests in using 
new biomedical technologies, as well as the costs and disadvantages of using rights to achieve 
these ends, by paying more attention to the problematic nature of rights. To do so, I 
reconstruct the story of Italian litigation for citizens’ access to PGD, paying particular 
attention to how exactly the interests of patients were recognized through rights litigation. I 
illustrate that the recognition of citizens’ interests in the Italian litigation process was partial, 
because the Constitutional Court accepted only the protection of mothers’ health as a 
justification for having access to PGD. Instead, relational values and interests of biological 
citizens such as responsibility and care for the health of their future children, the core element 
of biological citizens’ identity, that the plaintiffs displayed during litigation, were not 
recognized by the Italian Constitutional Court. I link this partiality to the prevailing 
(bio)ethical construction of the embryo as a person whose rights the State was obliged to 
protect, which was consolidated in the Italian legal doctrine. I argue that what was at stake in 
                                                
38  Roger Brownsword, ‘Ethical Pluralism and the Regulation of Modern 
Biotechnology’ in Francesco Francioni (ed), Biotechnologies and international human rights 
(Hart Publishing 2007). 
39 E.g., Mark L Flear and Anastasia Vakulenko, ‘A Human Rights Perspective on 
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the Italian litigation for PGD was a dispute which right – a more individualistic right (to 
health) or right that encompassed also relational values (the right to reproductive self-
determination), which is an example of such a reconstructed right as proposed by Herring – 
should legitimize the access to PGD. The former, however, prevailed over the latter due to the 
high value attributed to unborn life in the Italian constitutional order, urging the 
Constitutional Court to recognize that right that would better promote this value. Hence, the 
recognition of biological citizens’ ‘vital rights’ claimed vis-à-vis the state through litigation in 
Italy was partial; however, this was so not because the existing relations of power affected 
how individualistic rights would be balanced, but because certain important societal values, 
consolidated in the constitutional jurisprudence of Italy, prevented the participants of the 
debate from reconceptualizing the right to PGD from an individualistic into a more relational 
one. 
5.2. The law on medically assisted reproduction and the IVF embryo as a ‘citizen 
subject’ 
The Italian PGD litigation was a consequence of the adoption by the Italian Parliament of a 
highly restrictive Law 40/2004 regulating the use of ART in Italy. Heavily influenced by the 
ethics of life of the Catholic Church, by adopting this law, Parliament clearly wished to 
ensure full protection of embryos’ rights, even at the expense of the interests and rights of 
adult citizens. In art. 1, the Law symbolically recognized the IVF embryo as a rights-holder.40 
To implement the rights of embryos, the Law prohibited many reproductive technologies and 
practices. Specifically, it forbade embryo experimentation, prescribed that clinical and 
experimental research must be performed only for the sake of the embryo itself, forbade the 
creation of embryos for scientific and experimental research and outlawed eugenic embryo 
selection (art. 13). Further, in art. 14, it prohibited the discarding and cryopreservation of 
embryos, and prescribed that doctors must not ‘create embryos in a number higher than the 
one strictly necessary for a single and simultaneous transfer, and in any case not more than 
                                                
40 Law 40/2004, art. 1. ‘Al fine di favorire la soluzione dei problemi riproduttivi 
derivanti dalla sterilità o dalla infertilità umana è consentito il ricorso alla procreazione 
medicalmente assistita, alle condizioni e secondo le modalità previste dalla presente legge, 
che assicura i diritti di tutti i soggetti coinvolti, compreso il concepito’.   
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three’. Hence, the doctor was obliged to create not more than three embryos and all the 
resulting embryos, including those not capable of development and the sick ones, had to be 
implanted into the women’s uterus. The only exception to this rule was if the female patient 
had health issues that were unforeseen at the moment of fertilization of the eggs. Even in this 
case, however, after the patient’s health improves, the doctor is obliged to proceed with 
implantation. Combined, all these provisions technically made PGD impossible.  
To further restrict the possibilities of embryo manipulation, the Law directly regulated 
some adult citizens’ rights concerning the use of, and access to, ART. First, it prescribed that 
only infertile married couples could have access to ART in Italy. Therefore, fertile couples 
wanting to avail themselves of the opportunities offered by the new technologies were 
excluded. Similarly, single citizens, homosexual couples and unmarried heterosexual couples 
did not have the right to use them. Second, in art. 4, the Law prohibited women from 
withdrawing their consent after the fertilization of her eggs which meant she could formally 
be forced to undergo coercive treatment if she changed her mind after the IVF process had 
started.  
The Italian Law 40/2004, with its focus on the IVF embryo, and its negative 
implications on the lives and health of adult citizens, has been much discussed and criticized 
elsewhere.41 The Law was a product of a 20-year-long controversy spurred on and sustained 
by the intervention of the Catholic Church in political decision-making in Italy. 42  The 
Church’s moral judgement and vocal appeal to implement it through secular laws found a 
responsive audience among Italian politicians due to the political circumstances of that time. 
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In the beginning of the 1990s, Italian politics was undergoing profound changes as a result of 
Mani pulite (Clean Hands), a massive judicial investigation of corruption cases among Italian 
politicians, which led to the disintegration of Christian Democracy, the leading party, and to 
the emergence of new smaller parties. These latter, especially right-wing parties, such as 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the ultra-right Lega Nord per l’Independenza della Padania, 
used the Church’s moral teaching to foster their political identity and gain public support. 
This connection between the political interests of Italian politicians and the bioethical 
interests of the Church constituted the main political factor pushing for restrictive regulation 
of ART. 
The main bioethical issue in the debate on ART was the ‘moral and legal status of the 
human embryo’. According to Catholic teaching,43 an embryo is a person from conception 
and the protection of its life, like that of born persons, is of utmost importance and must be 
safeguarded through positive law. Hence, the Catholic hierarchy pressed Italian politicians to 
adopt restrictive regulations of ART to ensure the embryo was protected against technological 
and scientific manipulation. As Flamigni and Mori argued,44 the Church gave up its intent to 
ensure the protection of other catholic values through law such as the prohibition of human 
procreation ‘outside of the conjugal act’.45 As they argue, the Church agreed that it would not 
find support for this principle in an increasingly liberal society. However, the protection of 
embryos remained of paramount importance. In the war against the ‘culture of death’, or 
ethical relativism, and fighting for the reinstallation of the ‘culture of life’, 46  embryo 
protection remained the key guidepost for the Church.  
However, this absolutist view of human embryos was not shared by all, as a deep 
secular-Catholic cleavage had been embedded in Italian society, including the political 
sphere, for several decades. The lack of consensus regarding the status of the embryo and how 
ART should be governed, led to a failure to quickly produce a law regulating ART. As a 
result, the only document that regulated the provision of artificial reproduction services was a 
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Circular issued by the Minister of Health in 1988. However, the Circular only applied to 
public fertility centers, leaving private ones beyond its regulatory reach and leading to the 
establishment of a rather liberal approach towards ART. Private Italian clinics offered a wide 
array of ART procedures, ranging from more widespread ones such as the creation of 
supernumerary embryos and embryo cryopreservation to surrogacy, egg donation, and the 
fertilization of menopausal and single women. Thus, while Italian politicians were debating 
about how ART ought to be accommodated in Italian healthcare arrangements, Italian 
biological citizens were reaping the benefits of new technologies in quite an unconstrained 
way.  PGD, for example, was widely used in Italy, because of the wide spread of diseases 
such as beta thalassemia in Mediterranean regions.47   
The Law was eventually adopted in 2004 when the Berlusconi-led coalition won the 
majority of seats in Parliament. After it’s passing, it was immediately labelled the ‘Catholic 
law’, due to its restrictiveness, its emphasis on embryos and its complete neglect of women’s 
rights. Multiple assaults on women’s rights were apparent. Thus, the provision obliging 
doctors to create a maximum of three embryos, without the right to cryopreserve them, forced 
them to repeat harmful hormonal stimulations, which created the risk of causing such adverse 
effects as ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) and ovarian cancer. Also, the difficulty 
in estimating how many embryos would be created following oocyte insemination could 
result in a multiple pregnancy, which also put women’s health at risk too. Furthermore, the 
outlawing of PGD meant that couples faced a difficult choice between raising a baby with 
severe genetic pathologies or undergoing a psychologically and physically traumatic abortion 
procedure.  
The enactment of Law 40/2004 provoked a great outflow of Italian citizens seeking 
treatment abroad. The Osservatorio Turismo Procreativo (Observatory of Procreative 
Tourism), a project launched in 2005 to monitor the consequences of Law 40/2004, reported 
that the number of couples going abroad to receive treatment in 2005 was almost four times 
as high as it was in 2003.48 In 2010, the European Society of Human Reproduction and 
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Embryology performed a survey of foreign patients treated in 46 clinics in six European 
countries.49 It found out that 31.8% of the forms were filled in by Italian patients and 70.6% 
of them referred to legal restrictions as their reason for seeking treatment abroad. Among the 
most frequent procedures were IVF, gamete and embryo donation and PGD. Not all citizens 
decided to go abroad to receive the forbidden treatment, however. Some of them, instead, 
decided to pursue their rights, with hoping for a better outcome. 
5.3. The first local cases 
The Law’s prohibition on using the benefits of science and technology to fulfil one’s personal 
reproductive interests prompted citizens to mobilize their efforts and to change the Law ‘from 
below’. They used the mechanism of rights litigation to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Law and to have their interests recognized by the State. Specifically, the mobilization was 
undertaken by individual citizens who were susceptible to various serious genetic pathologies 
such as beta thalassemia or cystic fibrosis and wanted to use PGD to enable them to have 
pregnancies with healthy embryos. The interests of the majority of plaintiffs were represented 
by two renowned Italian specialists in biolaw, namely, Gianni Baldini, attorney at law and a 
lecturer at the University of Florence, and Filomena Gallo, attorney at law and secretary of 
the Italian association for the liberty of scientific research, Luca Coscioni. Litigants were 
supported by several patient and scientific associations acting in courts as third parties; these 
included the Luca Coscioni association, the association of aspiring parents ‘Cerco un Bimbo’ 
and the association for the study of infertility, CECOS Italia. In addition, and importantly, the 
fertility centers, which had formally denied the plaintiffs PGD and acted as defendants in the 
trials, mostly testified in favor of the plaintiffs. Hence, a strong coalition of individual citizens 
and their collectives emerged and acted together to restore rights taken away by Parliament.  
In 2004, the first complaint was brought against a fertility center in the local court in 
Catania.50 The plaintiffs, husband and wife, were healthy carriers of beta thalassemia and 
were infertile. During the course of their fertility treatment, Law 40/2004 came into force and 
the plaintiffs signed the consent form which the Law required. A month later the couple asked 
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the center to proceed with PGD and to have only healthy embryos implanted and the rest 
frozen. The wife also attempted to withdraw her previous consent to having all the embryos 
implanted. In her written request to the director of the fertility center asking him or her to 
proceed with PGD and have only healthy embryos implanted, the wife described her ‘hope to 
conceive a baby that could fulfill and complete our existence and fulfill our desire to be a 
family in the full and complete meaning of this word’. Further, she described the painful 
feelings she would have if she gave birth to a baby who would endure ‘atrocious suffering’ 
for which she would feel responsible.51 She also added that if she conceived a sick baby, she 
would be forced to have an abortion. The director of the center, however, rejected the request, 
referring to the restrictions established by Law 40/2004. The couple initiated legal 
proceedings, claiming that the fertility center’s refusal to perform PGD violated the 
inalienable constitutional rights of the wife stipulated in art. 2 (the guarantee of inviolable 
human rights) and art. 32 (the right to health and the right not to be forced to submit to 
unwanted medical treatment) of the Italian Constitution.  
The judge, however, did not sustain the complaint. First, he concluded that the 
prohibition of PGD did not violate the wife's right to health (art. 32 para. 1). According to the 
judge, the recourse to abortion, allowed by the law on abortion (Law 194/1978),52  was 
permitted only to prevent risks to the mother’s health that a health condition of the fetus or 
pregnancy could create. However, in the case of PGD, her health could not be harmed 
because the procedure is performed before the pregnancy is established. Second, he addressed 
the argument of the plaintiffs that the implantation of embryos against the mother’s will 
would violate art. 2 and art. 32 para. 2 of the Italian Constitution. According to the plaintiffs, 
together these norms meant that if a person is the title-holder of a right (in this case, the right 
to health), then the person’s will cannot be subordinated to another interest and that the will of 
the individual is the only measure for deciding if, when and how treatment is to be performed. 
But the court responded that, in the case of PGD, the interests of two subjects were in 
conflict: the mother and the unborn child. In this case, it is illogical that the mother alone can 
decide how to balance these interests. Therefore, it was up to the Parliament to decide how to 
balance these rights, and the prohibition on withdrawing consent, stipulated in Law 40/2004, 
represented nothing more than the Parliament’s view on how the two must be balanced. 
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Finally, he concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim was, in fact, simply their ‘desire-interest to 
have a healthy child’, which they only masked by referring to other rights. However, he 
continued, this right could not be sustained because the Italian Constitution did not guarantee 
the ‘right to have a healthy child’ or to a ‘virtual baby that lives only in a mental 
representation of its parents’. This, according to the court, was a eugenic practice, which 
Italian law forbids. Instead, together with Law 40/2004, the constitution protects the child 
‘that will in fact live as a result of the fertilization of the eggs, even [if it is] possibly sick’.  
Thus, the court’s reasoning and the outcome of the litigation provide us with first and 
rather vivid illustration of how rights-claiming against the state can affect the recognition of 
biological citizens’ demands to ensure the protection of their or their family’s health and use 
the advances of biomedicine and genetics to achieve these ends. As the analysis above 
illustrates, the plaintiff’s position was abundant with claims about the interdependence 
between her and her future baby and the care for its health and well-being that urged her to 
seek PGD. The plaintiff referred to the suffering she would experience if she would need to 
give birth to a severely handicapped and suffering baby, as well as the sense of an unfulfilled 
responsibility because of failing to ensure its good health. Thus, it was, not only an individual 
harm afflicted on her that urged her to seek PGD, but also, and particularly, the suffering of 
her future baby that she wanted to prevent via PGD. In such a view, exactly caring for the 
future baby entitled the woman to select embryos without pathologies and discard those 
carried defected genes. Her personal feelings of suffering are only a part of deep emotional 
ties that bound her and her future baby.  
However, caring for the health of the future baby as a reason for accessing PGD first 
had to be translated into a right whose violation might justify the access to PGD. Yet, 
translating it into a right was not unproblematic because care that the mother described in her 
appeal implied not only a relatively understandable desire to enhance the baby’s health, but 
also the selection of embryos with good genes and the destruction of affected embryos. PGD, 
in fact, while allowing women to fulfill their caring obligations, inflicted harm upon other 
entities – existing sick IVF embryos. Exactly the protection of their life against violation and 
the prevention of harm was the reason behind the prohibition of PGD. Therefore, care for the 
health of the future baby, a relational desire and responsibility, also implied the affliction of 
individual harm upon those embryos that would bear defected genes.  
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In the court’s view, motives such as the wish to give birth to a healthy baby out of 
responsibility for its health or simply to have a ‘normal family’ did not qualify as good 
enough reason for having access to PGD. Although the couple did not explicitly claim the 
right to a healthy child, the court ‘discerned’ this right in the couple’s complaint, particularly 
in the wife’s letter to her doctor, and dismissed it. According to the judge, satisfying this 
request would entitle the couple to ‘eugenically select only healthy children’ and mean a 
complete negation of the embryo’s right to life. The embryo was recognized as a legal subject 
by Law 40/2004, therefore its interests and rights deserved the same protection and 
recognition as those of adult citizens. Therefore, no selection, let alone destruction of embryos 
should be allowed by law, even if performed for apparently positive and well-justified reasons 
such as care for the health of the baby eventually to be born. 
Importantly, the court acknowledged, by referring to Law on abortion 194/1978, that 
an embryos’ right to life could be limited if the competing right to health of the mother was at 
risk. However, in the case of PGD, the court took the position that the wife’s health could not 
be harmed in this way, so no rights conflicting with embryo rights could be violated. In other 
words, attempting to be consistent with the Italian law on abortion, which attributes strong 
protection to unborn fetuses, the court applied an individualist approach to rights, seeing the 
mother and the embryo as competing rivals with conflicting interests, because this approach 
would better promote and guarantee the protection of the embryo’s life. If the plaintiff would 
prove how the mother’s right to health is violated, then it would satisfy the plaintiff’s 
complaint. However, because she failed to do so, the Court had to dismiss the complaint.  
The next case was brought by a couple from Cagliari in 2005.53 Like the previous 
case, the husband and the wife were healthy carriers of beta thalassemia and could not 
conceive a baby naturally. The first IVF cycle was performed without PGD. Following 
prenatal testing, the couple learned that the fetus was affected with beta thalassemia and the 
woman had an abortion. After the abortion, she developed an ‘anxiety depressive syndrome’ 
that lasted for over a year and the couple decided to make use of PGD to prevent a recurrent 
negative impact upon her mental state caused by a similar experience. But the doctor at the 
clinic refused to perform PGD, referring to art. 13 para. 1 of Law 40/2004 prohibiting embryo 
experimentation. The couple asked the Cagliari court to perform a ‘constitutionally oriented 
interpretation’ of the Law and oblige the clinic to perform PGD, because not doing so would 
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constitute ‘a grave threat to the psychophysical health of the woman deriving from a well-
founded fear that the embryo might be affected by a serious genetic disease’ and therefore 
violate her right to health.54 To substantiate the claim, the couple submitted a report from the 
wife’s psychiatrist to the court which indicated that the woman had developed a mental health 
condition that could re-occur if she was prevented from using PGD. The couple also asked the 
court to submit the Law to the Italian Constitutional Court for adjudication on the matter of its 
constitutionality if it decided that the first two requests could not be satisfied. 
The judge considered the requests of the plaintiffs and decided that the clarity of the 
Law’s intent to prohibit PGD did not allow a ‘constitutionally oriented interpretation’ of art. 
13 of the Law to be made and thus he could not instruct the clinic to perform the procedure. 
However, the court found that there was a possible contradiction between art. 13 and the 
Italian Constitution, specifically, art. 32 on the right to health. First, the judge referred to a 
judgment of the Constitutional Court on abortion (Abortion Ruling 27/1975) that addressed 
the issue of the conflict between the women’s right to health and the rights of the fetus, ruling 
in favor of the former.55 According to the judge, in the case of PGD, where the rights of IVF 
embryos similarly conflicted with women’s right to health, the protection of the latter should 
also be prioritized over embryo’s interests. Second, according to the judge, the plaintiffs 
demonstrated, having submitted the necessary evidence, how the legal prohibition of PGD 
could be harmful to the wife’s mental health. Hence, in this case, the reference to health was 
successful, because the plaintiff succeeded in proving how her health might be jeopardized by 
the prohibition of PGD. Third, the judge specified that legal access to PGD was warranted by 
the State’s constitutional duty to protect the right to health of the plaintiff and not the ‘interest 
of the parents in having a healthy child’, as eugenics was forbidden by Italian law. Therefore, 
access to PGD should be provided on exactly the same grounds as access to abortion, that is, 
only if the health condition of the embryo or pregnancy would cause adverse effects to 
women’s health.  Like the Catania court, safeguarding the mothers’ health was again listed as 
the only reason that could outweigh the conflicting rights of the embryo.  
The Cagliari case is thus also illustrative of the interdependence that exists between 
the embryo and the pregnant woman. The harm caused upon the mental state of the woman is 
related not only to her individual interest, but also to the care for the future baby and its 
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health. However, unlike the former case, rights invoked by the plaintiff were acknowledged 
by the judge because the plaintiff was able to translate this interdependence and care into the 
type of right that would take priority over embryos’ rights. This was done through reframing 
the mother’s suffering into illness. This allowed her to appeal to her right to health of the 
mother that could be violated if PGD remained prohibited.  
The analysis of the two cases is informative because it gives a preliminary illustration 
of how legal institutions struggle with carving out space for new biomedical technologies in 
their countries’ constitutional order. Both CLS and feminist scholars argued in their analysis 
of legal rights, one of the main issues that rights claims face is that they can always give rise 
to counter-claims.56 Because there is no objective criteria for deciding how the balancing of 
conflicting rights must be performed, the result of the balancing process depends on 
contextual factors, including political, moral and other variables. As I have shown above, 
what is important is not only how local factors affect the balancing of individual rights, but 
also how they affect the ways in which rights, their definition and their ontological 
presumptions are defined in courts in the first place. For example, the Cagliari court, similarly 
to the Catania court, did not recognize the ‘interest of a couple in having a healthy child’ as 
deserving state recognition. Although in both cases the plaintiffs did not claim this right or 
did not mention this interest, the judges discerned them while considering the plaintiffs’ 
accounts of their experience of care and responsibility. The main reason for this was the fact 
that entrusting parents with this ‘right’ or fulfilling this interest would imply the affliction of 
harm on sick embryos. According to both courts, Italian law and constitutional doctrine on 
abortion saw embryos as entities in and of themselves, separable and disconnected from the 
female body and having value and rights merely due to the mere fact of their existence. 
Therefore, women’s discretion on what they could do with these embryos, even if driven by 
the feelings of care and responsibility for their family, should be limited by law. The only 
legitimate reason for limiting embryos’ right to life would be the affliction of a harm of a 
greater moral weight such as harm to the health of the woman. 
                                                
56 Smart (n 24). 
 145 
As much research has shown, attitudes towards embryos vary, both geographically 
and over time.57 Therefore, the recognition by the State of women’s interests in using PGD 
will also vary and depend on how strongly unborn life is valued, in itself and in its 
relationship with the pregnant woman. In Italy, the constitutional jurisprudence and the laws 
regulating abortion and ART have accorded a high degree of protection to unborn life, 
particularly when compared to the majority of other European countries, including Great 
Britain, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden.58 Italian law does not provide a clear-cut answer 
with respect to the legal and moral status of the embryo. Whereas Law 40/2004 recognizes the 
embryo as a rights-holder and elevates its interests over those of adult citizens, the Abortion 
Ruling 27/1978 stresses that the embryo is ‘not a person but is yet to become one’. Yet, the 
entire body of Italian law, including the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, builds upon 
the position that unborn life deserves significant respect and is entitled to protection by the 
State. Clearly, with respect to the status of embryos, Italian law takes the most restrictive – 
dignitarian – perspective in the so-called ‘bioethical triangle’. Therefore, using the rights 
mechanism in defending women’s interests in those cases in which embryo protection is 
implicated is replete with negative expectations, leading, at most, to only a partial recognition 
of reproductive rights. This is exactly what we shall observe later.  
5.4. The first cases decided by the Constitutional Court and the right to health 
The judge of the Cagliari court asked the Constitutional Court whether art. 13 of the Law 
40/2004 violated art. 32 of the Constitution on the right to health.  However, the 
Constitutional Court declared the question of the constitutional legitimacy of art. 13 
inadmissible on procedural grounds,59 and that the prohibition of PGD also derived from 
other articles of Law 40/2004 which the local judge had not submitted for consideration. He 
also held that prohibition of PGD reflected the ‘spirit’ of the Law. Put in another way, the 
local judge had failed to correctly formulate the appeal, which entitled the Constitutional 
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Court to dismiss it. Importantly, the Constitutional Court did not take a stance on the 
legitimacy of PGD; its decision to keep the Law intact was a result of the local court’s failure 
to fulfil the procedural requirements of the appeal procedure.  
This failure by the local court to fulfill the procedural requirements used by the 
Constitutional Court as a reason not to discuss the Law’s constitutionality is very significant 
in our discussion of ‘hope in rights’. According to Italian constitutional law, a failure of the 
local courts to formulate a complaint cannot prevent the Constitutional Court from judging on 
the merits of the dispute, because of the constitutional law principle of derived 
constitutionality.60 According to this principle, the Constitutional Court also had a right to 
repeal those provisions that were not directly questioned by the Cagliari court, if it saw a 
direct violation of constitutional rights. However, the Constitutional Court left the Law 
40/2004 intact by using a procedural flaw as the reason for not judging on its merits. Several 
reasons can purport to explain the court’s ‘decision not to decide’.61 First, it might have been 
a political move, as the court may have wanted to avoid an explicit confrontation with 
Parliament, especially with respect to the problematic Law 40/2004. Second, its rejection 
might have derived from the recognition that Parliament indeed had a right to accord greater 
protection to IVF embryos than to fetuses and to prioritize them over a mother’s right to 
health (Chapter 3). Whatever the real reason was, the key implication of the court’s decision 
is that it points to the importance of embryos’ rights for defining the entitlements of other – 
born – citizens. In the present case, even mother’s right to health, individualist right, did not 
override the rights of the embryo. Otherwise, the court should have used the principle of 
derived constitutionality and repealed the disputed provision as violating the right to health.  
However, success came later, in 2009. The local Florence court 62  and Tribunale 
Amministrativo Regionale (TAR) of Lazio,63 following complaints by the plaintiffs, who were 
also carriers of mutated genes, submitted the Law 40/2004 to the Constitutional Court for 
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adjudication upon its constitutionality. This time, however, they provided the Constitutional 
Court with arguments about other reasons why the Law might be unconstitutional. To begin 
with, they emphasized that it was not only mothers’ mental health that could be harmed. 
Specifically, art. 14, prohibiting embryo cryopreservation and obliging the doctor to implant 
all embryos simultaneously, created adverse effects on women’s health like OHSS, ovarian 
cancer and multiple pregnancy do. The most substantial contribution, however, was the 
conclusion by TAR Lazio about the degree of protection the embryo was accorded by the 
Law itself.  According to the Tribunal, Law 40/2004 had already established by its own terms 
that the protection of embryos was not absolute. In particular, by allowing a doctor to create 
three embryos, the Law did not intend to cause a triple pregnancy, but sought to increase the 
chances of (at least) one successful pregnancy. Parliament had thereby accepted, albeit 
implicitly, that only the healthiest embryo would give rise to pregnancy, while the rest would 
perish. Hence, for the Tribunal, the possibility of creating three embryos and not one meant 
that embryo protection was limited and that their ‘lives’ could be sacrificed to achieve certain 
important goals such as the protection of the procreative rights of Italian citizens. Therefore, 
limiting the number of producible embryos to three, which Parliament obviously introduced 
to protect embryos against technological manipulation and overproduction, was illogical as it 
contradicted the intention of Parliament itself to limit embryo protection. In addition, it 
created risks to women’s health by increasing the risks of OHSS, ovarian cancer and multiple 
pregnancies. Therefore, the doctrine of the Constitutional Court on abortion, according to 
which a woman’s right to health had priority over an embryo’s life, should apply also to the 
case of ART. Together with the Florence court, TAR Lazio referred the case to the 
Constitutional Court for adjudication on its constitutionality, specifically, with regard to art. 
32 of the Italian Constitution on the right to health.  
In 2009, the Constitutional Court passed judgment, repealing as unconstitutional the 
prohibition to create no more than three embryos (art. 14 para. 2) and the exception to the 
prohibition of embryo cryopreservation (art. 14 para. 3), because these provisions violated the 
right to health of Italian female citizens.64 The Constitutional Court used the reasoning put 
forward by TAR Lazio about the limited embryo protection accorded to the embryos by 
Parliament itself. As a result, the court found that a number of the words of art. 14 para. 2, 
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namely, ‘a single and simultaneous transfer, and in any case not more than three’, and art. 14 
para. 3, in which it prescribed that embryo cryopreservation could be performed only if the 
woman had serious health issues, ‘unforeseen at the moment of fertilization’, were 
unconstitutional.  
The judgment was praised by many lawyers, citizens, doctors and scholars as a 
triumph of constitutional rights over political voluntarism. Although the court did not 
explicitly rule on PGD, many clinics started to introduce it into their practices. But as far as 
our ‘hope in rights’ is concerned, the judgment was obviously not the type of act that can 
fully satisfy this hope. First, bottom-up governance succeeded not (only) because the right to 
health acted as a trump but (particularly also) because the court was provided with a suitable 
rhetorical argument to recognize that embryo protection had, in fact, been limited already by 
the Law itself. As Kennedy argues, what often enables courts to recognize the claimed rights 
and leads to a closure of the debate on rights is the rhetorical mastery of the plaintiffs. In the 
present case, it was the argument about Parliament’s own intent as to how much protection 
embryo was granted. Second, like the reasoning and judgments of the local courts and the first 
judgment of the Constitutional Court, it again points to the importance of embryos’ individual 
rights for how successful plaintiffs’ appeal to their rights will be. In fact, it was only because 
the Court was able to reduce embryo protection using a suitably presented argument, that the 
litigation was successful.  
Tellingly, the judgment already contained the signs of how other cases on Law 
40/2004, and the claim made by plaintiffs that other experiences justifying access to PGD 
should be acknowledged, would be approached in future. For example, the Constitutional 
Court declined to declare that art. 14 para. 1, which prescribed the prohibition of 
cryopreservation as a general rule was unconstitutional. Instead, it found that limiting the 
possibility of cryopreserving embryos to only ‘serious’ health issues that were ‘unforeseen at 
the moment of fertilization’ was unconstitutional; instead of repealing the prohibition on 
cryopreservation as such, the court only extended the range of health issues that justified 
embryo cryopreservation. Similarly, it only partially repealed art. 14 para. 2: embryos still had 
to be created in a number ‘strictly necessary’ for implantation. Using the metaphor of Italian 
lawyers, in repealing the disputed provisions, the Court operated with a ‘chisel’ rather than an 
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‘axe’, thus allowing only that degree of embryo manipulation that was essential to prevent 
adverse risks to women’s health.65  
5.5. The last cases and the right to self-determination 
The following cases concerned PGD explicitly, hence they give additional information on 
how the Constitutional Court took into account the Italian citizens’ interests in, and reasons 
for, using PGD. The plaintiffs in these legal cases were fertile couples with various genetic 
pathologies who wanted to use PGD to become pregnant with healthy embryos and therefore 
needed recourse to IVF. They complained that the Law was unreasonable in preventing fertile 
citizens from accessing PGD, while at the same time allowing prenatal testing and abortion to 
be performed – procedures significantly more potentially harmful and risky than PGD. As a 
result, they argued that Law 40/2004 violated several constitutional rights, including the right 
to self-determination which was protected by the open-ended art. 2, the right to health (art. 
32), and the right to equality before the law (art. 3). 
These cases were considered by local courts and had different outcomes. The Cagliari 
court explicitly distinguished between the two rights that legitimized the couple’s access to 
PGD, namely, the right to health and the right to a healthy child, and recognized only the right 
to health as justifying access to PGD. 66 In the next three cases, however, the right to have a 
healthy child and the right to self-determination were acknowledged for the first time. Local 
courts in Salerno67 and Rome68 sustained that the ‘right to a healthy child’, as part of the right 
to self-determination and guaranteed by the open-ended art. 2 of the Constitution, also 
justified access to PGD. They, therefore, illustrate just how judicial decision-making evolved 
towards the acceptance of a more liberal regulatory regime for PGD, allowing access to it, not 
only to prevent health risks to the female patient, but also to ensure the couple’s right to self-
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determination on reproductive issues and the fulfillment of other – relational – values and 
goals.  
The position of the Constitutional Court, however, remained unchanged. The Rome 
Court asked the Constitutional Court whether prohibiting the use of PGD by fertile couple 
was in violation of art. 2 (as it included the right to self-determination and the right to a 
healthy child), art. 3 (right to equality) and art. 32 (right to health) of the Italian Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court passed its judgment in May 201569 declaring that art. 4 of Law 
40/2004 prohibiting the use of ART by fertile couples was unconstitutional. However, unlike 
the Rome court, the Constitutional Court found that this prohibition violated only two articles 
of the Italian Constitution, namely, art. 3 and art. 32. It concluded that it was unreasonable to 
prohibit access to ART and PGD by fertile couples while, at the same time, allow access to 
prenatal testing and abortion. This unreasonable prohibition violated art. 3 of the Italian 
Constitution. Furthermore, as abortion was much more traumatic than PGD, the prohibition of 
access to ART and PGD also violated art. 32 on the right to health. As a result, the court 
concluded that women should be allowed to access ART and PGD on the same grounds as 
they are allowed to have an abortion, namely, when the health condition of the embryo or 
pregnancy creates ‘grave risks’ to mothers’ health, as stipulated by art. 6 para. 1b of Law 
194/1978.  
An analysis of the court’s reasoning is interesting for a number of reasons. First, the 
court did not discuss whether ‘the right to have a healthy child’ and the right to reproductive 
self-determination were violated; in fact, in its ruling it did not mention these rights at all. 
This ‘elegant silence’, as Italian scholar Ianuzzi defined it, suggests that these rights found no 
support within the Constitutional Court.70 Rather predictably, and in a similar manner to its 
previous judgments, the court quashed another controversial provision of Law 40/2004 by 
finding that it violated only the right to health and thus allowed access to PGD if it was 
needed solely to prevent adverse health effects for the female patient.  
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Second, the court ruled that access to PGD should be allowed on the same grounds as 
abortion was allowed, according to art. 6 para 1b of Law 194/1978, that is, to prevent ‘grave 
risks’ to women’s physical and mental health. According to Law 194/1978, abortion is 
legitimate within the first 90 days of pregnancy if abortion creates a risk to mothers’ health 
(art. 3), and after 90 days, if abortion creates ‘grave risks’ to women’s health (art. 6). In the 
first case, the woman is free to have an abortion and does not need to ask the doctor’s 
permission, whereas in the second case the doctor’s permission is required. Hence, without 
discussing the reasons for its decision, the court allowed PGD not on the same conditions as 
abortion is allowed in general, but on the strictest conditions. It limited the type of health 
issues which could be prevented by performing PGD and obliged female citizens to ask for a 
doctor’s permission to perform it. In this way, the possibility of accessing PGD was obviously 
curtailed by these requirements.  
Third, the Constitutional Court rejected building on the judgment on the Costa and 
Pavan v. Italy decision that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had passed in 
2013.71 A brief description of the case is in order here. This complaint against Law 40/2004 
was brought by an Italian couple claiming that art. 8 of the ECHR (right to respect for private 
and family life) was being violated. The ECtHR upheld the applicant’s claim. It held that 
since Italian law allowed prenatal testing and therapeutic abortions, the prohibition of PGD 
was unreasonable. Therefore, the government’s interference in the applicants’ private and 
family life was disproportionate. During the trial, the Italian government objected to the 
applicants’ claim that their complaint was, in fact, a claim to the ‘right to have a healthy 
child’, which the ECHR does not guarantee. The ECtHR rejected the government’s objection, 
stating that the right claimed by the applicants was not the right to have a healthy child. 
Instead, ‘the right relied on by the applicants is confined to the possibility of using ART and 
subsequently PGD for the purposes of conceiving a child unaffected by cystic fibrosis, a 
genetic disease of which they are healthy carriers’.72 The former, according to the ECtHR 
would be impossible as PGD cannot exclude other factors that can affect the health condition 
of the future child such as other genetic disorders or complications during pregnancy. In this 
way the ECtHR distinguished between a ‘right’ to have a child unaffected by a particular 
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genetic disease, which is protected by the right to respect for private and family life, and the 
‘right to have a healthy child’, that is, an entirely healthy baby.  
 In addition, by emphasizing this difference, the ECtHR also made an important 
correction to other local courts’ rulings suggesting the potential violation of the right to a 
healthy child, discussed above. In these rulings, the courts did not discuss what exact meaning 
they attributed to the ‘right to a healthy child’. Hence, it is not clear whether they indeed 
meant the right to have a baby unaffected by a particular disease or the right to have an 
entirely healthy baby, the right to a highly implausible outcome. In any case, and despite this 
clarification, the Constitutional Court opted for carving out space for PGD in the same way in 
which it legitimized abortion, that is, only to prevent negative impacts on mothers’ health, and 
not out of respect for citizens’ private and family life. The ECtHR, by specifying, that the 
right to have PGD is not tantamount to a ‘right to have a healthy child’, clarified through 
which right the right to PGD could be recognized.  
Of a particular importance for this paper is the right to the violation of which the 
plaintiffs in Costa and Pavan v. Italy appealed to, that is, the right to respect for private and 
family life. According to proponents of the idea of relational autonomy, one of the ways 
through which relational values could be promoted is the endorsement by courts of the right 
to respect for private and family life (article 8 ECHR). For example, Herring praised the 
ruling in the case K v. LBX,73 in which the British Court of Appeal urged courts to take into 
account the right to respect for private and family life of the ECHR when it should be decided 
if a person should be taken care of at home or at a relevant medical institution. Building a 
ruling on article 8 of the ECtHR in cases involving human reproduction, courts could also 
promote relational values and give more discretion to women and their partners in 
reproductive decision-making.  
Thus, on the one hand, through litigation Italian citizens achieved their goal of making 
access to PGD legitimate. The bottom-up governance made the provision of PGD and other 
ART in Italy less restrictive. Indeed, there is an important parallel to be drawn between these 
and similar cases such as litigation for access to medicine in Brazil or the right to financial 
compensation for health damage in Ukraine. 74 And yet, on the other hand, the use of rights 
                                                
73 [2012] EWCA 79 
74 Hanafin, The Embryonic Sovereign and the Biological Citizen: The Biopolitics of 
Reproductive Rights (14). 
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yielded much more modest results in the present context. By failing to recognize that the 
prohibition of PGD might violate, not only the right to health, but also the right to 
reproductive self-determination, the court did not acknowledge other reasons that might urge 
citizens to want PGD. To begin with, there could be financial reasons for having PGD as the 
couple would be financially incapable of raising a child with a severe genetic disease. More 
importantly, it ignored other ethical and relational values, duties and responsibilities unrelated 
to health issues, that might urge biological citizens to seek PGD. Here, the letter of the wife 
from the Catania case, in which she refers to her responsibility towards the future baby as 
well as her and her husband’s wish to create a ‘normal’ family, is telling.  
Indeed, as much sociological research has shown, couples often choose PGD not for 
the sake of their own health or their interests but out of ‘parental obligation’ towards their 
future children and their health.75 Similarly, as Rapp has shown in her analysis of women 
having prenatal testing, women navigate within a complex ethical decision-making space, and 
the responsibility for the future baby and for other family members was often one of the 
reasons they sought prenatal testing.76  These conclusions suggest that particularly in the 
relationships between close family members such as between parents and children, 
individuals, albeit driven by parental self-determination, tend to build their decisions on 
relational autonomy and the feelings of mutual responsibility rather than the feeling of 
unlimited personal freedom, even if their decisions do not lead to a direct infliction of harm 
upon others.77 They were further confirmed by other authors exploring parents’ views on sex 
selection. For example, Scully et al. showed the majority of interviewed parents regarded 
voluntary self-limitation of their choices as constitutive of their identity as ‘good parent’, and 
                                                
75 Celia Roberts and Sarah Franklin, ‘Experiencing New Forms of Genetic Choice: 
Findings from an Ethnographic Study of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis’ (2004) 7 Human 
Fertility 285. Sarah Franklin and Celia Roberts, Born and Made: An Ethnography of 
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76  Rayna R Rapp, Testing Women, Testing the Fetus : The Social Impact of 
Amniocentesis in America (Routledge 2000). 
77 Ehrich, Kathryn, Clare Williams, Bobbie Farsides, Jane Sandall, and Rosamund 
Scott. 2007. “Choosing Embryos: Ethical Complexity and Relational Autonomy in Staff 
Accounts of PGD.” Sociology of Health & Illness 29 (7). 
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felt that parental autonomy was only possible within the limits set up by relational values. 78 
Similarly, in Petersen’s study of the experiences of people with genetic disabilities, many 
participants expressed concerns about the future of their offspring, which induced them to 
make reproductive choices that would favor what was fair or right for the child’s future, rather 
than their own desires.79 In other words, in such intimate relationships as between parents and 
children, the feeling of mutual responsibility, care and interdependence abound. However, 
such personal and relational family-related interests, values and responsibilities that Italian 
biological citizens might have had as part of their ‘regime of the self’ were not regarded by 
the Italian Constitutional court as deserving of state recognition.  
Clearly, one can suggest that this limitation is insignificant and couples will be able to 
circumvent it, for example, by referring to their health as the reason for wanting PGD. The 
fact that the Italian Law 194/1978 also allows access to abortion to protect the mother’s 
mental health will definitely provide quite wide grounds for accessing PGD. Like the plaintiff 
in the Cagliari case, women will be able to refer to ‘depression’ or ‘anxiety’ as their health 
grounds for having PGD. And yet, two implications are nevertheless significant. First, 
practically speaking, women will always need to ask permission from their doctors if they 
want PGD and prove they would be at risk of damaging their (mental) health, which 
automatically gives full decision-making power to the medical profession and runs the risk of 
them being denied. Second, and importantly for our discussion of rights, by distinguishing 
between the grounds that can legitimize the access to PGD and assessing their value, the court 
did not recognize the complexity involved in relationships between the pregnant woman and 
her embryos. Formally, Italian law still forbids the performing of PGD for reasons other than 
the female citizens’ health. Some citizens may find it unfair that the law does not allow them 
to follow their ethical convictions and fulfill their moral duties in reproduction as well as use 
new developments in science and technology to achieve these ends. Reproductive self-
determination, together with many different ethical choices, responsibilities, and hopes which 
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Italian citizens had had as a result of a rather unconstrained provision of ART and PGD 
before Law 40/2004 was enacted and which they had embraced as an element of their ‘regime 
of the self’, was excluded from the scope of interests that the Italian State was committed to 
protect.  
Litigation and rights-claiming through courts played a key role in determining how 
exactly biological citizens’ ‘vital rights’ should be accommodated in Italy. They acted like 
millstones, through which these ‘vital rights’ had to pass before receiving legal and formal 
country-wide recognition. The outcome of this process was rights that were accepted but 
transformed; ‘vital rights’ encompassing relational values and interests were defined as an 
individualist right to health. Clearly, the main reason for achieving this partial recognition of 
plaintiffs’ rights was the competing interests and rights of embryos whose protection the 
Italian Constitutional Court also sought to ensure by imposing constraints on adult citizens’ 
freedom of action, including the freedom to follow their convictions and use the benefits 
offered by biomedicine.  
Of course, most other countries also restrict the scope of genetic diseases that can be 
tested via PGD and therefore also limit citizens’ self-determination in terms of the 
reproductive choices they make. Hence, reproductive autonomy can and, according to many 
people, should be limited in order to avoid the wider negative social implications of 
biomedical and genetic technologies, such as the eugenic consequences, for example. As 
stated in the beginning of this article, this argument is used by disability movements to protect 
their rights, such as the right not to be stigmatized or discriminated against based on their 
disability. Thus, on the one hand, this general restriction of PGD testifies to the argument 
advanced in this paper that rights, by creating counter-claims, might be a less reliable 
mechanism for winning autonomy than is often assumed. Yet, on the other hand, an analysis 
of how PGD is regulated in other countries shows that the use of rights can lead to different 
outcomes and that rights are not inherently strong or weak, but that their success depends on 
the context. Specifically, in Great Britain, the genetic diseases that can be tested via PGD are 
limited to serious genetic pathologies with high penetrance which have been previously 
approved by the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority for testing. However, British 
law does not limit access to PGD only to prevent adverse health effects on women’s health. 
As a result, the British State makes it possible for citizens to follow their relational 
commitments and seek PGD, which they do, as much anthropological research mentioned 
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above has illustrated.80 In addition, women are not obliged to demonstrate and prove to their 
doctors how the genetic diseases of their embryos would harm their health.  
Therefore, despite the limitations on using PGD, the access to PGD in Britain is 
significantly more liberal than in Italy. This is so because utilitarian, hence more pragmatic 
and liberal, thinking is the main and dominant bioethical perspective in Great Britain which 
affects the regulatory policy on biomedicine, including PGD.81 This utilitarian thinking was 
specifically applied to defining the degree to which in vitro embryos must be protected 
against technological manipulation. According to the British Human Fertilization and 
Embryology Act adopted in 1990, embryos are only accorded protection from the 14th day of 
development from conception. Therefore, embryo research and use in medical treatment in 
Great Britain is among the most liberal in Europe as the law allows rather a lot of freedom to 
manipulate embryos for medical purposes (such as PGD) or research purposes (such as the 
derivation of human embryo stem cells). Hence, limited embryo protection allowed citizens’ 
reproductive autonomy to have a much greater scope in Great Britain than in Italy, as well as 
to implement their relational values.  
The following, and last, two litigation cases, although they do not concern health of 
the embryos, give a good illustration of what the circumscription of citizens’ procreative 
rights can entail in practice. The Naples court was asked to decide a case in which the doctors 
of a fertility center in Naples were accused of committing the crime of embryo destruction.82 
Specifically, doctors performed PGD, requested by a number of Italian couples, and following 
the results of PGD and IVF they discarded the embryos with detected pathologies instead of 
freezing them. The defense council for the doctors asked the Naples court whether the 
provisions of Law 40/2004 prohibiting embryo selection (art. 13 para. 3) and embryo 
destruction (art. 14 para. 1) violated, art. 32 (right to health) and art. 2 (right to self-
determination) of the Italian Constitution. The defenders also asked the court to submit the 
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case to the Constitutional Court for adjudication on the matter of its constitutionality. The 
court agreed with the defense and submitted the case to the Constitutional Court.  
Predictably, the Constitutional Court declared the provision forbidding the selection of 
embryos (art. 13 para. 3) to be unconstitutional, because the prohibition on selecting and 
implanting only healthy embryos would cause harm to women’s health and therefore would 
violate art. 32 of the Italian Constitution.83 However, it did not find that the prohibition of 
destroying embryos (art. 14 para. 1) was unconstitutional or that it violated the right to self-
determination. Specifically, it concluded that ‘the embryo, in fact, irrespective of the amount 
of subjectivity that is attributed to the genesis of life, is definitely not a mere biological 
material’. Its protection could be limited only if it was necessary to protect a value of greater 
legal and moral weight, such as women’s health. As Law 40/2004 no longer obliged the 
doctor to transfer an embryo with a genetic disease into the patient’s uterus, it did not create 
any risk to her health and was, therefore, not in violation of the Italian Constitution.  
The plaintiff’s request for the embryos to be destroyed refuted the notion that they 
were treating their embryos as mere biological material. For example, the so-called 
‘compassionate transfer’ is a widely used practice in fertility clinics in Italy, with embryos 
being placed into the women’s cervix or vagina rather than the womb allowing them to die 
there rather than be flushed down the sink. This practice makes clear that the woman 
acknowledges the embryos’ high value. In addition, these rituals play an important role for 
women themselves, because they  
represent attempts to recognize and register value in women’s experience of the 
creation of these embryos; the physical and emotional effort that has gone into wanting 
and making them. In this way, both life and death for embryos are by no means 
objectively, scientifically, legally identifiable moments. Instead, they might be 
described as investments—made typically by women but also by other parental 
figures—in that which is desired.84 
Indeed, the disposition of surplus embryos after the end of fertility treatment is another widely 
discussed topic in sociological research. As much research has shown, what happens to their 
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embryos is very important to couples.85 In countries with more liberal regimes, couples are 
given the right to dispose of the embryos as they see fit, and may donate them to other 
couples or for research. In these countries, citizens might feel that depriving them of this 
opportunity is too great a restriction of their reproductive freedom and responsibility, 
including for supernumerary embryos. But the Constitutional Court did not have the option of 
considering any personal circumstances and relational values. Following its dignitarian 
position towards embryos, it accepted that only the right to health justified the limitation of 
embryo protection.  
Therefore, on the one hand, Hanafin was right in arguing that Italian biological 
citizens managed to contest their ‘exclusion from full legal citizenship’ and, in this bottom-up 
governance rights indeed acted as “important weapons in a counterhegemonic ‘tactical 
biopolitics’”.86 And yet, on the other hand, the extent to which citizens secured the ‘writing of 
the law from below’ and managed to have their interests and rights recognized by the State 
was significantly more limited, particularly compared with the scope of those ‘vital rights’ 
that have become the key elements of the contemporary ethical ‘regimes of the self’, 
dominating in countries with liberal regulatory approaches towards ART and PGD, such as 
Great Britain, and in Italy before the adoption of Law 40/2004. This limitation was a direct 
outcome of the Constitutional Court’s biopolitical responsibilities towards the IVF embryo, 
established in the constitutional law doctrine, which prevented the Italian biological citizens 
from having their relational values recognized by the state through legal rights.  
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5.6. Conclusion 
In this article, I sought to show the limitations of using rights and rights litigation to gain the 
freedom to make personal choices related to one’s own health and that of one’s children and 
family and to use new advances in biomedicine to achieve these ends. I did not mean to 
suggest that we should abandon our hope, or faith, in rights, as Kennedy has done. The use of 
legal rights does play an important role in democratic governance and in making State 
authorities recognize and fulfill their citizens’ health-related needs, rights and responsibilities. 
Instead, I sought to suggest that a nuanced and more critical approach towards rights should 
be adopted. This critical attitude would help both scholars and citizens engaged in bottom-up 
governance to remain aware of the constraints inherent to rights and not to be overly 
optimistic about their liberating potential, hence sparing themselves from a disappointment 
and an eventual loss of faith in rights.  
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6.1. Introduction1  
Advances in human fertilization and embryology have brought immense opportunities for 
medicine and human health. Technologies such as in vitro fertilization (IVF), preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD) and human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research have contributed to 
managing serious health conditions and their further development is now widely associated 
with improved health.  
However, such ‘promised futures’2 of improved health have not been the only vision 
of what these biomedical advances may bring. Both in philosophical and ethical debates and 
in more down-to-earth political discussions, criticism has been mounted that these 
technologies might lead to the violation and erosion of human dignity.3 One of the criticisms 
that ‘dignitarianism’, as this position has been called, 4  raises with respect to these 
technologies is that they involve the use of human embryos. Regardless of how human 
embryos are regarded, either as full-fledged human persons or as just one of the stages in the 
development of human life, their use for medical or scientific purposes is nevertheless seen as 
problematic because embryos due to their ‘humanity’ deserve respect and therefore cannot be 
treated as objects of scientific or biomedical research. Hence, the requirement to protect 
human dignity can imply the prohibition of commodification, instrumentalization and 
commercialization of human life. It thus derives from the philosophy of Kant, according to 
                                                
1 Article was published as: Parfenchyk, Volha, and Alexander Flos. 2017. “Human 
Dignity in a Comparative Perspective: Embryo Protection Regimes in Italy and Germany.” 
Law, Innovation, and Technology 9 (1). 
2 Sarah Franklin and Margareth Lock, ‘Animation and cessation: the remaking of life 
and death’ in Sarah Franklin and Margareth Lock (eds), Remaking Life and Death. Towards 
an Anthropology of the Biosciences (SAR Press 2003). 
3 Leon Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics 
(Encounter Books 2002); Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the 
Biotechnology Revolution (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2002). 
4  Roger Brownsword, ’Ethical Pluralism and the Regulation of Modern 
Biotechnology’ in Francesco Francioni (ed), Biotechnologies and International Human Rights 
(Hart Publishing 2007). 
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whom no human life can be used merely as a means to an end but only as an end in itself.5 
Dignitarianism can also include the principle of ‘sanctity of life’ which has religious roots.6 
Sanctity of life implies that the dignity of human life entails its inviolability and sacredness 
and therefore requires respect for every human life, including patients in a ‘vegetative state’ 
and unborn life.7 In the discussion on whether a relevant technology violates human dignity, 
the appeal to dignity often acts as a ‘conversation stopper’.8 All possible therapeutic benefits 
that embryo use in medical treatment and scientific research offers are regarded as irrelevant 
if such technological and scientific practices violate human dignity.  
However, the extent to which the principle of human dignity can effectively shape 
regulatory policy on controversial biomedical issues is in need of exploration. Specifically, 
human dignity as described above constitutes the basis of only one and the most restrictive 
and disempowering ethics out of three strands of bioethical reasoning in the so-called 
‘bioethical triangle’ 9 . Besides dignitarianism, the bioethical triangle includes liberal, 
emancipatory human rights ethics and pragmatic, utilitarian ethics. The problem hence 
emerges when these three bioethical perspectives start competing for regulatory relevance, 
thus urging policy-makers to determine which of the three should shape policy and whether 
dignitarianism has some particular importance that could trump the two other ethics. 
                                                
5 Timothy Caulfield, and Roger Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity: A Guide to Policy 
Making in the Biotechnology Era?’ (2006) 7 Nature Reviews Genetics 72. 
6  This connection between human dignity and sanctity of life was most clearly 
expressed by John Paul II in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, according to which ‘the Gospel 
of the dignity of the person and the Gospel of life are a single and indivisible Gospel’. John 
Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (1995) <http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae.html> accessed 9 
December 2016.  
7 Doris Schroeder, ‘Dignity: One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Still Counting’ (2010) 19 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 118. 
8 Kurt Bayertz (ed), Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity (Springer Netherlands 1996). 
9 Brownsword (n 4). 
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Furthermore, and to complicate things further, human dignity constitutes the basis of 
not only dignitarianism, but also of the human rights perspective. 10  These two ethical 
perspectives build on two different versions of human dignity. Dignitarianism builds upon the 
restrictive version of dignity, or ‘dignity as constraint’. As stated above, it is rooted in 
religious beliefs or it is based on Kantian philosophy. Therefore, this principle entails that 
technologies such as human therapeutic and reproductive cloning, sex selection, tissue-typing 
and PGD may erode human dignity because they instrumentalize, commodify and destroy 
human life. Instead, the human rights perspective builds upon a liberal version of human 
dignity, or ‘dignity as empowerment’, which can be defined as autonomy and self-
determination. This perspective does not treat new biomedical technologies as necessarily 
problematic and conditions their legitimacy upon the need to obtain the informed consent of 
the concerned patients.  
The fact that human dignity underlies both bioethical perspectives, dignitarianism and 
the human rights approach, further aggravates the problem for policy-makers. For example, 
this problem is particularly pertinent when the interpretation of laws that build on human 
dignity is required. In the absence of a clear definition of human dignity, it is not clear 
whether the legislator implied human dignity as constraint or human dignity as empowerment. 
Therefore, even if the intent to protect human dignity might be uncontested by the parties to 
the debate, competition between several bioethical perspectives might still take place due to 
the intention of the promotors of different bioethical perspectives to interpret human dignity 
in a more liberal or more restrictive way.  
Taking the aforementioned problems into account, we explore how, when and under 
which circumstances the appeal to human dignity in public debates around new technological 
and scientific practices becomes problematic. To do this, we compare how Italy and Germany 
discussed and adopted policies on assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and hESC. Italy 
and Germany are commonly used as examples of countries whose restrictive policies on ART 
and embryo research have been influenced by the presence of strong dignitarian traditions. 
However, despite this apparent similarity, the two countries differ in terms of the timing of 
the adopted laws and their durability. The German Embryo Protection Act 
                                                
10 Ibid.  
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(Embryonenschutzgesetz, hereafter EPA) was passed in 1990 after five years of deliberation 
of its text. It has been in force since its inception and has since only been modified and 
complemented to regulate new technologies, including PGD and hESC. In contrast, the Italian 
Parliament deliberated the law on medically assisted reproduction (Legge sulla procreazione 
medicalmente assistita, hereafter Law on MAR) for 20 years after the first bills on IVF had 
been drafted, and adopted it only in 2004. However, within five years, almost all its restrictive 
provisions were repealed by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional. Thus, while the 
dignitarian tradition led to the adoption of a workable and enduring law in Germany, the 
Italian law, similarly influenced by the value of human dignity, was subject to a lengthy 
discussion, only to see many of its articles invalidated as unconstitutional in a short period. 
Summarised bluntly, in Germany, the dignitarian tradition led to an enduring and workable 
EPA, while in Italy it led to a controversial and, ultimately, unconstitutional Law on MAR.  
The main argument of our article is that in both countries human dignity as constraint 
played a key role in the political debate around the new ART and hESC research, mainly 
because these were framed as a potential assault on human dignity. Yet, the two countries 
differed in terms of their success to build their policies regarding ART and hESC research 
upon the principle of human dignity. We suggest that two factors were responsible for this 
difference. The first factor was whether dignitarianism was the dominant bioethical 
perspective in the relevant country. The second factor was the degree to which the regulators 
were willing to strike compromises with their opponents if dignitarianism was not the 
dominant bioethical perspective or was competing with other bioethical perspectives for 
regulatory relevance.  
While the focus of this paper is on human dignity and the possible difficulties in 
implementing it through policy, we argue that its conclusions are also indicative of general 
patterns of the relationships between particular bioethical configurations and regulatory 
outcomes. Indeed, much research has shown the connection between countries’ bioethical 
landscapes and the eventual regulatory outcomes of the debate on new biomedical 
technologies.11 This article contributes to this research in two ways. First, it illustrates the 
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importance of not only the presence of dominant bioethical perspectives, but also the ability 
and willingness of their supporters to strike compromises and to form coalitions with 
opponents. Second, it provides a more detailed account of how exactly such bioethical 
configurations translate into policies. In the conclusion, we will draw three broad patterns of 
how exactly bioethical configurations may shape regulatory policy.  
We shall proceed as follows. In Section 2, we will describe the debate around the 
Italian Law on MAR, both its discussion in Parliament and its invalidation by the 
Constitutional Court. In Section 3, we shall explore how the German government discussed 
the EPA and how it amended it to account for new technologies such as PGD and hESC. In 
Section 4, we will analyse and compare the two countries and conclude why human dignity 
succeeded in materialising in the German EPA and Stem Cell Act (Stammzellgesetz, hereafter 
SCA) and failed to do so in the Italian Law on MAR. Finally, we will derive three broad 
patterns in the relationship between countries’ bioethical landscape and their regulatory 
policy.  
6.2. Italy, sanctity of life and the debate on the Law on MAR 
Italy opened its laboratories to ART in 1984 when Italian doctors performed their first IVF 
procedures. At the same time, the Italian State made its first attempts to regulate the provision 
of ART services on its territory. As ART were still new technologies, raising ethical, legal 
and safety concerns, the then Minister of Health Costante Degan instituted an 
interdisciplinary commission entrusted with exploring various aspects of ART and issuing 
reports that could subsequently be used as the basis for a law on ART. The commission 
included doctors, scientists, philosophers, and legal scholars and was presided over by judge 
Fernando Santosuosso. 
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The reports produced by the Santosuosso Commission had a rather restrictive 
approach towards ART and embryo research, employing a clearly deontological reasoning.12 
IVF embryos were defined as ‘subjects’ whose primary legal entitlement was the right to life. 
Therefore, the reports prohibited embryo selection and the creation of embryos for other 
purposes than the initiation of pregnancy, such as scientific research. Finally, they also 
suggested that only as many embryos should be created as would be implanted into the 
woman, in order to prevent the creation of supernumerary embryos. In case the implantation 
of embryos would fail, the non-implanted embryos could be cryopreserved for later 
implantation into the same or another woman. In the latter case, equating embryos with born 
children, it prescribed that the implantation should be performed under the supervision of the 
Juvenile Court, similarly to the adoption procedure.  
The reports of the Santosuosso Commission were not implemented by the Minister of 
Health. As Flamigni and Mori ironically suggest, he found them too liberal.13 Instead, two 
months prior to their publication, he issued a ministerial circular named ‘Limits and 
conditions of legitimacy of services for artificial insemination in the domain of the National 
Health Service’.14 The Circular aimed at regulating artificial insemination alone, but also 
contained several provisions regulating the procedures regarding embryos. Specifically, the 
Circular entirely prohibited embryo cryopreservation and only allowed the creation of 
embryos that were required for implantation. However, the Circular applied to public centres 
only, thus leaving private centres beyond its regulatory reach. The adoption of the Circular 
thus addressed the need for regulation; however, due to its limited scope of application, it 
satisfied this need only partially.  
                                                
12  Commissione Santosuosso, ‘Proposte di disciplina della nuova genetica umana’ 
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13 Carlo Flamigni and Maurizio Mori, La Legge Sulla Procreazione Medicalmente 
Assistita (Net 2005). 
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6.2.1 Sanctity of life, the Catholic/secular cleavage and underregulation  
Simultaneously with the governmental attempts to regulate ART and embryo research, 
Parliament also wished to place these under state control. From the very beginning of the 
debate, a substantial number of bills, mainly drafted by the members of Christian Democracy 
(Democrazia Christiana, hereafter DC), had been presented to Parliament that called for the 
prohibition of any type of clinical and scientific manipulation of human embryos from the 
moment of fertilisation, including the creation of supernumerary embryos, their 
cryopreservation, testing, selection based on morphological or genetic conditions, scientific 
research and destruction. This prohibition was warranted because, according to the bills’ 
drafters, embryos from the moment of fertilisation were already full-fledged human persons. 
The belonging of the ‘nascituri’ (‘those to be born’), as embryos have been interchangeably 
called, to the moral community of people meant that they possessed human dignity and that 
their life was therefore inviolable. For example, the bill presented by Mino Martinazzoli, 
president of DC, and Carlo Casini, president of the Italian pro-life association Movement for 
Life (Movimento per la Vita, hereafter MpV) and a DC member (Martinazzoli bill), which 
was to be resubmitted many times throughout the debate, explicitly stated that there exist no 
interests that could outweigh the importance of preserving human life, including the life of the 
embryo.15  
 Another purpose of these bills, including the Martinazzoli bill, was to explicitly 
recognize IVF embryos as legal subjects and holders of the right to life. According to the 
Italian law on abortion, foetuses are neither ‘persons’ nor legal subjects enjoying the right to 
life,16 but they do ‘enjoy the inalienable rights of human beings’ and are thus protected by 
general art. 2 of the Italian Constitution.17 Unsatisfied with the partiality of legal protection of 
                                                
15 Camera dei Deputati, Proposta di legge (Norme a tutela dell’embrione umano), n. 
3486. X Legisatura, 22 dicembre 1988. 
<http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stampati/pdf/34860001.pdf> accessed 9 
December 2016. 
16 Corte cost. 18 febbraio 1975 n. 27, in Giur. cost., 1975, p. 117 ss. 
17 Art. 2 of the Italian Constitution: ‘The Republic recognizes and guarantees the 
inviolable rights of the person, both as an individual and in the social groups where human 
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embryos, the Martinazzoli bill stated that its main goal was ‘to extend the protection of the 
right to health and to physical integrity onto the initial phase of human existence’18 and 
thereby to recognise human embryos as a subject of rights, particularly of the right to life. 
Along with the prohibition against clinical and scientific manipulation of the embryo, the 
recognition of IVF embryos as legal subjects, whose primary right was the right to life, was 
regarded as the best means for ensuring their protection by the State.19  
This framing of embryos as human persons and legal subjects was attacked by more 
liberal politicians, largely belonging to the Italian Communist Party (Partito Communisto 
Italiano, hereafter PCI). One of the main discursive strategies they employed was to to 
oppose religion and the state. They stressed that the issue of an embryo’s moral status was a 
personal and subjective value, influenced by one’s religious views, and therefore could not 
serve as the basis for secular laws. Instead of focusing on the need to protect embryos against 
manipulation, they emphasised other risks that ART raise, especially if left unregulated, and 
thereby sought to re-problematise ART. Specifically, they stressed the need to prevent the 
commercialisation of reproductive technologies, ‘exploitation’ of patients, infliction of harm 
on women and new-borns, medical malpractice and a number of controversial practices such 
as eugenics and surrogacy.20  
Thus, from the very beginning, the deliberative space on ART and embryo research in 
Italy was characterised by two ways in which ART and embryo research were problematised. 
These problematisations built on two different understandings of what should be the basis for 
                                                                                                                                                   
personality is expressed.  The Republic expects that the fundamental duties of political, 
economic and social solidarity be fulfilled.’  
18 Camera dei Deputati (n 15).  
19 Camera dei Deputati. Assamblea, Resoconto stenografico. XIII Legislatura, 395 
Seduta, 20 luglio 1998. 
<http://leg13.camera.it/_dati/leg13/lavori/stenografici/sed395/s030r.htm>accessed 9 
December 2016 
20 Camera dei Deputati, Proposta di legge (Norme sulla inseminazione artificiale e 
sulla fecondazione in vitro), n. 1304. IX Legisatura, 17 aprile 1985. 
<https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/277857.pdf> accessed 9 December 2016. 
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laws on ART and embryo research, that is, the protection of embryos’ dignity and life or, in 
contrast, the prevention of medical malpractice and the protection of patients’ health. The 
presence of these two different problematisations was an expression of a deep 
secular/religious cleavage running throughout both Italian politics and society alike. In the 
political debates, these problematisations were advanced and supported by two groups of 
politicians. DC members supported full embryo protection and an absolute right to life of the 
embryo. In their struggle for implementing this principle through laws, they were supported 
by the Catholic Church, which retained its role of an influential political actor and opinion-
maker despite the secularisation of Italian society.21 Its influence on the Italian politics would 
be further reinforced in the beginning of the 1990s, when the corruption scandals led to the 
dissolution of the main political parties and emergence of smaller political parties, many of 
which would turn to Catholicism in search for their political identity.22  In contrast, PCI 
members rejected that human embryos necessarily had human dignity and instead emphasised 
the need to protect women’s health. This secular/Catholic cleavage of the Italian party system 
was to be the main principle structuring the debate around embryo use in medical and 
scientific practices in Italy. Furthermore, running through the entire Italian society alike, it 
split both lay citizens and the Italian medical and scientific community on the issue of the 
‘moral and legal status of the embryo’ and thus on how ART and embryo research should be 
regulated.23  
One of the main consequences of this cleavage was a difficulty in achieving consensus 
on how to regulate ART and embryo research. This led to the incapacity of the Italian 
Parliament to come up with any law on ART and embryo research for 20 years. As a result, 
the Circular remained the only instrument regulating the provision of ART services and 
                                                
21 Franco Garelli, ‘La rilevanza concreta e pubblica del cattolicesimo italiano’ (2005) 
5 Il Mulino 823. 
22 Alberto Melloni, ‘Tre fasi nel rapporto fra Chiesa, episcopato e politica’ (2006) 6 Il 
Mulino 1056. 
23 Celina Ramjoué and Ulrich Klöti, ’ART Policy in Italy Explaining the Lack of 
Comprehensive Regulation’ in Ivar Bleiklie and others (eds), Comparative Biomedical 
Policy. Governing Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Routledge 2004). 
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embryo research in the country. However, because it applied to public fertility clinics only, 
private centres remained outside its regulatory reach and instead were subject to self-
regulatory governance.24 The self-regulation of doctors practising ART in the private sector 
led to a rather liberal approach towards ART. Private Italian clinics engaged in practising a 
wide range of ART procedures, ranging from more widespread ones such as creating 
supernumerary embryos and embryo cryopreservation to more controversial ones such as 
surrogacy, egg donation, and the fertilisation of menopausal and single women. Due to this 
permissibility, sceptical observers defined Italy as a ‘Procreative Far West’ country.  
As a result of this permissive approach towards ART, large numbers of embryos got 
accumulated in Italian private clinics. This situation had a substantial impact on the approach 
of pro-life politicians towards ART and embryo protection. Embryos, besides being framed as 
full-fledged human persons and having an absolute right to life, started to be framed as weak, 
little and still unprotected little children whose life and health was at stake due to the ‘deviant 
egoism of those who want to have a child at any cost’.25 Women, instead, were regarded as 
the main subjects responsible for transgressing the established boundaries and putting at stake 
the interests of IVF embryos. In the discussion of the law’s text in Parliament, this urged pro-
life politicians to emphasise even more strongly the need for an absolute protection of 
embryos’ right to life even against the entitlements of prospective mothers to procreate and 
have their rights protected.26  
The debate around ART and embryo research in Italy was therefore taking place 
around a problem that interpretative policy analysis defines as ‘wicked problems’. According 
to Fisher, ‘wicked problems’ are problems ‘in which we not only don’t know the solution but 
                                                
24 Isabelle Engeli and Christine Rothmayr Allison, ‘When Doctors Shape Policy: The 
Impact of Self-Regulation on Governing Human Biotechnology’ (2016) 10 Regulation & 
Governance 248. 
25 Senato della Repubblica, Proposta di legge (Norme in materia di procreazione 
assistita), n. 112. XIV Legisatura, 6 giugno 2001, 2. 
<https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/63552.pdf> accessed 9 December 2016. 
26 Ibid.  
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are not even sure what the problem is’.27 Often, wicked problems can emerge in debates 
around moral and therefore frequently irreconcilable values. Italian society, split around the 
issue of the ‘moral status of the embryo’ and hence embryos’ entitlements, was similarly 
engaged in discussing what exact problem ART and embryo research actually raised. Was it 
the problem of violating the sanctity of life or was it possible risks to citizens’ health? The 
inability to reconcile views on the issue of the ‘moral status of the embryo’ led to the failure 
to adopt a law and to a de facto permissive regime.  
6.2.2 The debate around the Bolognesi bill, sanctity of life and the regulation of fertility 
treatment 
The discussion of the co-called Bolognesi bill provides a vivid illustration of what the idea to 
protect human dignity conceptualised as sanctity of life meant in practice. In 1998, largely 
due to the high-profile case of cloning the first mammalian animal Dolly the sheep, the 
government renewed its attempts to bring ART and embryo research under state control. It 
assigned the task of preparing the first draft of a unified bill to the Commission on Social 
Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies. The parliamentary coalition at that moment was centrist-
left, which suggested that a more permissive bill on ART might be adopted. Furthermore, the 
president of the Commission, Marida Bolognesi, herself a member of the Italian social-
democratic political party Democrats of the Left (Democratici di Sinistra - L’Ulivo), was 
known for her feminist and rather liberal views on matters related to ART and abortion.28 
However, as a result of the corruption scandals of the beginning of the 1990s, the dissolution 
of the main DC and PCI, and the emergence of a large number of smaller parties, political 
parties were no longer representative of either religious or secular views. Instead, the latter 
were dispersed across the entire political spectrum. Therefore, Marida Bolognesi, attempting 
to attract the voices of Catholic members of the party, approved a compromise text of the 
‘Bolognesi bill’. It allowed a doctor to create a maximum of four embryos in one IVF cycle, 
transfer as many embryos as was deemed appropriate to initiate pregnancy, and cryopreserve 
                                                
27 Frank Fischer,  Citizens, Experts, and the Environment (Duke University Press 
2000) 128.  
28 Chiara Valentini, La Fecondazione Proibita (Feltrinelli 2004). 
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the remainder; however, the remaining embryos must be transferred into the same woman in 
the following cycles. The bill also prohibited embryo research. Thus, it did allow some form 
of embryo manipulation such as the creation of supernumerary embryos and cryopreservation; 
yet, responding to the voices of the Catholic members of the party and to their moral 
reservations about creating supernumerary embryos, it limited the number of producible 
embryos to four and prohibited embryo research.   
However, absolutist voices precluded adoption of the law. Almost immediately after 
the bill was passed to the Chamber of Deputies, it was amended by including the embryo in 
the list of subjects whose rights the future law had to protect. In addition, to ensure absolute 
protection of embryos’ right to life, the amended bill prohibited embryo cryopreservation and 
selection, and mandated the creation of a maximum of three embryos during one IVF cycle, 
all of which, even those holding pathologies, had to be implanted into the woman’s uterus. 
Furthermore, pro-life politicians stressed the need to prohibit both women and men to 
withdraw consent after the fertilisation of the patient’s eggs. The main reason for this 
amendment was to protect embryos’ right to life from the moment of fertilization till 
implantation, if the couple would change their mind regarding the implantation of 
embryos.29  Finally, pro-life politicians proposed to prohibit PGD. According to them, 
PGD would involve the selection of human embryos based on their genetic profile, or in other 
words, a ‘eugenic practice’.30 Furthermore, PGD did not simply treat different forms of life 
differently, but presupposed the discarding and elimination of embryos that bore pathological 
genes. PGD thus represented a double offence against human life: not only did it imply 
                                                
29 Senato della Repubblica. Assamblea, Resoconto stenografico. XIII Legislatura, 852 
Seduta (pom.), 7 giugno 2000. 
<http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/6064.pdf> accessed 9 December 2016. 
30 Camera dei Deputati. Assamblea, Resoconto stenografico. XIV Legislatura, 421 
Seduta, 10 febbraio 2004. 
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December 2016. 
 174 
selection, but it also built upon ‘the affirmation that diseases can be treated by killing the 
sick’.31  
Liberal politicians criticised these restrictions as not paying enough attention to the 
interests of adult Italian citizens involved in ART, especially to those of women, as women’s 
bodies were the main object of treatment. They argued that the prohibition to create more than 
three embryos would force the doctor to perform repeated ovarian stimulations of the woman, 
thus raising the risks of such health conditions as ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) 
and ovarian cancer. They criticised the provision prohibiting withdrawal of consent after egg 
fertilisation, as it would violate the principle of informed consent and amount to forced 
treatment of women. Furthermore, the prohibition of PGD would cause ‘true family 
tragedies’32 and require ‘from couples a heroism that the law cannot require’,33 as it would 
force couples to raise children with severe genetic pathologies or force women to perform 
abortion, a much more harmful procedure than PGD. Yet, all attempts by liberal politicians to 
reduce the restrictiveness would fall short in face of the reluctance of pro-life politicians to 
negotiate the value of embryo life with other values, including health of the mother.  
6.2.3 Embryo and hESC research 
The regulation of embryo and hESC research in Italy was another hotly contested topic. 
During the discussion of the Bolognesi bill, how embryo research should be regulated in Italy 
was a secondary issue, yielding primacy to the issue of fertility treatment. It got prominence 
                                                
31 Senato della Repubblica. Assamblea, Resoconto stenografico. XIV Legislatura, 499 
Seduta (ant.), 03 dicembre 2003. 
<http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Resaula&leg=14&id=00114374
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Seduta (ant), 10 dicembre 2003. 
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only in 2000, when the British government decided to amend the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act to allow research on stem cells. This led to a full-blown controversy on 
whether hESC research should be allowed in Italy.  
First, a brief explanation of what embryonic stem cells are is warranted. Stem cells 
have been isolated from an embryo and grown for the first time in 1998. They are taken from 
an embryo at the blastocyst stage, normally five days after fertilisation of an egg cell. At this 
stage the embryo cells are pluripotent (capable of growing into many but not all types of cells) 
and therefore cannot become embryos. This makes them a useful and promising tool for 
curing diseases, such as Parkinson’s disease. However, because the extraction of stem cells 
from embryos involves their destruction, it raises similar concerns as research on embryos.  
Similar to the discussion of fertility treatment, the debate around the legitimacy of 
performing hESC research was first problematised as an assault on human dignity and a 
violation of the right to life. The views of discussants, who included both politicians and 
scientists, split along the secular/Catholic cleavage. The proponents of hESC emphasised the 
therapeutic benefits of hESC and the potential of such research to provide new cures for 
presently untreatable diseases. In contrast, the opponents claimed that hESC violates human 
dignity and embryos’ right to life. Similarly to the debate on fertility treatment, the second 
group of politicians was backed by the Vatican, which used the debate on stem cells to further 
advance its goals on the ‘re-Christianisation’ of Italy.34 Furthermore, in addition to employing 
ethical arguments in the debate, they also argued that hESC research gives worse results than 
research on adult stem cells. As Beltrame argued, by engaging in the discussion about 
therapeutic benefits of different types of research, Catholic politicians and scientists attempted 
to shift the debate from the ethical to the epistemic domain and thus to problematise the 
debate on hESC further by calling into question the therapeutic efficiency of hESC research.35 
                                                
34 Alberta Giorgi, ‘Ahab and the White Whale: The Contemporary Debate around the 
Forms of Catholic Political Commitment in Italy’ (2013) 20 Democratization 895. 
35 Lorenzo Beltrame, ‘Disputing the Boundary of Pluripotency. The Italian Public 
Debate on Amniotic Fluid-Derived Stem Cells’ (2013) 32 New Genetics and Society 385; 
Lorenzo Beltrame ‘The Therapeutic Promise of Pluripotency and Its Political Use in the 
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However, such reproblematisation was indeed anything but uncontroversial; instead of de-
moralising hESC, such reproblematisation indirectly asserted a moral status of the embryo as 
a full-fledged human being. Instead, the polarisation was reinforced as it was no longer only 
about the moral status of the embryo, but also about scientific evidence and knowledge.  
In 2000, the then Minister of Health Umberto Veronesi instituted an ad hoc 
commission, including 25 members and presided over by the Nobel prize winner oncologist 
Renato Dulbecco, in order to explore the ethical implications of hESC research. The final 
report was published in 2003.36 The members of the commission agreed that hESC provides 
significant benefits for medicine. However, they split on the issue of ethics of using hESC for 
medical purposes. While the majority of the Commission‘s members supported the use of 
surplus embryos for deriving hESC, seven Catholic members opposed the use of all embryos, 
even of surplus ones. They argued that the embryo was a full-fledged human person, whose 
right to life and human dignity had to protected, and no other benefits, including medical 
ones, could outweigh the value of its life. 
One of these Catholic members was Girolamo Sirchia, an outspoken proponent of 
research on adult stem cells. In 2001, when Italy had its parliamentary elections and the 
Berlusconi-led coalition won, Sirchia was appointed a new Minister of Health. After he took 
the post, Sirchia ‘promised’ to institute a new expert commission that would provide an 
‘alternative’ expert report. Despite that this alternative commission was not established, the 
reports of the Dulbecco Commission were not taken into account by the new Italian 
government and ended up in a drawer. Instead, immediately following his appointment, 
Sirchia issued a regulation on funding schemes of Italian science. The regulation did not 
include funding for hESC and covered only adult stem cells. Despite that no official 
regulation of hESC was produced, the governmental decision not to assign funds for hESC 
research was indicative of the then government’s reluctance to find ethically ambiguous hESC 
                                                
36 Ministero della Sanità, Relazione della Commissione di studio sull'utilizzo di cellule 
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research. The prohibition of conducting hESC research would be fully implemented with the 
enactment of the Law on MAR.  
6.2.4 The adoption of the Law on MAR and the institutionalisation of sanctity of life  
In the elections of 2001, central-right parties occupied the majority of seats in Parliament. 
After the restrictive text of the bill was approved by the Chamber of Deputies, the bill was in 
limbo awaiting discussion in the Senate. The Government appeared in no hurry, however. The 
situation changed with the intervention of the Vatican.37 In February 2003, representatives of 
the Government met with the Vatican clergy on the occasion of the anniversary of the signing 
of the Lateran Pacts. The Pope expressed the Vatican’s concerns with the Government policy 
such as its support of the war in Iraq and the implementation of discriminatory laws on 
immigration. He stressed that the Vatican could provide political backing if the law on 
assisted reproduction in its restrictive version would be approved as soon as possible. 38 After 
this meeting the position of the Government changed drastically. In December 2003, the 
Government obtained the approval of the Bill by the Senate. After the second approval of the 
Bill by the Chamber of Deputies, on 10 February 2004, it was passed as the Law on MAR.39  
In art. 1, the Law recognised the human embryo as a right-holder, although it did not 
give a definition of the embryo.  It allowed access to ART only to infertile couples if other 
methods of treating infertility proved unsuccessful. Further, in art. 13, the Law forbade 
embryo experimentation, prescribed that clinical and experimental research must be 
performed only for the sake of the embryo itself, and forbade the creation of embryos for 
scientific and experimental research and eugenic embryo selection. Finally, in art. 14 it 
prohibited the discarding and cryopreservation of embryos, and further prescribed that doctors 
must not ‘create embryos in a number higher than the one strictly necessary for a single and 
                                                
37  Chiara Valentini, La Fecondazione Proibita (Feltrinelli 2004); Patrick Hanafin, 
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38 Ibid.  
39  L. 19 febbraio 2004 n. 40, Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente 
assistita. 
 178 
simultaneous transfer, and in any case not more than three’. The only exception to the 
prohibition of embryo cryopreservation were serious health issues of the female patient, 
‘unforeseen at the moment of fertilisation’, which allowed doctors to freeze embryos. 
However, after solving these health problems, the doctor was obliged to proceed with embryo 
implantation. In the same year as it was enacted, the Law’s provisions were implemented into 
guidelines of the Ministry of Health introducing a new medical protocol for performing IVF 
both for public and private Italian clinics.  
Furthermore, three years later, another Circular was issued that specified what is 
meant exactly by ‘embryo’.40 As stated before, art. 1 of the Law on MAR did not specify this. 
As a result, doctors interpreted it as an entity that is formed with the fusion of the two pro-
nucleuses. This means that from the moment the sperm meets the egg until the fusion of their 
pro-nucleuses, the entity was not an embryo, and therefore the restrictive provisions of the 
Law on MAR did not apply to it. Therefore, doctors could create a large number of oocytes, 
fertilise them and cryopreserve these ‘pre-embryos’, as they have been called by Italian 
doctors. In this way, they did not have to repeat the detrimental ovarian stimulation of the 
woman and jeopardise her health. In addition, this procedure gave comparable pregnancy 
rates as a regular IVF. Finally, they could perform polar body biopsy, an alternative to PGD, 
although it had a narrower scope of application and could detect only the mother’s genetic 
diseases. However, the Circular prohibited these practices. It built its decision on a common 
line of reasoning employed in the debate around the Law on MAR, according to which life 
should be protected from the beginning, hence with the penetration of the sperm into an egg 
and not with the fusion of the two (pro-)nucleuses. As will be seen later, in Germany both 
procedures were allowed, which made IVF significantly less restrictive there. 
6.2.5 The challenge of the Law on MAR, abrogative referenda and litigation campaign 
Predictably, the Law on MAR was not a legal instrument able to function as a compromise on 
the issue of IVF regulation. Instead, the debate shifted to other institutional settings.  
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Referendum 
The enactment of the Law urged citizens who disagreed with the Law to organize an 
abrogative referendum against the Law.41 Several questions were put to vote that concerned 
the liberalisation of fertility treatment and the possibility to perform scientific research on 
supernumerary embryos. This campaign was supported by many Italian researchers and 
scientific associations, such as the Luca Coscioni Association for the Freedom of Scientific 
Research. They claimed, first, that absolute embryo protection was a religious principle that 
could not be the basis for a law in a secular country. In addition, they emphasised the 
principle of scientific freedom that was violated by prohibiting embryo research. The 
referendum failed, however, as the quorum was not met. The Catholic Church influenced this 
outcome. It organised a massive campaign against the referendum, calling Italian citizens to 
abstain from voting as ‘life cannot be put to vote’. This strategy proved suscessful and only 
25,7 percent of Italian citizens went to the polls. The threat posed to embryo’s life by 
referenda and the possibility of repealing the newly enacted Law was forclosed.  
Litigation  
In the same year, the debate around the Law shifted to a different – judicial – setting. 
Individual citizens, unsatisfied with the restrictive nature of the Law on MAR, continued to 
debate the law’s granting of absolute protection to the IVF embryo’s rights. They were 
supported by patient associations and fertility centres. The plaintiffs’ main legal complaint 
was that the Law on MAR prohibits PGD and thereby violates women’s right to health. Thus, 
the relationship of the mother and the embryo, whose opposing interests figured prominently 
during the debate on the Law on MAR and eventually underlay the Law’s text, again became 
the topic of debate, this time in the courtrooms.  
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In 2009, only five years after the Law on MAR had been adopted, the Italian 
Constitutional Court acknowledged that the Law violates women’s right to health.42  The 
question of the appealing courts concerned the constitutionality of art. 14 of the Law on MAR 
that obliged doctors to implant all created embryos simultaneously and prohibiting 
cryopreservation. The Constitutional Court concluded that this restriction could harm 
women’s right to health, because it significantly limited the freedom of the treating doctor to 
apply individual treatment to every patient, that is, decide on the number of embryos to create 
and to implant. As a result, the Constituional Court repealed the restriction that at most three 
embryos could be created and implanted simultaneously as well as the provision forbidding 
cryopreservation. Henceforth, embryos could be created in a ‘scientifically justified number’ 
to ensure good prospects of pregnancy and protect women’s health.  
Hence, the mechanism of litigation was used by those citizens and their collectives, 
including patients and medical associations, who disagreed with the value system upon which 
the Law on MAR was based, that is, the principle of the sanctity and inviolability of life of 
embryos. Furthermore, it attributed this value to a wide scope of embryonic entities, including 
fertilised eggs. Therefore, the Law on MAR excluded the voices of much of its constituency, 
such as patients, doctors, and scientists, whose activities and interests had been substantially 
curtailed. Those citizens who disagreed, believing that the law unreasonably prioritised the 
sanctity of embryo life over the mothers’ right to health, used the mechanism of constitutional 
law to protect their entitlements. This mechanism was successful and the interests of the 
patients and doctors were recognized by the Constitutional Court, repealing the most 
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restrictive provisions of the Law. 43  In fact, such citizen resistance enabled a parallel a 
significantly more liberal rewriting of the Law.44 
6.2.6 ART and stem cells: back to underregulation  
One consequence of the Constitutional Court’s judgment was that the regulation of ART was 
again entrusted to doctors themselves. This resulted in a situation of significant legal 
uncertainty, which the Italian government made several attempts to address through 
regulation. First, the Minister of Health set up two expert commissions to update the 
Ministerial guidelines on ART by 2010. However, up till now, updates have not been 
published. Second, liberal parliamentarians introduced a number of bills to regulate the access 
of both fertile and infertile couples to PGD. Yet, none of them reached the parliamentary 
floor. Thus, the Italian ART sector, having existed without any state regulations for 20 years 
to be suddenly overregulated when the Law on MAR was passed, returned to its pre-law state 
within only 5 years. Such issues as whether PGD was legitimate or not, which health 
conditions justified access to PGD as well as how, where and for how long supernumerary 
embryos should remain frozen did not have clear and precise legal answer. Some of these 
questions were addressed by the Constitutional Court when it repealed the prohibition for 
fertile couples to use PGD (art. 4) and the prohibition of ‘eugenic selection’ (art. 13) through 
its judgments in 2015. 45  Others, such as the destiny of cryopreserved embryos and the 
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indication of the types of diseases that could be selected out via performing PGD, remained 
unregulated. Medical self-regulation again became the main instrument governing the 
provision of ART in general and PGD in particular in Italian fertility clinics. However, this 
mode of governance came into being not as a result of the State purposefully delegating 
power to the medical profession, but rather as a consequence of the State’s failure to regulate 
ART and agree on how the wicked problem of the moral status of the embryo should be 
incorporated into laws, entailing legal uncertainty and insecurity, both for patients and the 
medical community. 
A rather similar thing happened with the import of hESC. To begin with, the failure to 
repeal the Law on MAR’s restrictive provisions and the fact that the latter remained in force 
did not make embryonic stem cell research entirely impossible. Specifically, the Law on 
MAR said nothing with respect to the possibility of importing hESC from abroad. In the 
absence of a clear state position, scientists used the loophole in the Law and began importing 
hESC from abroad. In their permissive interpretation of the Law, they were backed by a 
substantial number of legal scholars.46  However, the legitimacy of importing stem cells was 
not supported by many Italians, both lay citizens and scientists. For example, as Elena 
Cattaneo, a famous Italian researcher and supporter of stem cell research, stated in an 
interview, Italian scientists were willing to perform stem cell research and made frequent 
visits to her laboratory.47 However, as they did not wish to be called ‘unethical’ scientists, in 
public they denied the fact that they performed such research. In addition, several 
organizations, mostly Catholic, insisted that the loophole in the Law should be interpreted 
restrictively, accusing the researchers who were importing stem cells of committing a 
criminal offense, which led to a further worsening of the societal debate with respect to stem 
cell research.  
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Thus, the lack of clear state regulations on stem cells entitled Italian scientists to 
autonomously decide whether they wished to perform research on hESC and, if so, how they 
wished to perform it. This freedom resembles the self-governance of Italian doctors before the 
adoption of the Law on MAR and after the invalidation of its provisions by the Constitutional 
Court in 2009. However, the lack of any regulations was far from a positive outcome. It led to 
various negative consequences, including the insecurity which Italian scientists experienced 
with respect to the legality of performing research on imported hESC.  
6.2.7 Conclusion  
ART and embryo research, including hESC research, were ultimately problematised in Italy 
as a potential assault on human dignity. Therefore, the Law on MAR that was eventually 
adopted represented a solution to the problem that ART and embryo research raised. This 
problematisation as well as the conceptualisation of human dignity itself as ‘sanctity of life’ 
emerged as a result of historical, cultural and political factors, among which the presence of 
the Catholic Church as an important political actor played a key role.  
However, dignitarianism was not the main perspective in the Italian bioethics. The 
requirement to protect human dignity, or sanctity of life, of embryos was not supported by 
many lay people nor by decision-makers who adhered to more liberal views. In addition, the 
affinity of dignitarianism with the Catholic teaching raised objections on the part of the 
secular sections of Italian society, triggering even deeper disagreements among its supporters 
and opponents. Similarly, it entailed absolute and unrestricted protection of embryos’ right to 
life even against the competing interests of the future mother. Embryos included all 
embryonic entities, including non-viable and sick ones, from the moment of penetration of the 
sperm cell into an egg. Such an encompassing scope of entities that had the right to life 
substantially restricted treatment possibilities of Italian doctors, increased health risks for 
their patients and therefore further narrowed down the scope of those citizens supporting this 
ethical perspective and its implementation in law.  
Despite this disagreement, the supporters of dignitarian ethics made little or no 
attempt to strike a compromise with their opponents. All attempts of finding a middle-ground 
solution, such as the one undertaken by Marida Bolognesi, failed. As a result, this prevented 
the adoption of a law for 20 years. Italian patients were unprotected and clinics were stuffed 
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with supernumerary embryos. Furthermore, even after the Law had been adopted, the debate 
did not stop but shifted to the courtrooms, and in no more than five years, the most restrictive 
provisions were repealed by the Italian Constitutional Court, hence reverting to a situation of 
de facto underregulation after a short period of overreguation.  
6.3. Germany, non-instrumentalisation of life, and the debate on ART, hESC research 
and PGD 
Similar to Italy, in 1984 the German Government instituted an interdisciplinary commission 
to study ethical aspects of ART. The Commission was presided over by the former German 
Constitutional Court president Ernst Benda, illustrating the importance of the commission’s 
work. The produced report was restrictive in nature, prohibiting the manipulation and 
instrumentalisation of embryos as a general rule.48 According to it, embryos were entities 
worthy of protection because they constituted human life and therefore possessed human 
dignity, and the protection of the latter was the constitutional duty of the German State as 
envisaged by art. 1 para. 1 of the Basic Law. Specifically, it indicated that research on 
embryos might lead to such horrible scientific practices as Nazi experiments and eugenics and 
thereby violate the constitutional principle of human dignity. The report therefore prohibited 
germline engineering, embryo and sperm selection, surrogacy, the creation of embryos for 
scientific research, and the creation of more embryos than would ultimately be implanted into 
the woman. Unlike the Santosuosso Commission, it did not prescribe that embryos must be 
necessarily implanted, and if the woman for any reason would change her mind with respect 
to implantation, the embryos could be cryopreserved. Moreover, and importantly, the 
Commission allowed research on supernumerary embryos for ‘medical findings of great 
value’. By indicating that such research must be of ‘great value’, the Benda Commission 
attempted to make sure that embryos are not routinely used in laboratory experiments. 
However, the fact that it allowed their use for research meant that embryo protection was 
important, yet not absolute. 
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6.3.1 Parliamentary discussion, human dignity and adoption of the EPA 
The report of the Benda Commission was not fully implemented when the German 
Government proposed its bill in 1989. Its aim was to establish boundaries for the use of IVF 
and genetic engineering when applied to humans, specifically by prohibiting any kind of 
manipulation during the initial stages of human life.49 According to the Government, such a 
prohibition was required by the need to ensure the protection of human dignity (art. 1 para. 1 
of the German Basic Law) and the right to life (art. 2 para. 2). Although the Government 
acknowledged the constitutional right to perform research (art. 5), this right was limited by 
the need to protect human dignity. 
To prevent the manipulation of human life at its initial stages and to thereby protect 
constitutional principles of human dignity, the Government included in the list of the 
forbidden procedures a rather wide range of techniques. They included the creation of 
embryos for purposes other than initiating pregnancy (in order to avoid the creation of 
embryos for research purposes), the use of embryos for scientific research, modifying 
germlines or fertilised eggs till the moment of fusion of the nucleuses, the fertilisation of 
more eggs than can be implanted in one cycle, cloning, the production of chimeras, choosing 
the gender of future children, the use of donor gametes, and surrogate motherhood. All these 
procedures were defined as crimes punishable by prison sentence or fines. 
 The government bill was also specific in defining what exactly it considered as 
‘human life’ whose dignity the State had to protect. Specifically, according to art. 8 the 
protection was accorded to embryonic entities from the moment of the fusion of the gametes’ 
nucleuses (i.e. zygotes), including totipotent cells (i.e. cells that can grow into all cell types) 
that could be derived from an embryo, because a totipotent cell has the potential to become an 
embryo. In addition, to be protected by the State embryos had to have the potential to develop 
                                                
49  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zum Schutz von Embryonen des 
Bundesregierung, 25 Oktober 1989, Drucksache 11/5460, 
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and thus to be born.50 Art. 8 of the bill also stipulated that within the first 24 hours after 
fusion, when it is not certain whether an embryo will be able to develop, it is considered to be 
capable of development and therefore is also protected by the law. After these 24 hours, it can 
be already determined with full precision whether the embryo can develop. Thus, only 
embryos capable of developing and hence becoming individuals were protected by the law. 
Finally, the bill sought to protect not only the dignity of embryos, but also the dignity 
of women. Thus, the bill criminalised the insertion of embryos into the woman against her 
will, as it would violate the principle of autonomy. Furthermore, it acknowledged the 
possibility that a woman might not want to have the embryos implanted, or could not have 
them implanted, for example, in case of illness. In such cases, the bill allowed embryos to be 
cryopreserved and even destroyed, if the woman would not want to proceed with 
implantation.51 
The German Senate, the Bundesrat, agreed that embryos should be protected 
according to the Basic Law and, similarly to the Government, based its judgment upon the 
State’s duty to protect human dignity and human life. Is also feared a Dammbruch  – the 
breach of a floodgate: if research on embryos would be allowed, then it would only proliferate 
as new forms of research goals would appear in the future. However, it asked itself whether 
embryos produced to initiate pregnancy, but that are not implanted in the genetic mother and 
therefore not capable of developing into human beings, should be banned from research. 
These supernumerary embryos, according to the Bundesrat, are not protected by the law 
because they do not fit within the definition of embryos stipulated in art. 8 of the law, as they 
do not have the capacity to develop. So too can it be questioned whether performing medical 
research on them would violate human dignity. 
Responding to its own quandaries, the Bundesrat deemed a prohibition to perform 
research to be necessary, however. Performing research on supernumerary embryos could be 
dangerous because it could lead to a development that would ultimately be irreconcilable with 
                                                
50 Hans-Ludwig Günter, Jochen Taupitz and Peter Kaiser, Embryonenschutzgesetz. 
Juristischer Kommentar mit medizinisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen (W. 
Kohlhammer GmbH 2014) 354. 
51 Jochen Taupitz, ‘The German Stem Cell Act’ (2010) 11 German Law Review 1381. 
 187 
the ‘objective idea of human dignity’. Specifically, it could incite doctors to overproduce 
supernumerary embryos in order to satisfy the increasing demands of scientists to have more 
embryos at their disposal. Additionally, it could incite scientists to require the right to create 
embryos for research purposes if they do not have a sufficient number of supernumerary 
embryos. Therefore, the Bundesrat, though questioning whether research on supernumerary 
embryos violates the human dignity of embryos, nevertheless advised the Government to 
prohibit research also on supernumerary embryos. This suggestion was accepted by the 
Government and incorporated in the bill before it was sent to Parliament. 
During the parliamentary debates, the bill was modified to include a limitation of three 
embryos for implantation during one cycle in order to prevent the creation of supernumerary 
embryos. Three was chosen as a maximum because medicine at that time did not need more 
than three embryos to initiate pregnancy. Another amendment concerned the right to select 
sperm cells in order to avoid the transmission of a serious hereditary genetic disease from 
parents to children. The proposal of the Government did not contain this exception because 
sperm selection based on gender chromosomes was outlawed out of fear of eugenic 
practices.52 In the Bundestag the need to allow sperm selection was proposed by the Christian 
Democratic parties (CDU/CSU) in order to prevent the transmission of grave hereditary 
diseases to the children, e.g. Duchenne disease, or, if the woman would decide to abort a 
diseased foetus, to spare her the traumatic experience of abortion. After accepting the 
proposed amendments, Parliament voted in favour of the bill and on 1 January 1991, the 
Embryo Protection Act entered into force.   
Hence, the debate around the EPA lasted only five years and was not particularly 
controversial. The constitutional value of human dignity and the shared agreement that human 
dignity also applied to unborn life, including embryos, played a key role in the rather speedy 
enactment of the EPA. As observed before, the EPA was rather widely supported by the 
political parties (apart from the Green Party (die Grünen)).53 This shared agreement emerged 
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to a large extent due to the reluctance of the entire German society to repeat the mistakes of 
its Nazi past, which the inclusion of the principle of human dignity in the German Basic Law 
was meant to prevent.54 This reluctance led to acknowledging that the instrumentalisation and 
commodification of all human life to which practices such as human embryo research, cloning 
or gender selection might lead must be prohibited.  
6.3.2 The debate around hESC in Germany 
A subsequent debate in Germany, on embryo research and hESC research, was provoked by 
the news about cloning Dolly the sheep in 1997 and was further intensified by announcements 
about the derivation of hESC in an American clinic.55 In Germany, the EPA did not clearly 
prohibit research on hESC, as hESC were pluripotent and not totipotent cells and therefore 
were not embryos. Although derivation of hESC involves the destruction of embryos, a 
practice prohibited by the EPA, German researchers could perform research on imported 
hESC and thus would not violate the general prohibition against embryo destruction. 
However, for some this would still involve the destruction of embryos abroad and therefore 
violate the spirit of the EPA. This legal loophole triggered an intense debate in German 
society about the legality of performing hESC research in Germany and how the EPA should 
be amended to accommodate new research possibilities.  
The debate around hESC included many actors, which could be roughly divided into 
two groups. The first group, opposing hESC research, was rather heterogeneous, including 
Catholics, the Green Party and feminists.56 Unlike Italy, where the Vatican imposed one main 
frame on embryo use in ART and hESC, hESC research was problematised in many ways in 
Germany. Thus, while Catholics framed it as a problem of embryo dignity and right to life, 
feminists emphasised socio-political consequences such as the use of women’s bodies as raw 
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material for research. On the other hand, medical and scientific associations such as the 
German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, hereafter DFG) suggested 
that embryo research was promising because it could bring new cures.57 DFG, specifically, 
appealed to a more liberal regulatory approach to hESC and even suggested changing the 
EPA. However, compared with opponents of hESC research, such liberal voices were in a 
clear minority.  
However, in the end the debate around hESC focussed only on the moral status of the 
embryo. This result was provoked by an interview of a newly instated Minister of Cultural 
Affairs, Julian Nida-Rümelin, in Tagesspiegel in January 2001. He stated that embryos do not 
have self-esteem and therefore do not have human dignity, therefore the latter could not be 
violated. This led to public upheaval, for it was in direct contradiction with the publicly held 
opinion that embryos do have human dignity, as any other human being regardless of specific 
qualities. As a result, President Johannes Rau intervened with a speech and in sharp words 
defended human dignity and condemned the commodification of embryos. He stressed that 
the value of human dignity was a lesson learned from the crimes of Nazi-Germany.58 In 
another of his speeches, in May 2001, he claimed that medical research should never decide 
when human life should be protected, thereby pointing at the illegality of embryo research.59  
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The problem of the moral status of the embryo also underlay the reports of the two 
commissions – Enquiry Commission on Law and Ethics in Modern Medicine (Recht und 
Ethik der modernen Medizin) created by the Bundestag and the National Ethical Council 
(Deutscher Ethikrat) created by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder – set up to explore ethical and 
legal problems related to hESC research.60 Calls for a deliberate investigation of hESC were 
voiced when a German researcher, Oliver Brüstle, wishing to perform research on imported 
human embryonic stem cells, applied for funding at the DFG and the public debate turned 
into a political debate. Both commissions stated that the main ethical problem of hESC 
research was the destruction of embryos; since for many citizens, embryos had a right to life 
and dignity, their destruction might be ethically dubious as it would involve embryo 
instrumentalisation for the sake of performing scientific research. Yet, on the other hand, for 
other people embryos do not have dignity. They concluded that the problem of the embryo’s 
moral status is thus unsolvable, as it is impossible to reconcile different ethical views. As a 
result, both commissions proposed to prohibit general research on embryos in Germany and 
the derivation of hESC in Germany. Yet, they differed with respect to importation of hESC; 
whereas the Enquire Commission was against any hESC research (26 to 12 votes)61, the 
Ethical Council was in favour of hESC research by importing them from abroad (15 to 10 
votes).62  
The political debate on hESC finally led to a debate in Parliament. In January 2002, 
three motions (Anträge) on hESC research were discussed in Parliament. The first was from a 
politician of the social-democratic party (SPD). In line with the report of the Commission on 
Law and Ethics in Modern Medicine, it argued that human life starts at fertilisation with the 
fusion of two nucleuses, therefore it was the duty of the State to protect human life and 
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human dignity of embryos against misuse and instrumentalisation. This requirement entailed 
the protection of embryos against third parties who would kill them to produce hESC for 
research and thus turning them into mere instruments. No distinction should be made between 
embryos created inside and outside of Germany, therefore import of embryos and stem cells 
should also be prohibited.63 In addition, the motion sought to safeguard the dignity of women, 
to protect them from being turned into suppliers of raw materials for science, echoing others’ 
arguments that were used in the public debate. Though the motion did acknowledge the 
constitutional right to freedom of research, it considered this right had to yield to the more 
important ‘universal principle’ of human dignity of human beings, independent of their stage 
of development and capabilities.64 The second motion was from the liberal party (FDP).65 It 
proposed the use of imported hESC derived from embryos created to initiate pregnancy. 
Being of a utilitarian nature, it suggested that hESC research should be endorsed because it 
would be beneficial for medical research and promote the public good.66 The third motion, put 
forward by CDU/CSU member Horst Seehofer, former Green Minister Andrea Fischer and by 
the chairperson of the Law and Ethics of Modern Medicine Inquiry Commission and SPD 
member Margot von Renesse, also allowed the use of only imported hESC.67 However, unlike 
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the former, it included a substantial number of restrictions. This motion acknowledged that, 
on the one hand, hESC were not embryos and therefore their use was not in violation of the 
EPA and of the principle of human dignity. Therefore, the constitutional principle of freedom 
of research did not affect any constitutionally protected rights and principles. On the other 
hand, hESC research was ethically and constitutionally problematic because the derivation of 
hESC involved the destruction of embryos and therefore led to their instrumentalisation and 
destruction. Specifically, by approving the import of hESC, the law would violate the Basic 
Law if it would create a demand for new hESC and hence would lead to the destruction of 
embryos. To tackle this issue, its promoters suggested to allow the import of hESC created 
before the discussions of the motions in Parliament. To be fully consistent with the ethics 
enshrined in the EPA, they further limited hESC research to those that were derived from 
embryos created to induce pregnancy and not for research.  
The debate around the three motions was highly emotional and lasted five hours.68 
Due to the ethical nature of the issue, the politicians were allowed to vote according to their 
conscience and not to their party ideology. The views split around the issue whether hESC 
would violate human dignity. The politicians opposing hESC research emphasised that hESC 
research would turn embryos into objects of research and thus violate their human dignity. 
They made no distinction between supernumerary and regular embryos, nor between German 
and imported embryos. Similarly, they feared that allowing hESC research would lead to a 
Dammbruch, in the future allowing cloning, more exceptions for the import of hESC or 
production of embryos for research.69 In contrast, the politicians favouring hESC research 
stressed that by setting the cut-off date, the law would ensure that embryos ‘will not die for 
German research’.70 As hESC themselves were not embryos, they were not protected by the 
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Basic Law and therefore research on them would not violate human dignity.71 They also put 
forward the promises of hESC research and downplayed the fear of a Dammbruch, pointing 
out the strict conditions for researchers to perform hESC research. At the end of the day, the 
third motion got the majority vote in Parliament, with 340 votes in favour and 265 against.72  
Thus, as a general rule, the SCA outlawed hESC research, because such research 
would violate the principle of human dignity. Yet, it allowed importing hESC lines if they 
were created from supernumerary embryos before the cut-off date, which was set at the 1st of 
January 2002. This cut-off date was chosen to make sure that Germany would not stimulate 
the destruction of embryos anywhere in the world for German research purposes. Further, the 
SCA stipulated that to import hESC, scientists should first prove that the research could only 
be performed with hESC and not, for example, with animal stem cells. Lastly, the law 
contained a provision that obliged German researchers to submit proposals for hESC research 
to the Central Ethics Commission on Stem Cells for approval, before being allowed to 
actually import stem cells. This mechanism was intended to act as an additional safeguard 
against excesses or misuses. 
Thus, the constitutional principle of human dignity significantly affected the outcome 
of the debate around hESC in Germany. Because it revolved around a principle that was 
widely shared, that embryos could not be used as objects and be destroyed for German 
research, the German Parliament managed to overcome the differences in views and quickly 
pass a law. Tellingly, none of the motions discussed in Parliament called for allowing the 
derivation of hESC from German embryos. Despite the attempts of German scientists, 
represented by the DFG, to liberalise the policy on embryo research in Germany and oppose 
the German Sondermoral to the value of scientific research, the general consensus about the 
importance of protecting the constitutional principle of human dignity was deeply entrenched 
in German society. The absence of a deep cleavage like in Italy ensured a speedy passage of 
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the SCA. By allowing the use of stem cell lines only from supernumerary embryos initially 
created for pregnancy and by setting the cut-off date, the German Parliament thus created an 
image of a responsible regulator, loyal to the fundamental ethical principles of German 
society.  
Despite its consensual success, the SCA can be criticised for many reasons. It can be 
seen as hypocritical, protecting German supernumerary embryos from being used as material 
for stem cells while allowing to use foreign embryos for this purpose. Interestingly, in 2008, 
six years after passing the SCA, Parliament amended it by choosing a new cut-off date for the 
use of embryos, that is, May 2007, which might again suggest hypocrisy of the German 
regulators. Furthermore, it can also be criticised for creating regulatory incoherence through 
combining in the same regulatory order two contradictory value systems.73 One of them 
builds upon the restrictive ‘dignity as constraint’ value, whereas the other has a more 
utilitarian nature, allowing German scientists to reap the benefits from research on embryos 
that in any case will be turned into hESC lines in countries with more liberal policies. Finally, 
a potential criticism is that by gradually increasing the number of such ‘exceptions’, the 
German regulator may in the long run betray the very idea of human dignity.74 However, 
exactly this alleged ‘hypocrisy’ or ‘incoherence’ enabled the German regulator to pass the 
SCA and regulate hESC research on its territory. Unlike Italy, which came to a de facto 
liberal outcome on the regulation of hESC research as a result of a failure to compromise, 
Germany allowed the import of stem cells after a deliberate negotiation process and as a result 
of a willingness to account for different ethical views of its citizenry.  
6.3.3 The debate on PGD in Germany 
It was generally considered that the EPA, though not explicitly naming PGD, did not allow its 
use because the selection of embryos would violate the constitutional principle of human 
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dignity upon which the EPA was built. However, since as early as the mid-1990s, German 
society had been deliberating the possibility to legitimise PGD. The main strategy for this was 
to attempt to re-problematise it. Specifically, according to the German Society of Human 
Genetics (GfH), the prohibition of PGD was not consistent with parents’ interests as it would 
force pregnant women to perform abortions.75 A similar conclusion was reached by the ethics 
committee of a clinic in Lübeck, which was approached by two clinicians for advice on the 
issue of PGD. According to this committee, the EPA prohibited PGD. However, it wondered 
if such a prohibition would be ethical if it would force women to perform harmful abortions 
and thus create negative impacts upon their health.76 Finally, in 2000 the German Medical 
Association (Bundesärztekammer, hereafter BÄK) published a discussion paper on PGD.77 
The BÄK framed the problem of PGD as a conflict between the embryo’s right to life and the 
rights of parents, and concluded that because PGD was needed to protect the health of the 
future mother, it would not amount to eugenic practice and hence should be allowed.  
In 2010, a crucial event happened affecting the legality of PGD in Germany. The 
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, hereafter the BGH) had to decide upon a case of 
a German gynaecologist who performed PGD to prevent the passing of genetic disorders if 
these would lead to miscarriage, stillbirth or early death of the child. The gynaecologist 
performed three PGD operations and later turned himself in to the authorities. The BGH, 
however, acquitted him.78 First, the BGH concluded that all the doctor’s actions did not 
involve the misuse of embryos, strictly forbidden by the EPA. Instead, he performed PGD to 
make pregnancies possible, the only purpose that allowed the use of embryos according to the 
EPA. Second, it took into account that the EPA permitted sperm selection to avoid the 
creation of sick embryos. Drawing upon this analogy, it equated embryos with sperm cells 
and concluded that if sperm selection was allowed, then embryo selection should be allowed 
                                                
75 Herrmann (n 56).  
76 Ibid. 
77  Bundesärztekammer, Diskussionsentwurf zu einer Richtlinie zur 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik, in Sigrid Graumann (ed), Die Genkontroverse. Grundpositionen 
(Herder Spektrum 2001) 157. 
78 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), Urteil vom 6. Juli 2010 – 5 StR 386/09. 
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as well to prevent the passing of genetic disorders. Third, the German regulation on abortion 
permitted a termination if the foetus carried certain kinds of pathologies. Therefore, for the 
Court it was unreasonable to forbid PGD, given that abortion was significantly more intrusive 
and damaging than PGD. As a result, the Court decided that PGD was not a criminal offence 
under the EPA. 
The ruling created legal uncertainty with respect to the legality of performing PGD in 
Germany and Parliament was quick to remove it. During the Parliamentary debate around 
PGD, three types of bills were presented. The first proposal, put forward by Green Party 
politician Katrin Göring-Eckardt, entirely prohibited PGD. 79  Its proponents argued that 
according to the values of the Basic Law, every human being has the same dignity and the 
State cannot make decisions on which life is worthy of living and which is not, as it can lead 
to eugenic practices. This value system would be jeopardised if PGD were allowed. The 
second bill was put forward by SPD politician Peter René Röspel. It allowed PGD only to 
check the presence of serious genetic hereditary diseases in the embryo if these would lead to 
stillbirth, miscarriage or death of the baby in the first year of life and thus was similar to the 
BGH ruling.80 The third proposal, proposed by FDP politician Ulrike Flach, was substantially 
more liberal. It allowed PGD to perform screening both to check the presence of genetic 
abnormalities if they would lead to miscarriage, stillbirth or the death of the baby in the first 
year and when the parents have a severe hereditary disease with a risk of at least 25% of 
passing it on to their offspring.81  
                                                
79  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zum Verbot der 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik, 11 April 2011, Drucksache 17/5450, 
<http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/054/1705450.pdf> accessed 9 December 2016. 
80  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur begrenzten Zulassung der 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik (Präimplantationsdiagnostikgesetz – PräimpG), 12 April 2011, 
Drucksache 17/5452, <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/054/1705452.pdf> accessed 9 
december 2016. 
81  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Regelung der 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik (Präimplantationsdiagnostikgesetz – PräimpG), 12 April 2011,
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In 2011, only one year after the BGH ruling, Parliament voted for the third proposal, 
thus allowing PGD in both cases, that is, to check for genetic abnormalities in the baby if they 
would lead to miscarriage, stillbirth or death of the baby in the first year and when the parents 
have a severe hereditary disease. The amendment was incorporated into the EPA. According 
to the new art. 3a of the EPA, PGD remained a crime. However, it was not unlawful to 
perform PGD to prevent passing a serious hereditary disease to the embryo, including if such 
a disease would lead to stillbirth or miscarriage. The amendment also instructed that the 
woman had to undergo counselling beforehand and stipulated the institution of ethics 
committees that had to provide oversight over PGD.  
During the parliamentary debates in the Bundestag, the politicians opposing PGD 
argued that the selection of embryos for implantation violated human dignity as it constituted 
eugenic practice.82 Echoing the fear of Nazi eugenics, they stressed that the State should not 
decide which life would be worth living (lebenswert) and which life would not be 
(lebensunwert). In contrast, the politicians favouring PGD argued that allowing PGD would 
give German families a chance to avoid the psychological and social burden of raising 
children with severe genetic pathologies. They engaged in telling personal stories about 
people they knew whose lives were affected by similar experiences—for example, 
experiences from burying a baby of a few days old to the woman who lost six brothers due to 
the same genetic disease.83 More importantly they stressed that is was not a question of a life 
worth living or not, but having the possibility for parents to have a baby capable of living 
(lebensfähig).  
Interestingly, in their speeches, they made no reference to human dignity but chose a 
different technique. They stressed the obligation of the State to protect not (only) unborn life, 
but (also) adult German (female) citizens from heavy physical or mental burdens that might 
                                                                                                                                                   
Drucksache 17/5451, <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/054/1705451.pdf> accessed 9 
December 2016. 
82  Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 105. Sitzung, 14 April 2011, 
Plenarprotokoll 17/105 11947, 11954, 11956, 11967, 
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83 Ibid 11946, 11955, 11972. 
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result from performing an abortion or raising a child with a severe genetic disease, allowing 
them to have a baby capable of living. Put differently, the main strategy of the German 
regulators in legitimising PGD was its re-problematisation. Instead of discussing how exactly 
PGD should be accommodated in order to be consistent with the German constitutional order 
and the principle of human dignity, the supporters of PGD ignored the discussion of the 
principle of human dignity altogether. Rather, they emphasised how the prohibition would 
affect German couples who would be forced to raise children with severe genetic pathologies 
or women who would be forced to perform an abortion. In other words, they emphasized that 
the German state was obliged to care not only about the dignity of embryos but also about the 
dignity of adult women. Hence, dignity as empowerment was brought to the fore in the debate 
on PGD, implying the need for a more liberal regulation of new biomedical practices.  
And yet, the constitutional ideal of human dignity as constraint was not entirely 
absent. The amendment introduced in the EPA is reminiscent of how the German 
Constitutional Court allowed abortion.84 As a general rule, abortion was considered a crime as 
performing it would violate human dignity. However, the State was obliged to take into 
account and protect not only the right to life of unborn foetuses, but also the life and health of 
women. Unlike human dignity, according to the German Basic Law, the embryo’s right to life 
was not absolute, as according to the Basic Law it could be limited by law. Therefore, the 
Constitutional Court, while maintaining the definition of abortion as a crime, made it 
unpunishable if the woman would undergo counselling, and if her health condition would be 
affected by the embryo’s pathologies. Thus, the Court made abortion possible, yet without 
abandoning the State’s commitment to protecting human dignity.  
In a rather similar way, the German Parliament allowed PGD. As a general rule, it 
recognised PGD as a crime. PGD was still regarded as a practice incompatible with the 
German Sondermoral and the principle of human dignity. However, by redefining the scope 
of subjects whose dignity the State must protect, the proponents of PGD managed to carve out 
a space for PGD in the German constitutional arrangements, to protect the interests of adult 
citizens alongside the interests of unborn life.  
                                                
84 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfGE), Urteil vom 28. Mai 1993, BVerfGE 88, 203. 
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6.3.4 Conclusion  
ART and embryo research, including hESC research, are problematised in Germany as a 
potential violation of the constitutional principle of human dignity, enshrined in art. 1 of the 
German Basic Law. Whereas the Basic Law itself says nothing concerning the legitimacy of 
embryo manipulation and whether it violates human dignity, due to historical reasons, and 
mainly to the Nazi past of Germany, embryo research and experimentation were 
problematized as an assault on human dignity. Similarly, due to the memory of Nazi 
experiments, human dignity was conceptualised as the principle of non-instrumentalisation of 
human life. This implied that unborn life enjoyed strong protection in Germany. However, it 
was not absolute and did not entail an unrestricted right to life. This conceptualisation 
affected the way in which the EPA defined human life that the State was obliged to protect, 
that is, as human life from the moment of the fusion of the egg and the sperm and having the 
‘capacity to develop’.  
The memory of the Nazi past was also the reason why there was a general consensus 
in German society about the need to prohibit embryo experimentation out of respect for 
human dignity. This general consensus underlay a speedy and rather unproblematic adoption 
of the EPA and a broad endorsement of its restrictive nature. Importantly, there was an 
agreement with respect to another value that also played an important role in the speedy 
passage of the Law and in its support. Of the utmost importance was the consent of women, 
needed to prevent forced medical treatments. Hence, the EPA already contained the two 
bioethical principles, dignity as constraint, underwriting the general prohibition of embryo 
experimentation, and dignity as empowerment, prohibiting forced IVF treatment and allowing 
women to withdraw their consent any time during the treatment. These two bioethical 
perspectives enjoyed wide societal support making the EPA almost entirely criticism-proof.  
With the advent of new technologies, the extent to which the principle of human 
dignity encompassed embryo protection started to be questioned. The proponents of hESC 
research emphasized that the import of hESC from abroad would not violate human dignity if 
strong norms against such violation were embedded in the law and stressed another 
constitutional principle, the freedom of research. Similarly, the proponents of PGD 
emphasized the need to prevent negative impacts of raising children with severe genetic 
 200 
pathologies on women’s lives, thereby invoking the dignity as empowerment principle. 
Importantly, the proponents of both technological advancements did not argue against the 
need to protect embryos from scientific experimentation as such. At stake was the degree to 
which the competing interests and values could and should be taken into account.  
The eventually adopted SCA and the amendments to the EPA on PGD illustrate that a 
well-debated compromise was struck between the competing bioethical perspectives. Hence, 
the German regulator, while staying truthful to its constitutional values and historical 
memory, nevertheless approached and solved the problem of ‘regulatory connection’85 and 
therefore stayed in touch with new techno-scientific realities, keeping them under its vigilant 
watch. In addition, by embracing different views on the ethical legitimacy of new 
technologies, it took into account different normative positions of its constituency.  
6.4. Discussion and conclusion 
The comparison between Italy and Germany provides a good illustration when the appeal to 
human dignity in public debates on new technologies involving the use of embryos becomes 
problematic. First, the appeal to human dignity raises significant controversy when 
dignitarianism does not constitute the main bioethical perspective in the country at stake. 
Specifically, the comparison of the policies of Italy and Germany showed differences in terms 
of their efficiency and durability exactly because of a different degree of support that this 
principle enjoyed in the two countries. Seeking not to repeat the horrors of Nazi-Germany, 
German society broadly accepted that the regulation of new biomedical technologies must be 
in conformity with the principle of human dignity, conceptualised as the principle of non-
instrumentalisation of human life. This enabled the speedy enactment of laws regulating ART 
and hESC research, which were seldom contested after their enactment. In contrast, in Italy, 
due to the secular/religious cleavage, only the religious part of Italian society fully supported 
human dignity of embryos, conceptualised as sanctity of life. Moreover, the attempts of 
Italian politicians to embed this principle into law were rejected as inappropriate in a country 
where the Church is separated from the State. As a result, it led to a regulatory stalemate and 
underregulation of ART, both in the long period before the adoption of the Law on MAR and 
                                                
85 Brownsword (n 73). 
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after the invalidation of the most restrictive provisions of the Law by the Constitutional Court. 
A similar underregulation also characterised the legal situation with hESC.  
Second, the appeal to human dignity raises problems when the supporters of this 
principle may not be willing to compromise with their opponents. As has been demonstrated, 
the supporters of sanctity of life in Italy refused to seek out compromises with the supporters 
of more liberal views on ART and hESC research. In a country where this principle is not 
widely shared, the absolutism further exacerbated the controversy. In Germany, in contrast, 
the parties were open to compromises. Human dignity remained the main principle governing 
the development of policies. However, those who appealed to other principles such as 
freedom of research and dignity as empowerment also managed to have their position 
accommodated by law. Thus, ‘human dignity as constraint’ was combined with ‘human 
dignity as empowerment’ in the German policy on PGD. Although the outcome achieved by 
the German regulator may be criticised as incoherent, it had the advantage that it led to the 
closure of the controversy and the establishment of a tight and reliable mechanism of 
oversight on new technologies. In addition, through combining different perspectives, the 
German regulator undertook an attempt to stay in touch with techno-scientific realities and 
hence address the problem of ‘regulatory connection’.86 More importantly, such an outcome 
provided sufficient certainty for all the involved actors about their entitlements, duties and 
responsibilities.  
While the focus of this paper is on human dignity, we suggest that its conclusions can 
be also indicative of general patterns of the relationships between particular bioethical 
configurations and countries’ policy on new biomedical practices. In what follows, we will 
draw three broad patterns of how exactly bioethical configurations may shape regulatory 
policy. Clearly, in teasing out these patterns, we acknowledge that they do not work as 
uniform and regid templates for how bioethical sensisbilities of the relevant country shape its 
policy and therefore must be applied with an utmost caution in further analysis. However, by 
drawing them we believe that they can make further research on this topic more analytically 
tractable and therefore act as useful methodological resources for other scholars exploring the 
connection between countries’ bioethical landscapes and their regulatory policy. 
                                                
86 Ibid. 
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The first pattern is the correspondence of the regulatory environment of a country with 
the country’s dominant bioethical perspective. Put differently, if a specific bioethical 
perspective clearly dominates the bioethical landscape, the regulatory policy will reflect this 
perspective. Great Britain, where the utilitarian perspective is dominant, can exemplify this 
pattern. The second pattern is that in those countries where (a) several bioethical perspectives 
co-exist and (b) the supporters of competing perspectives are willing to make coalitions or 
strike compromises, the regulatory environment will reflect the terms of the compromise or 
coalition. We suggest that Germany might instantiate this principle. Although the ‘dignity as 
constraint’ principle remained the main regulatory principle, regulatory policy nevertheless 
accommodated ‘the dignity as empowerment’ perspective. Third, in countries where (a) 
several bioethical perspectives compete for regulatory relevance and (b) their proponents are 
not willing to form coalitions or strike compromises, the regulatory outcome will be 
unpredictable and uncertain. We suggest that Italy followed this pattern; the reluctance of 
Catholic politicians to strike compromises with respect to the regulation of ART and hESC 
research led to significant periods of underregulation and legal uncertainty.  
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In this concluding section, I will answer the two research questions that I posed in the 
Introduction to this work. Section 7.1, drawing on Chapters 3-5, will describe how rights 
figured in the debate around PGD in Italy and how this process has been connected with the 
regulation of PGD. Further, building on this analysis and also drawing on Chapter 6, Section 
7.2 will address the issue to what extent rights are a ‘right’ instrument for regulating new 
biomedical technologies such as PGD.  
7.1. Problematization and bioconstitutionalism as a ‘technology of power’ over life 
In countries around the world, the possibility of creating embryos in vitro, that is, outside 
their mothers’ bodies, and the associated possibility to test and select embryos before 
implantation have raised many issues. On the one hand, they provided important possibilities 
for individuals to overcome fertility issues. In addition, to individuals with genetic 
pathologies, PGD allowed to start pregnancy with already healthy embryos and to avoid 
undergoing risky procedures of prenatal testing and abortion. On the other hand, they 
provoked many fears about the use of embryos, science ‘racing ahead’, and resurrected the 
specter of eugenics and ‘designer babies’. Furthermore, unlike IVF, PGD as such is not 
performed to overcome health issues of citizens themselves but to screen out and eliminate 
affected embryos. As Franklin and Roberts (2006) argued, whereas IVF might be seen as 
more natural because it is a ‘helping hand’ to what nature would do otherwise, in case of 
PGD, its purpose is exactly to prevent nature to take its course. These aspects of IVF and 
PGD have raised questions on how they should be governed.  
7.1.1. Problematization: embryos’ life, adult citizens’ health and reproductive autonomy as 
objects of political concern 
To decide on how to govern ART and PGD, Italian society had to answer several questions 
that were at the same time legal, political, medical, ethical, and social. What is the 
constitutional obligation of the Italian State to respond to technological developments in 
medical care? Whose rights and constitutional entitlements do IVF and PGD allow to fulfill 
and protect? What kind of negative legal and social consequences do IVF and PGD entail? 
And how should the existing constitutional arrangements be transformed in order to respond 
to the challenges created and opportunities provided by these new ART? These questions 
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were answered differently by different sections of Italian society depending on what physical 
aspects of life were problematized in light of the new extracorporeal fertilization techniques 
(Rose and Valverde 1998; Lemke 2011, 2011b). As I showed throughout the thesis, after IVF 
entered the Italian fertility clinics, the biological existence of two types of beings became a 
matter of legal and political concern. On the one hand, it was adult citizens’ health and the 
health of their future children, which IVF and PGD could help improve and optimize, if 
performed under strict state control. On the other hand, it was embryos’ biological existence, 
which IVF and PGD, in contrast, undermined. These two problems were expressed and 
promoted by two different groups of people, both of which included patients, politicians, 
scientists, doctors, and non-governmental institutions. Thus, from the very beginning, the 
biological life of two groups of human beings became an object of politics for which the 
respective sections of the Italian society sought to propose their own solutions. Crucially, 
from the very beginning, both the problems and the solutions to them had been couched in 
terms of the need to protect constitutional rights.  
7.1.2. Governing through rights in Parliament: embryos’ rights and the redrawing of 
medicine’s boundaries 
In Chapter 3, I explored the debate revolving around embryos’ classification as entities having 
mere biological existence of zoē or as human persons, hence capable of political and moral 
existence, as bios. I illustrated how the Italian Parliament, prompted by the Catholic Church 
and its life ethics on embryos, which sees embryos as human persons that are endowed with 
human dignity and natural (human) rights, included embryos into the community of ‘citizen 
subjects’ and accorded legal personhood and rights to them. In addition, I showed how the 
role of women’s rights in the Italian constitutional order was negotiated. I showed how 
women were eventually subjectified as citizens having only duties regarding their embryos 
and how their bodies were subjected to disciplinary power. In Chapter 4, I also showed how 
Parliament deliberated and ultimately enacted ‘the three embryo’ standard and therewith 
redrew the boundary of medical expertise. 
I suggest that the attribution of rights to the embryo as well as the enactment of 
restrictive regulations on ART was the first important bioconstitutional transformation in the 
Italian controversy on PGD. It was performed through the use of sovereign power and a 
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particular type of subjectification of two groups of Italian citizens. First, IVF embryos were 
classified as citizen subjects having, not only the capacity for biological existence zoē, but 
also moral and political existence bios. Second, Italian female citizens were subject to 
disciplinary power performed by the state which regulated their bodies and reproductive 
behavior.  
7.1.3. Governing through rights in fertility clinics: knowledge, the constitution of ‘biological 
citizens’, and ‘vital rights’ 
While the Italian parliament was discussing what problem PGD and other ART raise and how 
to address this problem, both techniques were widely practiced in Italian fertility clinics. 
According to the medical code of the National Federation for the Orders of Doctors and 
Dentists (FNOMCeO), the main code of medical practice of Italian doctors, the only 
procedures that it outlawed were surrogacy and commercialization of gametes. In addition, 
Italian fertility clinics were performing IVF and PGD using the same clinical guidance for 
IVF as in other countries, albeit often violating them in the absence of any regulatory 
oversight (Valentini 2004). Thus, they created embryos in surplus, froze them, practiced 
multiple embryo transfer to increase the chances of pregnancy, tested and selected embryos 
during PGD.  
I suggest that this medical practice performed in Italian fertility clinics was the second 
key bioconstitutional transformations taking place in Italy as a result of the emergence of 
extracorporeal fertilization. Due to the lack of any regulatory oversight, reproductive and 
genetic medicine in fact was the only form of government (Foucault 1980) regulating 
practices performed in Italian fertility clinics. This practice consisted of both normative and 
epistemic elements: adult citizens’ procreative and health rights were prioritized over embryo 
protection and a particular knowledge about how to ensure these rights was produced and 
employed. It also employed a particular technology of power over patients, ‘technologies of 
the self’, thereby acting upon the biological existence of individuals in a ‘liberal’ way, that is, 
not by disciplining their bodies, controlling and oppressing them, but via ‘conducting their 
conduct’. Hence, a particular technology of power, knowledge and norms (i.e. rights) were 
co-produced, addressing a particular problem: the health of patients and of their children.  
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The main outcome of this co-production was the constitution of patients’ identities 
and subjectivities (Foucault 1980; Rose 2006), including their entitlements. I suggest that this 
subjectification was an important bioconstitutional process that would later translate the 
assumed entitlements into positive rights during litigation. The rights that were claimed in 
courts during the final, litigation, stage of the PGD debate, did not come out of nowhere. 
Instead, they had been embedded in the practices evolving in Italy for decades until they 
suddenly became illegal in 2004. Yet, of course it was not clear what kind of entitlement the 
‘vital rights’ (Rose 2006) actually constituted. Only with the involvement of the 
Constitutional Court was the entitlement framed as a right to health and not as a right to 
reproductive self-determination. The consequences of this framing I will explore in 
Subsection 7.2.  
7.1.4. Governing through rights in courtrooms: adult citizens’ rights, litigation and ‘biological 
citizens’ in courtrooms 
The transformation performed by Law 40/2004 dissatisfied many Italian citizens. The Law, 
clearly, erased all those entitlements that citizens thought they had and that they had forged 
throughout the period of unregulated ART. The identities they had as a result of governmental 
power of medicine as responsible citizens, understanding themselves partially as carriers of 
genetic diseases and acting on themselves to prevent passing these to their children, 
henceforth had to be transformed to conform to new political, legal and medical realities. As a 
result, they sought to claim back their rights to the now forbidden technologies. Some citizens 
went abroad, triggering a massive wave of reproductive tourism. Others sought to claim their 
rights through legal means and engaged in a long and not always successful process of 
litigation, claiming a violation of their right to health and of a right to reproductive self-
determination. Hence, acting as active ‘biological citizens’, they engaged into another 
bioconstitutional process of asserting their entitlements, either via courts or moving abroad to 
perform treatments forbidden domestically. The first step in this process was the 
reestablishment of the boundaries of medicine and the acknowledgment of the constitutional 
legitimacy to produce more than three embryos (Chapter 4). The second step was the debate 
on which right (the mother’s right to health or the right to self-determination) justifies the 
access to PGD (Chapter 5).  
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I suggest that the judge-made law resulting from the citizens’ litigation was the third 
key bioconstitutional transformation triggered by the emergence of an in vitro produced 
embryo. It was a compromise and an attempt to bridge the two bioconstitutional 
transformations mentioned above: the subjectification performed in Italian fertility clinics and 
the institutionalization of embryos as citizen subjects. It was performed and achieved through 
legal rights claimed in courts, which performed a tactical and instrumental role (Foucault 
1980; Golder 2015).  
7.1.5. Bioconstitutionalism as a technology of power: mechanism of governing  
As I illustrated in the Section above, depending on whose physical aspects of being the 
relevant section of the Italian society saw as threatened or protected by the new ART, the 
respective right was prioritized and the respective bioconstitutional approach to governing 
IVF and PGD was chosen. In this sense, the type of bioconstitutionalism – performed through 
the enactment of embryos’ natural rights, prohibitions, and disciplinary power (Parliament), 
or through codes of medical practice and ‘vital rights’ (fertility clinics), or, finally, through 
the (partial) satisfaction of legal rights claimed by citizens from below (courts) – was 
connected with the view on whose physical being mattered more for the relevant Italian 
authorities (Rose and Valverde 1998; Lemke 2011a, 2011b). Here, I would like to come back 
to the definition of bioconstitutionalism and to refine it.  
7.1.5.1. Rights as a technology of power: connecting four poles of human existence within the 
state 
Drawing from the analysis in this work, it is possible to see the mechanisms through which 
the use of rights, seen as a technology of power, govern. I suggest that rights represent that 
technology of power that bind and shape the four poles of human existence within the state. 
These four poles include an individual subject and the state, on the one hand, and physical 
and moral-political existence of human beings, on the other. The first connection Foucault 
elaborated in his theorizations on governmentality, whereas the second one represents a 
particular importance for his discussions on biopolitics.  
Regarding the need to account for both biological and moral-political existence, 
Foucault stated (2008, 22) that 
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with the emergence of political economy, with the introduction of the restrictive 
principle in governmental practice itself, an important substitution, or doubling rather, 
is carried out, since the subjects of right on which political sovereignty is exercised 
appear as a population that a government must manage. 
Therefore, rights (such as the right to life, the right to health as well as, as in the present case, 
the right to reproductive autonomy) represent that form of governing biological existence of 
individuals that also allows to take into account their political and moral existence as ‘free’ 
but also relational beings. The granting of legal rights ‘from above’, for example, when 
Parliament grants rights to new technoscientific entities (Chapter 3), or rights-claiming ‘from 
below’, including the satisfaction of rights claims by the judiciary (Chapter 5), is a way of 
biopolitically governing population in such a way that it simultaneously recognizes them as 
full-fledged members of the relevant political community, having connections with other 
members, and acknowledges the biological aspects of their existence.  
For example, in Chapters 5 and 6 I showed how the plaintiffs submitted evidence (e.g. 
psychiatrist records) demonstrating the negative impact on their health by the restrictive 
provisions of Law 40/2004. The submission of these documents shows that individuals also 
displayed the biological aspects of their existence that were affected by the disputed 
provisions of the Law. At the same time, they were legal subjects possessing the ‘right to 
health’ which they could claim vis-à-vis their government. Further, in this Chapter 5 I also 
argued that individuals acted not only as free but also as relational beings. Finally, an embryo 
was ultimately recognized as a human being possessing both biological and moral-political 
existence (Chapter 3).   
Further, in order to have significance, the realization of rights must be secured by the 
state, either through positive (adoption of the necessary measures to ensure the realization of 
rights) or negative means (non-interference). Therefore, rights also connect individuals with 
the state, thus presupposing a particular type of statehood within which these rights exist. For 
example, the decision that embryos’ rights should be ensured and, as a result, biomedical 
developments that violate these rights be prohibited, turns the state into a more conservative 
and absolutist one than the state that decides not to establish moral truths through law. 
Similarly, it also shapes the boundaries of the state with other social institutions such as 
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medicine. As I showed in Chapter 4, the decision on whose right should take priority 
simultaneously shaped the locus of the boundary between the state and the medical expertise.  
7.1.5.2. The ontologies of rights: types of inalienable rights 
In Italy, the governance of life through rights included another important element: the appeal 
to legal rights as based upon some inalienable entitlements of individuals that they have due 
to the simple fact of being human, that do not depend on being enacted in positive law, but 
that could be better ensured if such enactment would have been performed. This position has 
been developed in classical political philosophy, grounds liberal rights theory (Dworkin 1977; 
Minow 1990), underlies international human rights law and characterizes rights discourse in 
the majority of countries, including the debate on PGD in Italy. Specifically, the Italian 
Parliament appealed to embryos’ natural rights and to art. 2 of the Italian Constitution as 
enacting these natural rights in order to further translate these inalienable rights into positive 
law (i.e. Law 40/2004). The plaintiffs appealed to the Constitution, as enacting their 
inalienable rights, to change Law 40/2004 after it was passed. In other words, it was the 
appeal to some ‘outside’ rights (Kennedy 2002), enacted in the Constitution, that, according 
to the participants of the controversy, entitled them to change existing positive law, either by 
passing a new legislative act (Law 40/2004) or by repealing it (through a judicial decision). 
However, in the controversy around IVF and PGD in Italy, several and rather different types 
of these inalienable rights emerged.  
a) ‘Vital rights’ of biological citizens and natural rights of embryos 
The first type of right was the biological citizens’ ‘vital rights’ which emerged as a result of 
practicing IVF and PGD in mostly private fertility clinics and which were largely co-
extensive with governmental power of medicine. In Italy, these ‘vital rights’ concerned the 
interest of parents in having a child unaffected by a particular genetic disease. These rights, 
although with some modification (Chapter 5), were recognized by the Constitutional Court 
and thus translated into positive law (judicial decision). The second type of right was the 
natural rights of embryos which were translated into positive law ‘from outside’ in order to 
protect human dignity and life of embryos by Parliament (legislative act) (Chapter 3). They, 
in fact, were not subjected to disciplinary or governmental power.  
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Comparing these two types of rights, we can see that despite their inherent similarity, 
in that both existed as part of being human, they were very different with respect to the degree 
of transformation through biomedicine that they implied. The ‘vital rights’ implied change 
and transformation of human vitality and human biological characteristics, made practically 
unlimited by new genetic technologies. In contrast, the rights of embryos invoked to shield 
life and health of embryos from outside influence resisted the transformative power of 
biomedicine. Therefore, while similar in some respects, they were also very different, 
particularly with respect to the degree of transformation of biological aspects of human life 
and health that they implied and with respect to the associated degree of acceptability of new 
biomedical technologies that made these changes possible. This difference played a key role 
in the governance of new biomedical technologies which I will come back in Section 7.2.1.  
Returning to the first conclusion about the different mechanisms through which rights 
work, we can see that each right – the ‘vital rights’ as they were defined by the plaintiffs or by 
the Constitutional Court and embryos’ natural rights translated into positive law by 
Parliament – presupposed a particular understanding of the state about its own responsibilities 
towards life in its care, the locus of the boundary with the medical institution, particular 
relationships between state and citizens and the relationships (as well as rights and duties) 
between citizens themselves (e.g. between the mother and the embryo).  
b) Individual and relational rights 
As I showed in this work, after Law 40/2004 was passed and limited the exercise of citizens’ 
‘vital rights’, citizens appealed to the Constitution as a legal act enacting these inalienable 
entitlements (Chapter 5). According to the plaintiffs, these ‘outside’ rights were recognized by 
the Constitution but were not recognized by Law 40/2004. However, what exact ‘outside’ 
entitlement the Constitution protected in this context – the right to self-determination or the 
right to health – turned out to be unclear. Plaintiffs appealed to both rights, seeking to get 
access to PGD to also protect their relational values. However, the Constitutional Court, 
building upon its doctrine, ultimately recognized that the entitlement at issue was the 
constitutional right to health. As a result, the ‘vital rights’, recognized by the Court, were 
different from those ‘vital rights’ that citizens thought they had and which might have been 
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part of their ‘regime of the self’. As I stated in Chapter 5, the outcome of the litigation was the 
‘vital rights’ that were accepted but transformed. 
This points to another difference between rights. The ‘vital rights’ exercised by the 
citizens and appealed to by them during litigation were relational rights because they favored 
the fulfillment of relational values and responsibilities. Instead, the Constitutional Court 
defined them as a type of individual rights. That rights are individual is another theoretical 
contribution of the liberal rights theory and classical political philosophy. The rights-bearing 
subject is primarily an individual subject, whose capacity ‘to will, to act, to choose’ (Langlois 
2010, 254) is its most important one. Despite the attempts of feminist and communitarian 
scholars to reconceptualize rights, rights primarily figure as claims to have a space where this 
individual may exercise this capacity ‘to will, to act, to choose’. In Italy, despite that Italian 
plaintiffs sought to define their entitlement as a more relational right, emphasizing their 
relational values that could be pursued through such a relational right, the Constitutional 
Court defined it as a traditional individual right. This points to the fact that the same 
inalienable right was conceptualized differently in different institutional settings and by 
different parties invoking it, thereby leading to different conclusions which constitutional 
right was exactly at stake. I will come back to discussing this issue in Section 7.2.2. 
7.2. Rights as a ‘right’ instrument for the regulation of PGD 
By answering the question to what extent rights can ensure a ‘right’ regulation of new 
technologies, I will add to an already existing literature discussing the challenges that rights 
face in regulating new technologies (seminally, Brownsword 2008). I acknowledge that 
building my conclusions on one country case-study is tricky, as these problems might not 
emerge in other countries. Indeed, as I showed in Chapter 6, even such a slight difference as 
the exact conceptualization of human dignity, either as non-instrumentalization of human life 
or as sanctity of life, might significantly affect the degree of skepticism or conservatism 
towards adopting new technologies. Yet, in what follows, I will try to derive those 
conclusions that in my view might emerge in other contexts as well and which therefore 
scholars should be attentive to in their exploration of the role of rights in the regulation of 
new biomedical technologies.  
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7.2.1. The vital rights of biological citizens and embryos’ rights: conflicting rights and their 
effect on the policy on new biomedical technologies  
As I stated above and as I sought to show in this work, rights do act as external limits to 
governmental power. As I described in Chapter 4, positive rights of embryos, based on 
‘natural rights’ and human dignity, were limits to governmentality. Similarly, in Chapter 6, I 
showed that the Constitutional Court provided access to PGD on much more modest grounds 
than was claimed by some plaintiffs and in a more limited scope than probably existed in 
practice before Law 40/2004 was adopted in order to ensure the rights of embryos. This 
conclusion taps into recent discussions about the importance for law to exercise a proper 
symbolic and normative function and not merely reflect technoscientific developments. 
Similarly, in the age when the transformation of ‘life itself’ knows few limits, as Brownsword 
(2008) stated, human dignity may be an important moral reference point in assessing those 
biomedical transformations that affect the most fundamental existential assumptions that 
people have long taken for granted, such as what it means to be human. In addition, as I 
showed in Chapter 6, in countries such as Germany, human dignity may also play an 
important role as an element of national identity and enable a more critical reflection on new 
biomedical technologies.  
Yet, these positivized natural rights of embryos also co-exist with other more 
‘transformative’ rights, that is, those vital rights that imply transformation and change and 
that new biomedical and, particularly, genetic technologies make possible. Both types of 
rights have a close relation with new biomedical technologies; yet, while the embryos’ rights 
presume the need to limit them, the second one, in contrast, presume their further 
development.  
The co-existence of these two types of rights has several consequences. First, the 
presence of two different types of rights introduces an uncertainty into the debates on new 
technologies, as it is not clear which or whose rights the regulation of new technologies must 
seek to protect most. This uncertainty is similar to the twofold conceptualization of human 
dignity, as empowerment or as constraint. In the case of rights as a regulatory benchmark, we 
can redefine the problem as a competition between ‘rights as empowerment’ (such as the right 
to health) and ‘rights as constraint’ (such as the rights of embryos). In the first approach, 
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rights would be claimed by citizens wishing to have freer access to new technologies. In the 
second approach, entities such as embryos, protected as holders of rights, might call for 
constraints on scientific or medical experimentation. Indeed, as I showed in Chapter 3, the 
proponents of embryo protection very often appealed to human rights (and not to human 
dignity) as the main reason why the law on reproductive technologies should have a 
restrictive character.  
Second, and similarly to the problem of the twofold meaning of human dignity, the 
problem of regulatory range emerges. If we agree on, say, rights as empowerment as a 
regulatory approach, does this mean that embryos do not deserve any protection whatsoever? 
Should, for instance, surplus embryos be treated as biological waste? Should parents have the 
right to decide on what do with them, for example, to destroy, to donate for research, etc.? 
May the State nevertheless constrain citizens’ freedom on what to do with embryos, similarly 
to how it constrains citizens’ freedom if they wish to sell their body parts, in order to prevent 
their commodification? Finally, due to the competition of rights, the problem of balancing 
emerges. As I showed in this work, there are no undisputed, objective and self-evident criteria 
how the right to life of IVF embryos (regarded as full-fledged human persons by Parliament) 
must be balanced with the rights (to health or self-determination) of women. In the Italian 
litigation for access to PGD, even the right to health did not act as a trump, because it was far 
from self-evident whether this right should outweigh IVF embryos’ interests. 
This suggests that the appeal to rights does not lead to one – permissive – outcome 
with respect to regulating new biomedical technologies as Brownsword suggested. In fact, 
because two different types of rights exist, they rather lead to a further debate about rights and 
the acceptability of new biomedical technologies rather than close it. As this work has shown, 
the debate can be quite extended, producing no long-term solutions.  
7.2.2. Judicial review and framing: regulating new technologies through rights ‘from below’  
Another aspect that must be taken into account in exploring the problematic nature of the use 
of rights in regulating new technologies is that when constitutional rights are claimed, 
discussed or accorded in courtrooms, their definitions and their building blocks do not 
preexist judicial review but, are, in contrast, its outcome. Two examples discussed in this 
work should be mentioned here. First, in Chapter 5, I showed how suffering was defined 
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differently, either as a mere psychological experience or as ‘depressive and anxiety 
syndrome’, that is, illness, by the judiciary, depending on whether plaintiffs submitted the 
reports of their psychiatrists or not.  
The second example is the definition of ‘vital rights’ of citizens, that is, the 
entitlements they thought they had, in courtrooms. In Chapter 5, I showed that the plaintiffs 
sought to define their ‘vital rights’ both as a right to self-determination and as a right to 
health. However, the Constitutional Court acknowledged only that this entitlement involved 
the right to health. In other words, it was far from clear to the participants of the controversy 
which exact inviolable right the Italian Constitution protected and which right the plaintiffs 
could claim.  
The recognition by the Constitutional Court that the inviolable right at stake was the 
right to health had several important implications. Despite that it recognized that the right to 
health might be jeopardized by the prohibition of PGD and thereby captured some of the 
experiences of Italian women, by choosing the right to health the Constitutional Court failed 
to acknowledge many other interests of Italian women, such as relational values of care and 
responsibility for the health of the future baby, as deserving state recognition and thus as 
protected via constitutional rights. Despite the fact that the judgments repealed many of the 
Law’s provisions, only health of the woman and not her reproductive interests were 
recognized as being at risk. As such, it was not the health of the future children that justified 
the access to PGD, nor the women’s interest in securing it, but the health of the mother that 
could be harmed if PGD remained prohibited. Therefore, physical experiences were not 
straightforwardly defined as falling within the scope of constitutional rights protection and 
thus having relevance for the moral and legal existence of citizens or not. As seen above, 
several factors may affect this process. The first is how individuals themselves define it, for 
example, by submitting the medical records to the judiciary or failing to do so. Second, the 
judiciary may feel constrained by its own jurisprudence to qualify the claimed entitlements as 
particular constitutional rights.  
This process of defining which right the issue of access to PGD in fact concerned, 
reminds one of the idea of framing. Framing is largely used in post-positivist policy analysis 
and has roots in the sociology of Erving Goffman (1974). Goffman (1974, 21) famously 
defined it as a construction of meanings through which individuals ‘locate, perceive, identify, 
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and label’ elements of external reality. An important aspect of framing consists is that by 
interpreting social reality, individuals focus on some of its aspects while concealing others. 
Consequently, through framing, ‘actors not simply describe but create the world’ (Hajer 1993, 
44). In the post-positivist policy analysis, framing has received much attention because of a 
shared assumption that policy development critically depends on how the relevant political 
problem is defined or framed (Stone 1989). Framing, therefore, has an important role for 
public policy, because it involves formulating ‘the social meaning of an issue domain, where 
meaning implies not only what is at issue but what is to be done’ (Schön and Rein 1994; 
Hajer 1993, 1996). However, in legal analysis, let alone the analysis focusing on legal aspects 
of the use of biotechnological developments, this concept has received only marginal 
attention. An exception to it is the work of Smith (2016) who analyzed same-sex litigation in 
the United States and Canada using the concept of frame. She illustrated how in the debate 
over the problem of legality of same-sex marriage social movements in both countries used 
three frames, namely, the political right frame, the queer culture frame and the morality 
frame. She argued that due to political traditions, in both countries, the political right frame 
was successful and thus allowed the plaintiffs to win the case owing to the long-standing legal 
traditions in both countries in upholding civil rights claims. However, Smith did not focus on 
how different rights themselves can act as different frames.  
I suggest that in the Italian litigation for PGD, the right to have access to PGD was in 
fact framed as either of these two rights: the right to health and the right to reproductive self-
determination. Since through framing some aspects of social reality are made visible and 
others are concealed, framing the right to PGD as either of these rights also makes some 
aspects of social (or, for the purpose of this work, biological and, related to that, moral-
political) reality visible, while concealing others. Framing the right to PGD as a right to health 
conceals the importance of relational values of care and responsibility. In contrast, framing 
the access to PGD as a right to self-determination conceals the importance of embryos’ 
biological existence as an end in itself. 
For our discussion of the role of rights for regulating new biomedical technologies, 
this conclusion may imply several consequences. First, due to such indeterminacy of rights, 
when citizens seek to receive access to a particular biomedical technology, they may be 
surprised to find out that those values or those experiences, that the relevant technology could 
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protect and the protection of which they thought they are entitled to, are not or cannot be 
covered by the existing rights regime. For some, this partial outcome may look like a failure, 
particularly when some important values are not recognized through law. Second, participants 
may use rights strategically by framing their demand to a new technology in such a way that it 
would bring about the desired outcomes regarding the access to the relevant technology. For 
example, they can take into account the context such as the judicial doctrine in order to frame 
their experiences through rights in a strategically advantageous way. I will come back to the 
strategic use of rights in the next section.  
7.2.3. The double role of legal rights and the regulation of new biomedical technologies   
As I stated in the Introduction, according to the critical approach to rights, propounded for 
example, by Foucault and feminist legal scholar Wendy Brown, rights do not simply act as 
instruments that the right claimant freely uses to achieve their own objectives, such as the 
access to new technologies. Rather, rights have ‘political ambivalence’ (Golder 2013, 10) in 
that they ‘are both political tools for the contestation and alteration of mechanisms of power 
and simultaneously mechanisms of capture and inscription’ (Golder 2013, 6-7). As I argued in 
Chapter 5, the claim to and an ultimate guarantee by the judiciary of the women’s right to 
health also allowed plaintiffs to contest the power exercised by Parliament and at the same 
time imposed constraints on the plaintiffs in that they ‘constitute[d] the very identities of 
those who deploy them’ (Golder 2013, 7). What does this mean for our discussion of the role 
of rights in regulating biomedical advances?  
Reification of identities  
First, the definition of the plaintiff’s identity in a single court proceeding ‘will not be limited 
to the litigant asserting the right: they will instead be deployed to regulate all members of the 
group’ (Ford 2002, 56). Therefore, by configuring the subject of rights as a female patient, it 
would mean that, first, it would exclude male citizens from the category of subjects qualifying 
for access to PGD. Second, female citizens might be able to receive PGD, but only if they 
prove that PGD is needed to prevent negative impacts on their health by the health condition 
of the embryo. Hence, they will need to formally represent themselves as sick patients, for 
example, by providing the required proofs to fertility centers that their bodily or mental health 
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is indeed at risk. Similarly, they are dependent on an assessment of their health condition by 
the doctor and therefore, formally and officially, are not entitled to autonomously decide on 
whether or when to perform PGD. They are not ‘agents’ in the full sense of this word, as they 
are officially deprived of full decision-making power. Using the language of CLS, their 
identities as sick patients lacking full autonomy will be repeatedly reiterated in their 
encounters with doctors, and symbolically they will be represented as using PGD for 
therapeutic reasons. Importantly, women who did not participate in litigation will still have to 
follow these requirements: the disciplinary power of rights will affect not only the individual 
claimants, but the entire population, or that part of it that wants access to PGD. Biopolitics 
thus is exercised on the Italian citizenry through the disciplinary effects that 
bioconstitutionalism has in reifying the identities of rights-holders.  
Strategic use of rights  
Despite the reification of their identity as female patients, as I also showed in Chapter 5, 
women will probably still be able to receive a rather liberal access to PGD due to the ability 
of interpreting the ‘mental health’ justification broadly. For example, experiences such as 
anxiety and depression can be qualified as health issues: The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), for instance, treats them as mental disorders. 
Therefore, Italian women might make use of this broad definition of health as an escape route 
and perform PGD on the grounds that they choose. I suggest that this is an effect of the 
‘tactical’ or ‘instrumental’ use of rights in the litigation for PGD, performed by plaintiffs and 
by courts (Golder 2015, Foucault 2007). As Golder, building on the Foucauldian critique of 
rights, stated:  
[t]o employ law as a tactic is to approach it not as a substantive ideal or a normative system 
binding on all, but rather as an assemblage of power-knowledge available for appropriation by 
various social actors that can be, and is, put to varying uses. An instrumental deployment of 
law (or any other assemblage) is a kind of insubordinate, disobedient, and potentially 
subversive deployment that plays the game in a way that does not respect the stated purpose of 
the game and hence troubles and possibly undermines it (Golder 2015, 117). 
Thus, on the one hand, the need to guarantee the right to health might be seen as compatible 
with the intention of the state to recognize embryos as persons and therefore as subject of 
strong constitutional protection. On the other hand, the use of rights was an instrument 
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strategically deployed by those who disagreed with the biopolitical intentions of Parliament 
and wished to make use of new advances in science and technology to achieve their own 
goals. Thus, their instrumental value in achieving the desired social or legal ends is strong if 
they are deployed in a strategically ‘right’ way. This aspect of rights might therefore be taken 
into account by those who wish to ensure that new technologies will enable the ‘right as 
empowerment’ framework to win over competing discourses such as dignitarianism or ‘rights 
as constraint’.  
7.2.4. Private clinics, Parliament and courts: institutional setting and its influence on the 
regulation of new technologies through rights 
In this work, I showed that it matters a lot for the regulation of new technologies, not only 
their regulation through rights as such, but also the context in which these rights are 
exercised, discussed or claimed. In order to appreciate this importance, it is necessary, first, to 
see rights broadly as including not only positive rights but also the entitlements that make part 
of citizens’ identity and, second, to consider that rights shape the four poles of human 
existence within the state. Through these moves, it is possible to see how human life and its 
biological and moral aspects are recognized by the relevant state authorities and, hence, how 
they treat the role and impact of new technologies for the protection of these rights.  
First, speaking about private fertility clinics, we can see that here IVF and PGD were 
highly demanded because citizens’ vital rights were prioritized above all. In the situation of a 
non-existent state, that is, when it did not exercise any supervisory function, biomedicine, 
with its promises to give birth to healthy children, was reigning, shaping and fulfilling the 
entitlements of Italian patients. Second, in Parliament, both IVF and PGD were ostracized. 
The state qua Parliament saw them as threatening its duty to ensure the protection of its ‘little’ 
and ‘vulnerable’ unborn citizens and their rights. At the same time, biological existence of 
women was valued relatively low and their rights were deemed less significant for the state. 
The rights of both embryos and women received this particular degree of protection because 
of the influence of powerful moral actors such as the Catholic Church as well as due to the 
political ambitions of Italian political parties. Third, and finally, in courts, women’s rights 
were vindicated and PGD was reintroduced into Italian healthcare arrangements. This was 
done through acknowledging the importance of women’s health, which should take priority 
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over embryo’s life. However, only health was recognized as justifying access to PGD and not 
reproductive self-determination. Here, the court’s jurisprudence played a key role in 
pronouncing this judgment.  
What this triangulation of spaces where rights are claimed, exercised and conferred 
shows is the importance of an institutional setting where such practices take place for how the 
relationships between the state and its citizens, which concern the biological aspects of human 
existence, will be structured in the form of legal rights and how, respectively, this will affect 
the acceptability of new biomedical technologies. Arguably, the most liberal setting is a 
fertility clinic: here, the transformative power of biomedicine shapes ‘vital rights’ of citizens, 
inculcating freedom and choice into them and making them part of biological citizens’ 
identity. Parliament is prone to different political interests and influences of strong morality-
setting institutions such as the Catholic Church. Instead, courts are bound by legal precedents, 
which ground ‘continuity scripts of the law’ (Rosenberg 1991, 11) and limit the judiciary’s 
discretion in terms of the type of judgments they could pronounce.  
An important aspect of how rights figured in these three spaces is that they were 
represented as some inalienable entitlements of individuals that should be translated into the 
country’s positive law. Citizens were performing PGD because they thought they had this 
entitlement and, in courts, referred to the Constitution as legalizing this inalienable 
entitlement. Parliament also referred to the Constitution as well as to natural rights of 
embryos. The Constitutional Court built its judgment on a particular interpretation of the 
Constitution, which legalizes inalienable rights of Italian citizens (Italian Constitution; 
Barsotti et al 2015). In this way, all the involved actors were implementing ‘outside’ rights 
into positive law, seeking to achieve a just political order. Indeed, exactly such natural rights, 
whose existence is independent on state power and positive law, have been the underlying 
idea behind the international human rights regime and national constititutional law, 
particularly, in Italy (Italian Constitution; Barsotti et al 2015). However, as I sought to show 
in this work, in Italy, the appeal to such inalienable rights did not lead to a single decision 
about how they should be defined and translated into policy and hence regulate PGD. As a 
result, as this work shows, the appeal to natural (or inalienable rights) in bioconstitutional 
debates may expose life to a decision-making process with inherently unpredictable outcomes 
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and boil down to a debate about subjective normative or political commitments or interests of 
those who participate in the debate. 
7.2.5. Vital rights, ‘biological citizens’ and the regulation of new biomedical technologies 
I stated in the Introduction that anthropologists and social scientists have concluded that the 
simultaneous development of a neoliberal form of government and the development of 
biomedical practices in ‘advanced liberal democracies’ led to the emergence of a particular 
type of identity (Rose 2006). This identity includes ‘vital rights’, or the assumption that one 
has an entitlement to claim the protection of one’s right to health and life vis-à-vis the state, 
engage in political activism for funding a particular type of research, etc., as a key 
component. The development of Italian fertility treatment practices, regardless of their vexed 
legal existence, also took this route.  
I suggest that this view on ‘vital rights’ as elements of personal and collective 
identities may mean that posing the question whether rights are a ‘right’ instrument of 
regulating new technologies may be inappropriate in the first place. Since identities, including 
the assumptions about one’s rights, are an outcome of the mutual constitution of personhood 
and the state, the problem then is not whether rights can be ‘law’s hope technology’, but 
whether broader political processes, producing a particular type of identity and rights, should 
be judged as positive. The productive assessment of rights and their role for the regulation of 
new biomedical technologies can only be performed if the entire socio-political landscape is 
taken into consideration. In other words, such rights as the right to access new biomedical 
technologies or the right to practice them will be considered ‘right’ as long as the neoliberal 
form of governance is regarded as a preferred form of governance. New biomedical 
technologies such as PGD take the central stage in this neoliberal form of governance because 
the exercise of ‘vital rights’, which are an essential part of this form of governance, in fact 
presupposes and favors their use.   
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Summary 
1. Background, aim and research questions  
The contemporary development of practices of law and policy-making making related to 
biomedical issues, e.g. the UNESCO set of declarations on genetics, bioethics and human 
rights, illustrates that in an era where new biomedical practices and technologies cause much 
fear and anxiety, it is through the appeal to rights that citizens seek to shield themselves 
against potentially dangerous new technologies. 
The main objective of this work is to explore how constitutional rights figure in social 
controversies around new biomedical technologies and to highlight the possible advantages, 
problems and difficulties that the use of rights as benchmarks for their regulation involves. It 
does so by drawing on the concept of bioconstitutionalism. Bioconstitutionalism builds upon 
the ideas from science and technology studies, the Foucauldian critique of state and power, 
and the critical approach to legal rights, to analyze the influence of new biomedical practices 
and technologies on the construction of legal personhood, subjectivity, constitutional rights, 
citizenship, and the problems of legitimacy and accountability. Drawing on 
bioconstitutionalism research, this thesis seeks to address the problems related to the use of 
rights as benchmarks for the development of new biomedical technologies and practices, 
thereby also contributing to the further development of bioconstitutionalism research.   
To address this issue, this work is mainly based on a case study: the exploration of a 
social controversy around a technology known as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in 
Italy. Together with other reproductive technologies, PGD had been freely practiced for a 
long time up to 2004, when the Italian Parliament passed a law on medically assisted 
reproduction (Law 40/2004) and prohibited many reproductive technologies, including PGD. 
This was considered necessary to protect the rights of human embryos created through IVF, 
which were granted legal personhood and turned into ‘citizen subjects’ by Law 40/2004. 
However, the adoption of the Law was followed by a massive litigation campaign initiated by 
Italian citizens who had predispositions to various genetic diseases and who were supported 
by patient and scientific associations. As a result, in a series of decisions spanning over a 
decade, the Italian Constitutional Court repealed the most contested provisions of the Law 
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that prohibited PGD, as they violated the right to health of Italian citizens. Exploring the 
different roles that rights have played in the Italian controversy, as well as the different ways 
in which they have been used, appealed to, shaped, and implemented, this work thus seeks to 
contribute to exploring the problems of using rights in social controversies around new 
biomedical technologies.  
To fulfil this aim, the thesis addresses two research questions.   
1. How have rights been used (identified, created, transformed, balanced, etc.) in the debate 
around PGD in Italy and how has this process been connected with the regulation of PGD? 
The use of the ‘how’ question in this work means that it will attempt to examine both the 
process of intertwining of rights and PGD (‘how’ as a trajectory and methods) and the result 
of the process (‘how’ as a form that this intertwining ultimately took).  
2. To what extent can rights ensure a ‘right’ regulation of new technologies? The tinge of 
normativity in the second question means that this work is an exercise in contextual self-
reflexivity. Rather than giving a definite answer in the abstract whether rights are a ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ tool for shaping new biomedical technologies such as PGD, it more seeks to elucidate 
possible advantages, problems and difficulties of using rights in regulating new biomedical 
technologies in their particular context.  
2. Different perspectives on PGD in Italy 
This work starts with a brief overview of the events surrounding PGD in Italy (Chapter 2). As 
such, it can serve as a point of reference for the reader to keep an overview of the different 
debates and events. Subsequently, the thesis analyzes three crucial instances in which rights 
have been involved and debated in the Italian PGD controversy, applying different conceptual 
lenses (Chapters 3-5), and puts it in a comparative perspective (Chapter 6).  
Chapter 3 explores how a rationality of government – natural rights as an external 
legitimation of political power – was employed to classify IVF embryos either as entities 
having a mere biological existence as zoē, or as human persons, capable of moral and political 
existence, as bios. It shows how through the appeal to natural rights of embryos, the latter 
were granted legal subjectivity and rights, and how the implementation of the restrictive 
regulation of assisted reproductive techniques (ART) to ensure the ‘making live and letting 
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die’ (Foucault 1980, 70) of these new Italian citizens was performed. In this way, it contends 
that natural rights have not been displaced by other rationalities for the exercise of political 
power, such as nature as an internal self-limitation of power.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the debate around the provisions of Law 40/2004 that prescribed 
a uniform method of performing IVF in Italian fertility clinics, namely to fertilize no more 
than three oocytes during one IVF cycle and to transfer all created embryos into the patient’s 
uterus simultaneously. Drawing on the concept of boundary-work (Gieryn 1983, 1995), it 
explores how the Italian Parliament justified the expansion of the jurisdictional powers of the 
State into a domain traditionally occupied by the medical profession, namely, the prescription 
of treatment methods, and how the Italian Constitutional Court established and motivated the 
constitutional illegitimacy of the Parliament’s actions. It shows that the demarcation of the 
jurisdictional domains of the medical profession and the Italian State depended upon how the 
latter tipped the balance between the conflicting rights of IVF embryos and the rights of adult 
Italian citizens, and how the procedures of embryo surplus production and cryopreservation 
acted as a terrain where both the State and the medical profession came to defend their 
interests. 
Chapter 5 explores the Italian litigation for access to PGD as an example of biological 
citizenship. It pays particular attention to how exactly the interests of citizens have been 
recognized through rights litigation and therefore engages with the critical approach to rights. 
It shows that the biological citizens’ ‘vital rights’ that litigants claimed vis-à-vis the state in 
Italy were only partially recognized; however, this was so not because the existing relations of 
power affected how individualistic rights are balanced, but because certain important societal 
values, namely a high value accorded to unborn life, as consolidated in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of Italy, prevented the participants of the debate from successfully 
reconceptualizing the right to PGD from an individualistic into a more relational one. 
Chapter 6 puts the Italian controversy on PGD in a comparative perspective and 
compares the ways in which Germany and Italy – countries with comparably strong bioethical 
reservations against new biomedical technologies – debated and enacted regulations on IVF, 
human Embryo Stem Cell (hESC) research and PGD. It is directed towards analyzing human 
dignity because exactly the protection of human dignity, conceptualized as sanctity of life in 
Italy, was the main purpose for adopting the restrictive Law 40/2004. It explores the debate 
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on these technologies in Italy and Germany from a comparative perspective to shed light on 
when and under which circumstances the appeal to human dignity in public debates around 
new technological and scientific practices becomes problematic. It shows that in both 
countries, ‘human dignity as constraint’ played a key role in the political debate around the 
new ART and hESC research, mainly because these were framed as a potential assault on 
human dignity. Yet, the two countries differed in terms of their success to build policies 
regarding ART and hESC research upon the principle of human dignity. Two factors were 
responsible for this difference. The first factor was whether dignitarianism is the dominant 
bioethical perspective in the relevant country (which was the case in Germany but not in 
Italy). The second factor was the degree to which the regulators were willing to strike 
compromises with their opponents, particularly if dignitarianism was not the dominant 
bioethical perspective or was competing with other bioethical perspectives for regulatory 
relevance (and German regulators turned out more willing to agree on compromises than 
Italian regulators).  
 3. Conclusion  
Based on the previous chapters, Chapter 7 draws conclusions to answer the main research 
questions. It first concludes how rights figured in the debate on PGD and then discusses the 
advantages, problems and difficulties of using rights for regulating new biomedical 
technologies such as PGD. 
3.1. Governing life through rights 
Drawing upon the analysis performed in this work, I suggest that constitutional rights work as 
a strategy of intervention upon the biological existence of citizens, articulated in the form of 
claiming, attributing, implementing, or exercising constitutional rights and, as such, rights are 
a technology of power over life. The ways in which rights work include several important 
elements. First, rights bind and shape the four poles of human existence within the state: the 
physical and moral-political existence of human beings, on the one hand, and the individual 
subject and the state, on the other. Specifically, rights (such as the right to life, the right to 
health as well as the right to reproductive autonomy) represent that form of governing 
biological existence of individuals that also allows taking into account their political and 
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moral existence as ‘free’ but also relational beings. The granting of legal rights ‘from above’, 
when Parliament grants rights to new technoscientific entities (Chapter 3), or rights-claiming 
‘from below’, including the satisfaction of rights claims by the judiciary (Chapter 5), is a way 
of biopolitically governing a population in such a way that it simultaneously recognizes them 
as full-fledged members of the relevant political community, having connections with other 
members, and acknowledges the biological aspects of their existence.  
Further, in order to have significance, the realization of rights must be secured by the 
state, through either positive means (adoption of the necessary measures to ensure the 
realization of rights) or negative means (non-interference). Therefore, rights also connect 
individuals with the state, thus presupposing a particular type of statehood within which these 
rights exist. For example, the decision that embryos’ rights should be ensured and, as a result, 
biomedical developments that violate these rights be prohibited, turns the state into a more 
conservative and absolutist one than the state that decides not to establish moral truths 
through law. Similarly, it also shapes the boundaries of the state with other social institutions 
such as medicine. As Chapter 4 showed, the decision on whose right should take priority not 
only affected the balance between mothers’ and embryos’ rights, but also simultaneously 
shaped the locus of the boundary between the state and medical expertise.  
Finally, as this work showed, the governance of life through rights may include 
another important element: the appeal to legal rights as based upon some inalienable 
entitlements of individuals that they have due to the simple fact of being human and that do 
not depend on being enacted in positive law. However, this work showed that this appeal to 
natural (inalienable) entitlements is not unproblematic. Inalienable rights can be of quite 
different types with respect to the degree of transformation through biomedical technologies 
they imply or allow (e.g. ‘vital rights’ of biological citizens and natural rights of embryos). 
While similar in that they both can be regarded as inalienable entitlements of citizens (both 
born and unborn), they are also very different, particularly with respect to the degree of 
transformation of biological aspects of human life and health that they imply and with respect 
to the associated degree of acceptability of new biomedical technologies that make these 
changes possible.  
Moreover, the same entitlement can be defined differently by the partipants of the 
controversy. For example, this work showed that biological citizens’ ‘vital rights’ for citizens 
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themselves were relational rights because they favored the fulfillment of relational values and 
responsibilities. Instead, the Constitutional Court defined them as a type of individual rights. 
This points to the fact that the same inalienable right can be conceptualized differently in 
different institutional settings and by different parties invoking it, thereby leading to different 
conclusions which constitutional right is exactly at stake.  
3.2. Governing life through rights: difficulties and advantages of regulating new biomedical 
technologies through rights 
Based on the analysis in this work, I suggest there are several reasons why the use of rights 
for the regulation of new technologies may be problematic. The first problem that the use of 
rights as an instrument of governing new technologies may create concerns the fact that 
natural (inalienable) rights can be of two different types. The co-existence of these two types 
of rights has several consequences. First, it introduces an uncertainty into the debates on new 
technologies, as it is not clear which or whose rights the regulation of new technologies must 
seek to protect most. This uncertainty is similar to the twofold conceptualization of human 
dignity, as empowerment or as constraint. Second, and similarly to the problem of the twofold 
meaning of human dignity, the problem of regulatory range emerges. This suggests that the 
appeal to rights does not lead to one – permissive – outcome with respect to regulating new 
biomedical technologies as, for example, Brownsword suggested. In fact, because two 
different types of rights exist, they rather lead to a further debate about rights and the 
acceptability of new biomedical technologies rather than close it. As this work has shown, the 
debate can be quite extended, producing no long-term solutions.  
The second problem connected with the problematic nature of the use of rights in 
regulating new technologies is that when constitutional rights are claimed, discussed or 
accorded in courtrooms, their definitions and their building blocks do not preexist judicial 
review but, are, in contrast, its outcome. As this work showed, it was far from clear to the 
plaintiffs and Constitutional Court which exact inviolable right the Italian Constitution 
protected and which right the plaintiffs could claim. As a result, due to such indeterminacy of 
rights, when citizens seek to receive access to a particular biomedical technology through 
appealing to constitutional rights, they may be surprised to find out that those values or those 
experiences that the the use of the relevant technology could ensure and the protection of 
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which they thought they are entitled to, are not or cannot be covered by the existing rights 
regime. For some, this partial outcome may look like a failure, particularly when some 
important values, such as relational ones, are not recognized through law.  
The third aspect concerns the double role of rights. On the one hand, rights reify 
citizens’ identities and exercise disciplinary power, not only on those citizens who participate 
in litigation, but also on those who will be affected by the legal force of the pronounced 
judgment. For example, in the Italian controversy, female citizens’ identities as patients will 
be reiterated in their enounters with doctors and state authorities. On the other hand, 
participants may use rights strategically by framing their demand to a new technology in such 
a way that it will likely bring about the desired outcomes regarding their access to the relevant 
technology. As this work shows, despite the fact that, formally, Italian citizens’ demands were 
only partially recognized, they nevertheless will be able to have access to PGD on quite 
similar grounds as they had before Law 40/2004 was passed.  
The fourth aspect concerns the importance of the institutional setting in which 
constitutional rights are exercised, discussed or claimed for how the relationships between the 
state and its citizens, with respect to the biological aspects of human existence, will be 
structured in the form of legal rights and how, respectively, this will affect the acceptability of 
new biomedical technologies. As this work showed, in all the discussed spaces – fertility 
clinics, Parliament, and courts – rights figured as some inalienable entitlements of individuals 
that should be translated into the country’s positive law. However, and importantly, the 
appeal to such inalienable rights did not lead to a uniform decision about how they should be 
defined and translated into policy and hence regulate PGD. As a result, the appeal to natural 
(or inalienable rights) in bioconstitutional debates may expose life to a decision-making 
process with inherently unpredictable outcomes and boil down to a debate about subjective 
normative or political commitments or interests of those who participate in the debate. 
Finally, the fifth aspect concerns the fact that posing the question whether rights are a 
‘right’ instrument of regulating new technologies may be inappropriate in the first place. This 
particularly concerns ‘vital rights’ as elements of personal and collective identities. Since 
identities, including the assumptions about one’s rights, are an outcome of the mutual 
constitution of personhood and the state, the problem then is not whether rights are ‘right’, but 
whether broader political processes, producing a particular type of identity and rights, should 
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be judged as positive. The productive assessment of rights and their role for the regulation of 
new biomedical technologies can only be performed if the entire socio-political landscape is 
taken into consideration. In other words, such rights as the right to access new biomedical 
technologies or the right to practice them will be considered ‘right’ as long as the neoliberal 
form of governance is regarded as a preferred form of governance. New biomedical 
technologies such as PGD take the central stage in this neoliberal form of governance because 
the exercise of ‘vital rights’, which are an essential part of this form of governance, in fact 
presupposes and favors their use. 
 
 
 
 
